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The need to accommodate new technologies at an increasingly fast pace has led the judicial 
branch to become a key source of changes in patent policy in the United States. This dissertation 
examines the co-construction of patent policy and innovation strategy in the judicial branch of 
government. Its main contributions are to the economics of innovation literature and to the 
policy process literature.  
A long-lasting debate on the relationship between patents and innovation has led to a 
multitude of studies supporting each side of the debate in the consideration of the desirability 
of strong patents. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of conclusive empirical evidence mainly 
due to methodological challenges in estimating the impact of changes in patent strength. 
Leveraging a shock created by the US Supreme Court, I show that the common belief that 
weaker patents lead to fewer innovations is incorrect (for a specific aspect of patents), while 
accounting for heterogeneous patent-related strategies. Using a mixed-methods approach 
(interviews, court documents, and census data), I find that the arguments made in court mirror 
the debate in the academic literature and I show that the impact on innovation is contingent on 
firms’ characteristics and innovation strategies. Motivated by the heterogeneous impact of 
patent policy, stakeholders attempt to influence US Supreme Court decisions. I take 
advantage of this setting to address a gap in the policy process literature, which has neglected 
the judicial branch of government. This dissertation builds on perspectives from legal and 
political science literatures, examining policymaking processes in the US Supreme Court to 
incorporate the judicial branch of government in the corpus of policy process literature. 
Focusing on the role of stakeholders and how they use information strategically, I find 
evidence of the influence of different types of information at the two phases of the policy 




1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Courts have gained importance in patent policy as traditional policymaking processes 
(in the legislative and executive branches of government) struggle to adapt the patent 
system to new forms of innovation due to the increasingly fast pace of technological 
change. Since the 1980s, within a relatively static framework set by the two other 
branches of government, court rulings on legal disputes have continuously changed the 
strength of patents in the US. Over the past two decades, the patent policies adopted by 
the elected branches of government were the American Inventors Protection Act that 
included the 18 months disclosure in 2001 and the America Invents Act in 2011. The 
courts have made more frequent changes to the patent system: the Supreme Court alone 
has ruled over thirty patent-related cases since 2000, including decisions on the 
patentability of software and business methods (Bilski v. Kappos in 2010, Alice v. CLS 
in 2014), genes (Molecular Pathology v. Myriad in 2013), and other subjects.  
1.1 Economics of Innovation 
The socio-economic impact of these changes in patent strength have long been debated 
and are still controversial both among academics and practitioners (Arora et al., 2008; 
Boldrin and Levine, 2009; Budish et al., 2016; Cohen, 2005; Jaffe, 2000; Penrose, 1951; 
Sampat and Williams, 2019; Williams, 2017, 2016).  
The idea of granting temporary exclusive rights to inventors is consistent with 
Schumpeterian growth theory (Schumpeter, 1928, 1942). In the Schumpeterian model, 
growth is generated by the repetition of a creative destruction process: new products or 
processes are introduced, resulting in the opening of new markets. Innovators have 
monopoly power in these markets until the emergence of a new product/process that is 
sufficiently more competitive replaces the old ones. In this dynamic framework, the 
opportunity to acquire monopoly power and obtain associated rents by excluding others 
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is necessary to create an incentive to innovate. By using intellectual property (IP) rights 
such as patents, policymakers trading off the deadweight loss due to temporary 
monopolies for the social welfare gains resulting from increased incentives to innovate. 
Patents help address the Arrow information paradox faced by inventors (Arrow, 1962), 
in which inventors need to disclose knowledge to potential technology buyers while 
retaining the ability to obtain compensation for the knowledge they have produced. In 
addition, patents are also meant to induce knowledge spillovers by disclosing patented 
inventions to the public. Both of these functions are expected to enhance this cycle of 
growth.  
 Although there has never been a period of real consensus among scholars and 
policymakers, there have been relative swings in the general attitude towards the 
desirability of stronger or weaker patents. Patent policy changes aspects of patent 
strength: the scope of patenting, the breadth of interpretation of the claims, the ability 
to exclude infringers from using patented knowledge (Walsh et al., 2016), and other 
administrative aspects. Beginning with several studies published in the 1960s that 
primarily focused on established firms, economists have pointed to patents' inefficiency 
in providing incentives to invest in R&D, including in high-technology industries 
(Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). In a period starting in the 1980s , scholars favored strong 
patents for the protection they provide small and medium enterprises (SME), new firms, 
and research organizations engaging in technology transfer (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 
1998). In the policy realm, this period lasting until the 1990s was marked by events that 
strengthened patents in multiple ways. First, the Bayh-Dole Act adopted in 1980 
facilitated universities to take ownership of patents resulting from government-funded 
research projects. Second, the creation of the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) in 1982 unified judicial decision-making. Additionally, several court decisions 
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broadened patentable subject matter in areas such as software and business methods1 
and life science2. As a result, the success rate of patent holders in protecting patented 
knowledge significantly increased (Jaffe, 2000). Around the 2000s, the increasing 
strength of patents generated concern among scholars, leading to an opinion shift 
against strong patents (Cohen, 2005; Lerner, 2002). An important concern was the 
barrier to knowledge due to multiple aspects including the patenting of formerly 
publicly available knowledge due to the Bayh-Dole Act (Nelson, 2004), the 
fragmentation of knowledge into several patents associated with one invention in 
certain scientific fields (Galasso and Schankerman, 2010; Ziedonis, 2004), the need to 
compete within new patent-intensive behaviors such as patent portfolio races (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001), and more frequent and costly litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
2001).  
With non-practicing entities such as universities, government laboratories, and 
private firms patenting more actively, scholars and policymakers focused their attention 
on firms that relied on patent royalties without commercializing inventions. Following 
some high-profile patent disputes that resulted in high costs for the accused infringers,3 
there was a shift from empowering patent holders against infringers (who were seen as 
knowledge thieves) to doubting the good faith of patent holders and the culpability of 
alleged infringers. The literature is divided on the harm (Bessen and Meurer 2014, 
Lemley and Shapiro 2007) and benefit (Mcdonough, 2006; Steensma and Chari, 2016) 
resulting from these non-practicing entities.  
 
1 Diamond v. Diehr (1981) and State Street Bank and Trust v. Signature Financial 
Group (1998) 
2 Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) 
3 Polaroid v. Kodak in 1989 and NTP, inc. v. Research in Motion in 2005 
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This period was marked by several decisions that backtracked the range of 
patentable subject matter, as some subjects were judged as having questionable 
boundaries and were held responsible for the increase in legal disputes. This narrative 
towards patent holders is likely to have influenced policy decisions, consistent with a 
recent remark by the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO)4 in answering a former USPTO Chief Economist’s question regarding a key 
change needed in the patent system. These shifts are also perceived by industrial actors. 
“First, we need a change in the dialogue about IP (intellectual property). Policy 
starts from there, so it is a key issue. The negative narrative in the media  
towards patents impacts decisions by policymakers.” Andrei Iancu, Director of 
the USPTO (February 2019) 
“We can feel that this is a period of ‘retreat,’ of backtracking with protections 
that are less generous than before. It may have been excessive before, and it is 
perhaps becoming excessive in the other direction today.” (Interview about the 
US patent system with the chief IP officer of a French chemical manufacturing 
corporation, September 2016) 
The concomitance of this shift and the increasing role of the Supreme Court in patent 
policy in the 2000s (Holbrook, 2013) is not a coincidence. Both the academic literature 
and the media5 point out that the Supreme Court is stepping in because it perceives that 
the CAFC went beyond its objective of unifying the patent system and too far into 
strengthening patents (Groetken et al., 2008; Holbrook, 2004; Seidenberg, 2008; 
Shapiro, 2000). The Supreme Court believes that the “pendulum has swung too far” and 
 
4 “A Discussion with Andrei Iancu, Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual 
Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office” at the 
Scheller College of Business at Georgia Tech, February 25th 2019 







goes as far as stating that the CAFC “fundamentally misunderstands what it means to 
infringe”6 some types of patents. 
 
Whether changes in patent strength will stimulate or deter innovation is still an open 
debate among scholars today (Arora et al., 2008; Boldrin and Levine, 2009; Budish et 
al., 2016; Cohen, 2005; Jaffe, 2000; Penrose, 1951; Sampat and Williams, 2019; 
Williams, 2017, 2016) and creates uncertainty for innovators. Studies in the economics 
of innovation literature have provided extensive insights supporting both sides and help 
us understand various mechanisms that explain changes in patenting behavior. Recent 
work by Heidi Williams and her co-authors point out, however, that we still have a 
limited understanding of what these changes mean for innovation itself and investments 
in innovative activities (Budish et al., 2016; Sampat and Williams, 2019; Williams, 
2017). Because of the variety of ways in which innovation is produced across firms, 
most studies that have attempted to provide such insights have focused on particular 
technological areas, often pharmaceuticals. There is a need to examine the 
heterogeneous impact that patent policies have on different types of firms because, as 
demonstrated by the data in Chapter 3, different types of innovators have adverse 
positions and high stakes when it comes to patent policy. In addition, studies estimating 
the impact of changes in patent strength face challenges related to identification such 
as the controlling of rival hypotheses such as technical breakthrough, regulatory capture, 
and industry- or country-level changes (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 
1999). Lastly, this literature also faces measurement issues, since publicly available 
archival data consist mainly in patents from which inferences and assumptions are being 
 
6 p. 5 in the opinion of the Supreme Court delivered by Supreme Court Justice Samuel 
Alito for the Limelight v. Akamai Technologies case (572 U.S. 915) in 2014 
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made on innovation despite the wide disparity in how patents are used. This dissertation 
aims to contribute to the theoretical debate on the relationship between patents and 
innovation by filling those theoretical and empirical gaps in the economics of 
innovation literature. 
1.2 Policy Process Literature 
In this setting, the US Supreme Court became a central policymaking actor starting in 
the 2000s (Holbrook, 2013). Decision-making requires legal knowledge as well as 
knowledge about technology and the economic strategy driving patenting behavior. 
This creates a situation of asymmetry of information. Stakeholders that develop cutting-
edge technology and use patents in their strategy participate in Supreme Court cases, as 
litigants or amici (hereinafter together referred to as “stakeholders”), by presenting their 
arguments to the Court. Despite the risk of regulatory capture, Supreme Court Justices 
have incentives to rely on the information provided by stakeholders in order to 
understand the problems in question and make rulings that will solve them. Therefore, 
an additional empirical objective of this dissertation is to provide insights on the role of 
stakeholders and the information they provide on patent policy made in the Supreme 
Court. 
Theories of the policy process have focused on the executive and legislative 
branches of government (Sabatier and Weible, 2014) and have largely ignored 
policymaking by the judicial branch, even though courts were acknowledged as 
policymakers as early as the 1950s by legal and economic scholars (Dahl, 1957; Epstein 
et al., 1989; Gely and Spiller, 1989; McCubbins et al., 2005, 1994a). In an article on 
the influence of stakeholders and expert information on government, some of the central 
scholars in the policy process literature dismiss the courts as irrelevant. In their view, 
settings in which stakeholders attempt to influence the government’s decisions through 
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decision-making include “legislative committees and subcommittees, courts, 
executives, and administrative agencies” (Weible et al., 2010, p.525). However, the 
courts are not viewed as a setting in which “substantive” policymaking occurs because 
“courts usually resolve procedural issues not substantive disputes” (Weible et al., 2010, 
p.525). 
In addition, while there is a popular belief that courts are apolitical and impartial, 
the legal and political science literature unequivocally rejects this naïve belief regarding 
the Supreme Court. Given that Justices are appointed by presidents who have strong 
political orientations and policy agendas, it is not surprising that the Justices’ behavior 
also reflects some policy preferences (Dahl, 1957; Martin and Quinn, 2007; Segal and 
Spaeth, 2002). Nevertheless, this may explain the lack of focus on the judicial court in 
theories of the policy process (Sabatier and Weible, 2014).  
 Regardless of the reason, the policy process literature has not sufficiently 
considered the courts. The policy process has been described as being composed of two 
key phases: agenda setting and policymaking.  
Agenda setting is an important step in the policy process: “Choosing among 
problems is the greatest dilemma facing any government” (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2015, p. 40). Agenda setting by a governmental organization involves identifying a 
situation as a problem that the organization has a role in addressing (Kingdon, 1995). 
The governmental organization’s action is determined by this step in which it chooses 
issues for which it will allocate its attention (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005).  
The policymaking phase consists of searching and choosing among alternative 
solutions to solve a problem (Kingdon, 1995). Policy problems are often relatively 
complex. As a result, a significant amount of information and a high level of expertise 
are needed (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015; Moe, 1995). Policy problems are also 
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complex in the sense that solutions adopted are likely to impact multiple groups of 
stakeholders. As a result, given that policymakers have resources and cognitive 
limitations in collecting and processing the adequate information and that stakeholders 
have incentives to influence the outcome of policymaking, stakeholders provide 
information to policymakers when the policymaking process allows it. While there is a 
risk of regulatory capture in using information provided by stakeholders driven by 
private interests, there are clear benefits for the policymakers in having monitoring costs 
subsidized; when several competing entities monitor an issue, they provide higher-
quality information at lower costs (De Figueiredo et al., 1999).  
While these two phases are often conceived of as consecutive, the difficulty in 
obtaining sufficient information to understand a policy problem creates a “chicken and 
egg” situation. In order to understand the problem sufficiently to decide whether it 
should be an agenda item, information is needed. However, collecting information is 
costly, and the resources required to collect it are allocated only if the situation is 
identified as an important enough problem and is therefore on an agenda. Consequently, 
both phases often occur in a simultaneous manner and problems are sometimes 
identified as agenda items because available solutions receive attention first 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2015; Cohen et al., 1972; Kingdon, 1995). This simultaneity 
creates a challenge in obtaining empirical evidence for the factors that influence each 
phase.  
Both phases of the policy process have been examined extensively in the policy 
process literature. Theories including the punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner 
et al., 2014; True et al., 1999), theories of policy learning (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 
1993; Nelson et al., 1987; Sabatier, 1988; Weiss, 1977, 1993, 1980), and the advocacy 
coalition framework (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2015; Weible, 2007) have provided 
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conceptual frameworks with which to consider the role of stakeholders and information 
in the policy process. Recent work by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) has discussed the 
role of two types of information at each phase. The authors define the notion of entropic 
information as having high diversity in content supported by various sources. This type 
of information is viewed as useful at the agenda setting phase, as it gives policymakers 
a comprehensive view from which to better choose problems on which to focus. Expert 
information, on the other hand, is more useful at the policymaking phase so that 
informed decisions can be made about complex problems and alternative solutions to 
adopt the best policy.  
Baumgartner and Jones (2015) point out the lack of empirical evidence in this 
area and undertake steps to fill this gap using extensive historical data at the local, state, 
and federal budget levels. However, the study is not able to overcome the traditional 
issues faced by most studies examining the role of stakeholders and information in 
policymaking in isolating causal mechanisms (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014; Keim 
and Baysinger, 1988) because it relies mainly on sets of budget data in the elected 
branches of government. Limitations arise when policy outcomes are linked to 
stakeholders’ activities that are only partially observable. Empirical evidence on the 
relationship between stakeholders and policymakers suffers from traditional challenges, 
which are applicable broadly to the policy literature but also non-market strategy studies 
in the management literature. Isolating causal mechanisms and providing empirical 
evidence proves difficult (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015; de Figueiredo and Richter, 
2014; Keim and Baysinger, 1988). Some of the key reasons are related to the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of studies focus exclusively on the executive and legislative 
branches of government in which: 1) there is little variation in the lobbying expenditure 
of firms that lobby and certain types of benefits, such as government contracts providing 
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stable benefits over time; 2) the probability of having omitted variables is significant 
given that interactions in terms of frequency and content are not fully disclosed and 
outcomes of various types are difficult to measure and compare; and 3) policies often 
aggregate decisions on multiple aspects and it may be difficult to tie the results to 
lobbying actions. 
When policy is made through the judicial branch, one or a small number of 
entities can bring an issue to the policy agenda by starting a lawsuit; this process moves 
quickly relative to traditional policy processes (Sabatier and Weible, 2014). For 
contentious cases, the parties can petition the Supreme Court. Like other policymaking 
settings, the Supreme Court has discretion over accepting the issue on their agenda 
(grant of certiorari). Stakeholders other than the litigants can also influence these 
decisions. Chien (2010) finds that the existence of an amicus brief has a significant 
positive effect in the petition phase. In addition, participating in the policy process in 
court presents a lower barrier of entry than lobbying in other branches of the 
government, since participating as an amici requires less than USD20,000 (Caldeira and 
Wright, 1988; Chien, 2010). This process is somewhat adapted to the multiple-stream 
theory that explains the policymaking process as actors taking advantage of a policy 
window (a lawsuit) to bring a problem to light and bring proposed solutions to the 
attention of the decision-makers (the Supreme Court) (Kingdon, 1995). A key 
difference is that the policymaker is not free to choose from any problems, as there are 
a limited set of problems (petitions) compared to those considered by the elected 
branches of government, which are free to address any issue.  
Once an issue is on the policy agenda, policymakers design a solution and 
stakeholders advocate for their interests. In this phase, scholars have focused on the risk 
and existence of situations of capture that could lead to suboptimal policies. Given that 
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individuals and organizations have a bounded rationality and diverse objectives, amicus 
briefs are rarely neutral and are instead a tool of advocacy (Krislov, 1963). In this phase, 
similar to the elected branches of government, Supreme Court Justices as policymakers 
can be faced with a wide variety of arguments and stakeholders through party and 
amicus briefs. However, the key difference is that while the arguments supporting their 
final decision can be diverse, the set of policy choices is much more restricted than in 
the elected branches of government. The Supreme Court rules in favor of either the 
petitioner(s) or the respondent(s). This decision is not simply binary, as the 
argumentation in the opinion can provide nuance in how the Court recommends 
enforcing their decision. Nevertheless, the set of policy solutions that can be adopted to 
solve problems on their agenda is limited relative to those considered by the elected 
branches of government.  
This dissertation extends a theory of the policy process (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2015) focused on the role of stakeholders and information to the judicial branch of 
government. In addition, the dissertation makes an empirical contribution to the policy 
process literature by taking advantage of the particular features of the policy process in 
the Supreme Court, such as the clear separation of the two phases and the observability 
of interactions between stakeholders and policymakers. 
 To achieve this objective, I rely on the legal and political science literature that 
provide extensive insights on the agenda setting phase (among others: Black & Owens, 
2009; Caldeira & Wright, 1988) and the policy selection phase (among others: Johnson, 
1997; Segal and Spaeth, 2002) in the Supreme Court. Scholars have examined factors 
that affect those two phases, such as the Justices’ preferences (Baum, 1977; Harvey and 
Woodruff, 2013) and the influence of stakeholders as litigants (Black and Boyd, 2012) 
and as amici (Paul M Collins, 2007; Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997). Scholars have also 
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studied the role of information brought by these stakeholders in Supreme Court 
decisions (Cameron et al., 2000; Larsen, 2012; Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997). This 
literature provides abundant insights on which to build a theory of the policy process in 
the judicial branch of government. However, the legal and political science literature 
overlooks the nuances in how different types of information are likely to influence the 
Justices. Therefore, the dissertation also aims to contribute to the legal literature.  
To provide a deeper discussion of the role of stakeholders and information, I rely 
on other streams of the literature that have examined the mechanisms through which 
stakeholders can influence policymakers’ decisions using information. In the policy 
learning literature, information is first thought as “informing” or “enlightening” 
policymakers. To alter policymakers’ beliefs, this influence is likely to occur through a 
continuous accumulation of evidence over long periods of time (Daviter, 2015; Sabatier, 
1978; Weiss, 1977). Insights from the social movement literature indicate that expert 
information can have a significant effect on skeptical decision makers (Ganz and Soule, 
2019). Politicians need to rely on experts in the natural and social sciences to save costs 
in acquiring the knowledge and monitoring new information given the breadth and 
uncertainty of complex policy issues (Moe, 1995). According to the well-established 
organizational learning literature, when there is information asymmetry, political 
coalitions can use information as a source of institutional power (Cyert and March, 1963; 
March, 1962). Therefore, better-informed stakeholders may use information 
strategically to shift policymakers’ attention and reframe policy problems to their 
advantage (Daviter, 2015; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Policymakers, particularly 
the Supreme Court, have incentives to make decisions that are perceived as legitimate. 
As a result, legitimacy is a resource that allows stakeholders to obtain more influence 
on the attention of policymakers (Deephouse et al., 2017; Jia, 2017; Jia and Mayer, 
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2015; Suchman, 1995). This dissertation unpacks the effect of using information as 
knowledge and as a source of legitimacy.  
1.3 Goals of This Dissertation 
This dissertation has four primary objectives. First, the dissertation aims to improve our 
understanding of the recent phenomenon of patent policymaking in the Supreme Court. 
The empirical understanding of this phenomenon is important for policymakers and 
stakeholders that have an interest in innovation and patents.  
 A second key objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the innovation 
strategy literature by improving our understanding of the heterogeneous impact of 
patent policies of different stakeholders. There is still controversy regarding the impact 
of the strength of patents on innovation. The debate has been stymied by difficulties in 
understanding the effect of various facets of patent policy. I focus on the impact of a 
major change in patent policy made by the Supreme Court. I propose an empirical 
strategy to overcome the potential endogeneity issue from stakeholders’ participation 
in influencing the decision. In addition, I examine the flurry of insights in the existing 
literature on patent strength in light of the arguments made by stakeholders during the 
process of making this policy decision. This part of the dissertation improves our 
understanding of how courts shape the patent system by (1) examining the 
heterogeneous impact of these decisions on the rate and direction of firms’ innovative 
activities and (2) showing the incentives to influence the direction of patent policy 
motivated by this heterogeneity.  
A third key objective is to provide a starting point for incorporating the judicial 
branch of government in the corpus of policy process literature. Focusing on the theory 
by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) that explains the role of different types of information 
at different phases of the policy process, I discuss its generalizability to policymaking 
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in the Supreme Court by relying on existing insights from the legal literature. By 
conducting this exercise and using insights from the policy learning literature, the social 
movement literature, and organizational learning theory, this dissertation also 
introduces some nuance in the view proposed by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) on the 
role of information in the policy process. 
Lastly, the fourth key objective of the dissertation is to provide empirical 
evidence supporting or refuting the above theoretical contribution in a way that 
overcomes the traditional empirical challenges laid out earlier. This dissertation 
presents the context of patent-related Supreme Court cases over 2000-2015 as a setting 
that provides multiple advantages to accomplish that objective. Exchanges of 
information between stakeholders and policymakers are observable and recorded in the 
format of court briefs, as opposed to mostly unobservable interactions through lobbying 
in the legislative and executive branches. In addition, the relatively standardized format 
of legal precedent citations and citations of other external documents in stakeholders’ 
briefs and the Supreme Court opinion rendering the final decision provide a unique 
opportunity to track whether information provided by participants affects the final 
decision. Some of the other key advantages of this setting are that patent decisions have 
remained so far relatively apolitical (Sag et al., 2009), so focusing on patent policy 
allows the observation of the role of influence beyond party affiliation. An additional 
advantage is the ability to distinguish three policy topics regarding patent strength 
(patentability, breadth of claims, and ability to exclude), which are stable over time.  
This dissertation is organized as follows. First, Chapter 2 serves as a primer on 
policymaking in the Supreme Court. This chapter presents the process of case review 
in the Supreme Court as well as the archival records on each of these cases. This chapter 
aims to familiarize the reader with the data and empirical setting used throughout this 
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dissertation to support theoretical contributions with empirical evidence, in order to be 
able to engage more deeply throughout the rest of the dissertation. 
 Next, Chapter 3 is grounded in the literature on the relationship between patent 
strength and firm innovation, and focuses on how patents’ provision of the ability to 
exclude affects the rate and direction of innovation. This chapter provides theoretical 
and empirical insights on the long-debated relationship between patent strength and 
innovation. Leveraging a shock created by the US Supreme Court, it challenges the 
view that weaker patents lead to fewer innovations. To confront theories in the existing 
literature predicting changes in firm strategy leading to both increases and decreases in 
innovation, a mixed methods approach is used. I combine the analysis of court 
documents with quantitative estimations of the impact using a panel data set of patent 
and firm data to examine the mechanisms behind patent policymaking and firm strategy. 
I show that the common belief that weaker patents lead to fewer innovations is 
unfounded, while accounting for the heterogeneous patent-related strategies. 
 Motivated by Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 I examine the relationship between 
stakeholders who have incentives to influence patent policy and the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in the two phases of the policy process: agenda setting and policymaking. I 
focus on the effect of different types of information conveyed by the stakeholders to the 
policymakers and examine how their effect compares to the predictions made by 
Baumgartner and Jones (2015) based on settings traditionally considered by the policy 
process literature. I find that expertise is used to influence policymakers by providing 
legitimacy to a position, as opposed to influencing policymakers by enlightening them 
through expert knowledge. 
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 The concluding chapter, Chapter 5, discusses the key findings of this 
dissertation and its theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions as well as 
managerial and policy implications. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 PRIMER ON POLICY PROCESS IN THE COURT 
This chapter discusses the Supreme Court (henceforth also referred to as “the Court”), 
how it functions as an organization in the judicial system, as well as the Court’s 
relationship with other branches of government as a policymaker.  
2.1 Role of the Supreme Court in a Tripartite Government 
In theory, the US government is composed of three co-equal branches to separate 
executive, legislative, and judiciary power and to form a system of “checks” and 
“balances” to safeguard democracy. In practice, however, several aspects contribute to 
the perception of the judicial branch as the weakest or “least dangerous” branch 
(Hamilton et al., 1788). The Court’s jurisdiction and the number of Justices are not 
stated in the Constitution and can be modified by the elected branches of government. 
Another well-known interdependency is that the Supreme Court can rule on laws or 
actions taken by the two other branches of government if they are not constitutional. 
However, the court cannot initiate any action; it can only respond to cases that 
stakeholders bring to the court. Additionally, as head of the executive branch, the 
president appoints the Justices with the consent of the Senate.  
The power that allows the Supreme Court to make policy is called “judicial 
review.” This power gives the Court the power to examine and possibly invalidate the 
actions of the executive and legislative branches of government both at the federal and 
state levels.7 Using this power, the Court can also rule to decide how laws should be 
interpreted by lower courts in order to enforce policies uniformly across the nation. 
As the highest court in the judicial branch, the power of the Supreme Court to 
rule on cases is established by the Constitution. However, the concrete organization of 
 
7 Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/judicial_review 
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the ways in which the Supreme Court rules on cases was established by Congress in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. Initially, the Judiciary Act limited the Supreme Court’s powers 
to examining whether government officials are abiding by the law.8 The Supreme Court 
granted itself judicial review power in the Marbury v. Madison decision in 1803.  
The Supreme Court can use its powers to review congressional laws (statutes), 
state actions (by relying on the Supremacy clause in the Constitution), federal 
bureaucratic agencies, and presidential actions. As a result, the Marbury v. Madison 
decision allowed Judges to make laws in areas that overlap with the executive and 
legislative branches of government. In practice, however, the Supreme Court is 
reluctant to taking actions that could be perceived as political, such as interfering with 
statutes and with presidential actions, especially on national security issues. While the 
power of judicial review was not included in the US Constitution, its desirability was 
expressed by some of the Constitution’s authors:  
“A Constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental 
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the 
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there 
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has 
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in 
other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute.” Alexander 
Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton et al., 1788) 
Using the power of judicial review, the Supreme Court makes laws by setting 
precedents. Decisions made by the Supreme Court are binding to lower courts. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court is able to make laws by setting precedents without re-
writing laws made by the other branches of government. These precedents are only 
binding in court, not in the executive or legislative branches. Nevertheless, they do 





The Supreme Court does not have enforcement power. As a result, it is possible 
for a president to refuse the orders of the Supreme Court, which occurred for example 
in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). While such disregard for a 
Supreme Court decision has become highly unusual, this organizational structure makes 
the Supreme Court dependent on its legitimacy in the perception of the public and the 
elected branches of government. The Court aims to be viewed as impartial, and 
therefore independent from the other branches and their political partisanship, as 
decisions should be enforced regardless of the party in power. Therefore, decisions have 
to be supported with legitimate arguments because public perception may influence 
whether the elected branches of government are willing to enforce the Court’s decisions 
(Baum, 1977; Epstein et al., 1989; Gely and Spiller, 1989; McCubbins et al., 2005, 
1994b; Spiller and Gely, 1992; Spiller and Tiller, 1997).  
Court decisions follow the principle of “stare decisis,” which means to “let the 
decision stand.” This principle also means that while the Supreme Court can change 
precedent, it must justify any departure from the status quo. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court is to a certain extent constrained by its own precedents. 
2.2 Role of the Supreme Court in the Judicial System 
The Court system in the judicial branch of government is hierarchical. The US Supreme 
Court is the highest court of the judiciary, which is also comprised of federal courts and 
districts courts referred to as “lower courts” in comparison. Disputes that are brought 
to court can be handled on either the federal side or the state side. I focus on the Federal 
side that has jurisdiction over cases in which the law at issue is a federal law, treaties, 
or the US Constitution. Cases dealing with intellectual property issues fall into this 
category. The first level of courts on the Federal side is made of ninety-four US District 
Courts. The ruling of a US District Court can be appealed in a US Court of Appeals. In 
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this second level, the federal appeals courts are called circuit courts, and decisions in 
circuit courts are made by a panel of three judges. Twelve circuit courts are distributed 
regionally. Patent cases are handled by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC). Rulings of the federal courts of appeals can be appealed in the Supreme Court.  
 Cases handled by the judicial system represent a small proportion of all legal 
disputes. Examining the proportion of cases that are dropped among federal civil trials 
in 2002, Galanter (2004) found that about 1.8 percent of the cases were resolved by a 
court decision. Among patent cases over the period 2005-2010, 4.2% of the cases 
reached trial (Cotropia et al., 2017).  
2.3 Key Characteristics of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court is the highest court in the judicial system. Since 1869, the Court 
has been composed of eight associate Justices and one chief Justice. All Justices are 
nominated by the sitting President and confirmed by the Senate. Nominations are 
therefore made along party lines with strategic considerations for the orientation of the 
Justices already on the court and the constraints imposed by the Senate’s response 
(Moraski and Shipan, 1999). Once approved, a Supreme Court Justice is appointed for 
life.  
 The topics that have been tackled so far in Supreme Court cases can be 
categorized 9  into: attorney-related issues (e.g. disbarment, fees), civil rights (e.g. 
Constitutional, State jurisdiction, desegregation, employment discrimination, voting), 
criminal procedures (e.g. death penalty, discovery, jury instructions, firearms), due 
process (e.g. jurisdiction, prisoners’ and defendants’ rights), economic activity (e.g. 
antitrust, consumer protection, intellectual property, mergers, environmental protection, 
 
9 Categories used by www.oyez.org, website jointly created by the Cornell’s Legal 
Information Institute (LII), Justia, and Chicago-Kent College of law archiving and 
making the archive of the Supreme Court of the United States publicly available.  
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regulation of public utilities), federal taxation, federalism (e.g. federal-state ownership 
dispute, natural resources, pollution), First Amendment, interstate relations, judicial 
power, privacy, and unions. Rules governing the process of reviewing cases are detailed 
in a document entitled “Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States” (Supreme 
Court of the United States, 2017) written and updated10 by the Supreme Court since 
1845. 
 Cases are brought by litigants that petition the Supreme Court to review their 
case. When litigants petition for a writ of certiorari, they are asking the Supreme Court 
to agree to direct an inferior court to send the record for a case and conduct a judicial 
review. In addition to the petition, three other briefs can be filed by the litigants but are 
not mandatory. First, the respondent(s) can file a “brief in opposition,” arguing for a 
denial of the petition. They are expected to argue against the petition and also “address 
any perceived misstatement of fact or law in the petition” according to Rule 15 
(Supreme Court of the United States, 2017). Briefs in opposition to a petition are 
compulsory only in death penalty cases. Second, the brief in opposition can be followed 
by a response by the petitioner in a “reply brief for the petitioner(s).” Third, the 
respondent(s) can answer as well in a document called the “reply brief for the 
respondent(s).” 
Rule 10 (Supreme Court of the United States, 2017) determines the rules for 
selecting cases to review. The language of the rule is not clear-cut and explicitly leaves 
room for discretion on the Justices’ part: “review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter 
of right, but of judicial discretion.” Nevertheless, Rules do emphasize some aspects of 
procedures, including the fact that petitioning the Supreme Court should be a “last 
 
10 Rules are not updated in a systematic way. They have been updated six times since 
2000 and were updated three times in the 1990s. 
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resort.” Litigants should have already exhausted all the appeals at the district-level and 
federal-level courts. In addition, Rule 10 recommends reviewing cases in which lower 
appellate decisions present a conflict (Black and Boyd, 2012). This means that one of 
the high-level objectives when reviewing a case is to improve certainty and consistency 
in the law (Baum, 1993). In addition, the question must be “an important question” 
according to Rule 10 (Baum, 1993; Black and Boyd, 2012). Cases are accepted if four 
or more Justices are in favor of placing the issue on the Court’s agenda (sometimes 
referred to as the Rule of Four). The Court has no obligation to justify its decision at 
this phase. 
The number of cases that make their way in the judicial system up to a petition 
of the Supreme Court is between 7,000 and 8,000 cases per term.11 About a hundred of 
such cases were argued and decided each term over the period 2000-2015 (Table 1). 
Some petitions may be accepted but not argued if they are vacated in the grant, vacate, 
remand order (GVR order) due to a change in the legal circumstances such as a 
confession of error or a change in the law. Among cases that are decided in the Supreme 
Court, less than 2% are patent-related.12 The number of patent-related cases that the 
Supreme Court hears seems to be increasing compared to the number of such cases 
reviewed each year historically (Salmon, 2017). 
 
11 Source: https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx 
12 Patent-related cases were identified by selecting all Supreme Court cases that 
include the keyword “patent.” This list of cases was then narrowed down based on the 
case description in the Supreme Court opinions. Cases in which patents are mentioned 
but the issue at stake is unrelated to patents were excluded. The excluded cases were 
double-checked using the description of the case on www.oyez.org (website jointly 
created by the Cornell’s Legal Information Institute (LII), Justia, and Chicago-Kent 
College of law archiving and making the archive of the Supreme Court of the United 
States publicly available) and using the list of patent-related cases provided on 
writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (Blog on patent news and 
scholarship managed by Lisa Ouellette, Associated Professor at Stanford Law School, 
Michael Risch, Professor of Law at Villanova University and Camilla Hrdy, Assistant 




Table 1 Cases decided at the Supreme Court (term starting) 












Stakeholders trying to trigger a policy change by placing their problem on the Supreme 
Court’s agenda are the petitioner(s) and the amici arguing in favor of the petitioner(s). 
The respondent(s) and their advocates argue in favor of a rejection of the petition by the 
Supreme Court in order to maintain the lower court’s decision. The lower court’s 
decision is not necessarily the status quo. Arguments made in the Supreme Court often 
reach beyond the nature of the case before the court because the Supreme Court is not 
a court of error correction.  
The meaning of a denial of petition for a writ of certiorari cannot be interpreted 
in a consistent way, and the action of denying itself does not create a binding precedent. 
In some instances, the Supreme Court may deny a case because there is no need to 
modify the ruling made by the lower court. However, not all denials should be 
considered as an approval, as the Supreme Court points out in the case Missouri et al. 
v. Jenkins et al. (docket number 93-1823 in 1995). In addition, a denial is not an 
indication of the merits or demerits of a case, as stated by the Supreme Court in the case 
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc (338 U.S. 912).  
 If a case is granted a writ, the Supreme Court will review the case. Once a case 
is on the agenda of the Supreme Court, two briefs are always filed by the parties 
involved: a brief by the petitioner(s) must be filed within 45 days, after which the 
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respondent(s) has 30 days to file a brief in response. The two briefs can be followed by 
an additional but optional reply brief by the petitioner(s) and a reply brief by the 
respondent(s).  
Entities that are not parties in a case on the Supreme Court’s discussion list can 
participate as amici curiae (often referred to as simply “amicus”/“amici”), meaning 
“friend(s) of the court.” Entities that wish to argue in that capacity can file an amicus 
curiae brief (often referred to as simply “amicus brief”) with the consent of the party 
they support, at both the certiorari phase and the merits phase. Federal and state 
governments are not required to obtain this permission. Occasionally, the Court invites 
an amicus brief from the Solicitor General or an administrative agency. Rule 37 
indicates that “an amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant 
matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to 
the Court.” In addition, parties sometimes ask other entities to support their position 
with an amicus brief. Amici that have participated in the certiorari phase are under no 
obligation to participate in the merits phase. New amici can participate in the merits 
phase without having participated in the certiorari phase. The average number of 
amicus briefs and amici per case over 2000-2015 (Table 2) shows no clear temporal 
trend in amici participation. 
 
Table 2 Average number of amicus briefs and amici per case at the Supreme 
Court 
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The Justices can be assisted by clerks in reviewing documents. Associate Justices are 
allowed up to four clerks and Chief Justices can have up to five. Clerks are recent law 
school graduates that were at the top of their class. They usually serve for one or two 
years. Justices can decide whether to place their clerks in the cert pool and cases are 
assigned randomly among those clerks. For clerks of Justices who participate in the 
“cert pool,” a standard task is the review of the numerous petitions for certiorari to 
write memos summarizing the case. The legal literature finds that their influence on 
decisions is modest overall (Bonica and Chilton, 2019). Nevertheless, they can be 
influential in some legally significant or close decisions (Bonica and Chilton, 2019). 
 Once the Supreme Court has reviewed the documents on a case, a date is set for 
the oral arguments of the parties involved. Amicus curiae very rarely make oral 
arguments. Oral arguments are meant to “emphasize and clarify the written arguments 
in the briefs on the merits” (Rule 28). In addition, Rule 28 indicates that the litigants 
can assume that the Justices have read the briefs and discourage litigants from reading 
a “prepared text.” In practice, oral arguments last 30 minutes for each side and most of 
the time is spent answering the Justices’ questions. There is no clear rule regarding 
interactions during oral arguments, and the Justices’ speaking time is not evenly 
allocated. Justices Clarence Thomas, for example, is well-known to participate only in 
very rare occasions.  
 Rulings are made through voting; each of the nine Justices have one vote. In 
order for a decision to be official and binding, five out of nine Justices must agree on at 
least one argument that either “affirms” or “reverses” the lower court’s decision. This 
part of the decision is the one element that is binding as jurisprudence. The Supreme 
Court also decides on the consequence for the ruling of the lower court in the focal case. 
The Supreme Court can “vacate” it, which means making that judgement legally void, 
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and order to “remand” the decision, which means sending back the issue to the lower 
court for a new trial. This occurs mainly when the court has decided to overturn, and 
the lower court’s ruling is “reversed and remanded.” 
 The rulings of the Supreme Court are called opinions and are delivered in 
writing. There is no difference between a unanimous opinion and a non-unanimous 
opinion in the extent to which they are binding for lower courts and for future decisions 
of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, unanimous opinions, which represent about 36% 
of all decisions (based on the period 2000-2017) (Tuberville and Marcum, 2018), are 
perceived as stronger precedents (Davis and Reynolds, 2006). For example, scholars 
have found that unanimity can influence relations between the Court and the legislative 
branch: unanimous decisions reversing federal statute(s) are less likely to be met with 
counteractions by Congress (Meernik and Ignagni, 1994). Goldman (2006, p.219) 
argues that:  
“…a consensually decided case indicates that ‘objectively’ the case situation 
(either because of clear-cut precedent, or the straight-forward applicability of 
the statute, or constitutional provision to the facts of the case) offered little 
leeway for the judge and that institutional pressures inhibited an outcome other 
than that achieved.”  
Many cases are not decided unanimously because the court is ideologically divided: 63% 
of cases between 2000 and 2017 were not decided unanimously (Tuberville and 
Marcum, 2018). In such cases, the main opinion is written by the majority, and the 
Justices on the losing side of the case can write a dissenting opinion. Dissenting 
opinions have no force in the law. The legal literature finds that they are sometimes 
strategically used by Justices who write “spirited dissents” with the objective of 
providing arguments for potential future reversal of a decision of which they do not 
approve (Banks, 1999). 
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 Sometimes, Justices who have voted on the same side of a case write separate 
opinions when the arguments supporting their decision are different. “Plurality opinions” 
are written when more than half the Justices agree on the judgement but not on the 
rational supporting the judgement (Spriggs and Stras, 2011). In such situation, 
concurring opinion(s) are also made available. An example of plurality decision was 
the Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al. (573 U.S. 208) in 2014. 
Five Justices wrote the majority opinion (also called lead opinion), and four Justices 
wrote a separate concurring opinion in which they partly concurred with the rationale 
in the majority opinion and presented aspects on which they disagreed.  
By the principle of majoritarism followed by the Supreme Court, only the 
majority decision and its opinion are binding for lower courts. Plurality decisions can 
sometimes result in a decision with no majority opinion. In such situations, the decision 
has no binding precedential effect and is applicable only to the parties in the focal case 
(Kimura, 1992). None of the patent cases over the period 2000-2015 present such an 
outcome.  
2.4 The Supreme Court in the Literature 
Legal scholars and political scientists have long debated which internal and external 
factors influence decisions in courts (Baum, 1977; Epstein et al., 1989; Gely and Spiller, 
1989; McCubbins et al., 2005, 1994b; Spiller and Gely, 1992; Spiller and Tiller, 1997). 
From a policymaking point of view, the agenda-setting phase (the certiorari phase) and 
the policymaking phase (the merits phase) can be distinguished clearly in the Supreme 
Court. This section presents the constraints, incentives, and limitations the Supreme 
Court Justices face in each phase of the policy process.  
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2.4.1 Constraints 
Parties can petition the Supreme Court only after going through lower courts. As a result, 
the sample of cases that reach the agenda-setting phase are likely to be biased towards 
cases with parties that have the incentives and the resources to make a petition. In this 
phase, case selection is legally constrained by Article III of the US Constitution. This 
article limits the Supreme Court’s power to set their agenda based on jurisdiction and 
stipulates the need for cases to be the subject of an actual controversy, to be ripe, and 
to involve litigants that have standing. In theory, the implementation of case selection 
is based on Rule 10 (Supreme Court of the United States, 2017). Ulmer (1984) attempts 
to determine how conflicts predict grants of certiorari, while qualitatively assessing and 
excluding cases “in which a conflict is claimed but in which examination indicate no 
genuine inconsistency in outcomes or doctrine” (Feeney, 1975). Ulmer (1984) 
compares the predictive power of several variables referred to as an important “cue” for 
certiorari decisions (Songer, 1979), and finds conflict to be the most significant 
predictor of a grant. Concretely, a common case of conflict considered by the Supreme 
Court is a circuit split. In the case of patent cases, there is only one court: the CAFC. 
Therefore, circuit splits are not possible. However, another potentially relevant situation 
of conflict is the intra-circuit split in which the CAFC panel of three judges is not 
unanimous. The most prominent example in recent patent cases is the Alice Corporation 
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2011) decision. 
Lastly, conflict may also be indicated by a disagreement between the ruling of the 
District court and the ruling of the CAFC. Based on Rule 10, the Supreme Court seeks 
information to tease out “important and far-reaching” cases (Black and Boyd, 2012). In 
practice, the cases accepted by the Supreme Court are generally of two types. In the 
first type, the dispute is about an element of the US Constitution. The second type of 
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case is those in which the law does not provide a clear answer and the case is perceived 
by a majority of the Justices as having important socio-economic impact (Murphy, 
1964). The Court has no obligation to provide an explanation for its decisions at this 
phase. In sum, Rule 10 provides two main criteria in a language that leaves the Justices 
significant discretion to decide. 
The Justices also have discretion to interpret the Constitution and laws made by 
other branches of government in making their ruling in the merits phase. There are no 
official rules (Supreme Court of the United States, 2017) dictating how the final ruling 
should be made and what kind of arguments can justify a decision. Rule 10 implicitly 
provides some guidance by considering that a key goal is to seek a coherent body of 
law. Another aspect to note is that rules of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of the 
United States, 2017) do not give any instructions related to advancing the policy 
preferences of the Justices (Baum, 1993).  
As pointed out by Baumgartner and Jones (2015, p. 37), ambiguity in the 
Constitution is a desirable feature rather than a problem; this can be illustrated by the 
commencement address given by Justice David Souter to the class of 2010 at Harvard 
University. Justice Souter uses the example of the case of the Pentagon papers, in which 
the values of freedom of press are in tension with national security concerns, to illustrate 
the following point:  
“A choice may have to be made, not because language is vague but because the 
Constitution embodies the desire of the American people, like most people to 
have things both ways. […] These paired desires of ours can clash, and when 
they do a court is forced to choose between them, between one constitutional 
good and another one.”  
Laws adopted in the executive and legislative branches of government also reflect goals 
that are supported by at least part of the citizens, and these goals are very often in tension 
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with the desires of other citizens. The Supreme Court has the power to make policy by 
interpreting these laws in the judicial review process without rewriting them.   
Because of this apparent lack of constraint and accountability, legal studies have 
identified the Justices as seekers of legal policy, starting with the work of Murphy 
(1964). Within an institutional setting of existing laws and past decisions (precedents), 
Justices make legal policy decisions by establishing jurisprudence. However, despite 
having the power to strike down laws and reverse precedents in the merits phase, the 
Justices refrain from taking such actions lightly because of the constraints and 
incentives presented in section 2.4.1 and section 2.4.2 (among others: Baum, 1977; 
Black and Owens, 2009b; Caldeira et al., 1999; Epstein and Knight, 1998; Murphy, 
1964). 
Appointed Justices are often eminent lawyers who have been trained to reason 
within the existing laws and precedents (Baum, 1977): “all lawyers [and future justices] 
undergo law-school training that emphasizes the value of legally oriented judging.” 
In addition, the Supreme Court does not have enforcing power, and its main 
powers rest in the legitimacy of the institution (Murphy, 1964). Given the dependence 
of the Supreme Court’s power on legitimacy in dealing with the other branches of 
government, any departure from the status quo has to be carefully justified (Baum, 1977; 
Epstein et al., 1989; Gely and Spiller, 1989; McCubbins et al., 2005, 1994b; Spiller and 
Gely, 1992; Spiller and Tiller, 1997). The elected branches of government are likely to 
be influenced by public perception of the legitimacy of the Supreme Court decisions 
they are enforcing. A long-standing debate in the literature has been about the 
independence of the courts. Part of the literature points to characteristics of the system, 
such as the Justices’ appointment and tenure, that free the judges from political pressure, 
(Posner and Landes, 1975) while others view the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, 
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as a policymaking organ (Dahl, 1957). In this view, Justices behave as sophisticated, 
strategic actors (Caldeira et al., 1999; Epstein and Knight, 1998). Their choices are 
interdependent with aspects beyond their political preferences such as the preferences 
of fellow Justices, the executive and legislative branches of government, and the public 
(Epstein and Knight, 1998). Interactions between Justices at the certiorari phase, 
imposed by the Rule of Four applied to grant certiorari, have been documented by 
Epstein and Knight (1998), with behaviors such as defensively denying certiorari by 
anticipating unwanted outcomes in the merits phase or strategically leveraging the 
threat of dissenting in the merits phase. In sum, the legal literature points out that 
Justices have policy goals. However, in achieving these goals, legal considerations are 
far from being irrelevant in the Justices’ decision-making, and are instead rather central. 
Black and Owens (2009, p. 1062) find empirical evidence, using a sample of nondeath 
penalty petitions, that “at the intersection of law and politics, law is both a constraint 
on and an opportunity for Justices.” 
2.4.2 Incentives 
Within this environment of legal constraints and opportunities and while the judicial 
branch is theoretically apolitical, legal scholars consistently point out that a key driver 
of the Justices’ decisions are their policy preferences (Dahl, 1957; Martin and Quinn, 
2007; Segal and Spaeth, 2002). Given that Justices are appointed by a president with 
undeniable policy preferences, Dahl (1957) points out that “under any reasonable 
assumptions about the nature of the political process, it would appear to be somewhat 
naive to assume that the Supreme Court either would or could play the role of Galahad.”  
As Justice Frankfurter points out, many of the great justices who have left their 
mark had little to no prior judicial experience and were not anonymous and invisible 
enforcers of the law (Dahl, 1957; Frankfurter, 2006). Justice Frankfurter also highlights 
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the fact that the Supreme Court could not be influential in American politics if Justices 
were selected on their judicial qualities with no consideration for their policy 
preferences (Dahl, 1957).   
Justices have the incentive to push an agenda of legal policy (Epstein and Knight, 
1998; Martin and Quinn, 2002; Murphy, 1964; Segal and Spaeth, 2002) consistent with 
their preferences (Dahl, 1957; Martin and Quinn, 2007; Segal and Spaeth, 2002). In 
order to succeed, they need to consider both the desirability of the status quo (Bonneau 
et al., 2007; Hammond et al., 2005) and their preferences.  
Studies have found that the Justices’ voting behavior in the merits phase reflects 
their preferences (Martin and Quinn, 2007; Segal and Spaeth, 2002). For the agenda-
setting phase, there is no consensus among initial studies on the role of Justices’ legal 
and policy preferences (among others: Brenner and Krol, 1989; Caldeira and Wright, 
1988; Palmer, 1982). Later work introduces more nuance by examining ideological 
proximity between the Justices’ preferences and two outcomes: the predicted outcome 
on the merits phase (Caldeira et al., 1999) and the status quo (Bonneau et al., 2007; 
Hammond et al., 2005). Justices are individuals capable of making backward induction 
reasoning to elaborate strategies to shape legal policy (Epstein and Knight, 1998; Martin 
and Quinn, 2002; Segal and Spaeth, 2002). Black and Owens (2009, p. 1064) build on 
these findings to propose a model that takes into account the fact that “[Justices] should 
pay attention not just to where the Court will set policy, but how that policy will change 
the benefits they currently enjoy.” As a result, the likelihood of Justices granting 
certiorari depends on the relative proximity of their ideology with the expected 
outcomes on the merits phase and the status quo. If they are ideologically closer to the 
expected final decision, they are more likely to grant certiorari, while if they are 
ideologically closer to the status quo, they are more likely to deny it.  
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Given the importance of legitimacy for the Supreme Court, Justices seek to 
provide valid arguments to support their position and the final ruling of the Court as 
they advance their individual policy preferences. In addition, given the complexity of 
some decisions, litigants and amici are important actors that provide information to the 
Court (Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997). As a result, to be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 4, scholars have examined the influence of stakeholders through their presence 
(Chien, 2010), their status (Black and Boyd, 2012), and the information they bring to 
the court (Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997). Studies using plagiarism software have found 
evidence that the language of Supreme Court opinions are influenced by both parties’ 
briefs (Corley, 2011) and amicus briefs (Collins et al., 2015; Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 
1997). In addition to the content of the briefs, the literature has also found that 
participation itself influences the final ruling (Chien, 2010; Songer and Kuersten, 1995).    
Regardless of policy preferences, the following incentives can also drive the 
Justices’ behavior. First, Justices are likely to aspire to certainty and consistency in the 
law, as prescribed in Rule 10. The Supreme Court may grant certiorari because the 
Justices want to reverse a lower court’s decision when they assess that the decision is 
not in conformity with the legal doctrine (Kornhauser, 1992). This may occur when a 
lower court treats a case based on a set of rules that differs from the set of rules that the 
Supreme Court deems appropriate for the given case and for all cases of equivalent 
class. The Justices will have an incentive to accept the case on their policy agenda in 
order to rectify the discrepancy and ensure consistency in the law in their view. 
Second, Justices can decide to accept a case on their agenda in order to 
implement a longer-term strategy to have lower courts comply with this equivalence of 
classes. To force lower courts to comply, the Supreme Court has few motivational tools 
compared to common hierarchical superiors (who can promote, fire, change salaries, 
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etc.) (Cameron et al., 2000). The main leverage that can be used by the Supreme Court 
is related to status in judicial culture (Cameron et al., 2000). Lower court judges have 
incentives to avoid reversal by higher courts because “[f]requent reversals bring the 
derision of colleagues and a decline in professional status” (Perry, 1991).  
Lastly, Justices can accept to review cases even if they agree with the lower 
court’s decision. Justices occasionally perform “aggressive grants” and affirm a lower 
court’s decision in order to make it applicable at a national level (Cameron et al., 2000). 
These are clearer cases in which Justices seize opportunities to go beyond enforcement 
and actively create policies. Formal modelling of the Supreme Court behavior and 
empirical evidence have focused on the enforcement actions or failed to distinguish it 
from the creation actions of the Court (Cameron et al., 2000). 
2.4.3 Limitations 
In addition to constraints (mainly based on Article III of the US Constitution) and 
individual incentives, Justices have limitations that prevent them from making the most 
optimal decisions. Policymakers are boundedly rational human beings (Simon, 1972), 
and Supreme Court Justices are no exception. Policy problems are often complex (or 
“wicked”) (Rittel and Webber, 1973) and not well defined (Simon, 1973).  
 A full picture of the existing problems is needed for policymakers to decide 
where to allocate their attention and set an agenda (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015; Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2005). Nowadays, the Supreme Court typically receives 7,000-8,000 
petitions each term13 and each Justice is allowed four to five clerks per term. Even 
assuming that the nine Justices, each with four clerks, are able to work in parallel and 
split the cases (which is not possible, since several Justices need to agree to take a case), 
the caseload per person is over 150 petitions per term. The case overload of Supreme 
 
13 Source: www.supremecourt.gov 
 35 
Court Justices was already considered problematic when the number of petitions 
reached 4,000 in the 1970s (Griswold, 1974). Since humans have limited cognitive 
abilities to correctly process large amounts of information, there is a risk of the adverse 
effects of crowding out in the decision-making process. In addition, while the level of 
technicality of cases varies, many cases require technical knowledge that the Justices 
do not have. For example, some patent-related cases require an advanced understanding 
of technology and of the economic strategy underlying patenting behavior. As a result, 
making informed decisions often requires making an extensive effort of collecting and 
processing information under resources constraints. Anecdotal evidence that illustrates 
Justices’ lack of willingness to seek out expert knowledge related to patents is the fact 
that Supreme Court clerks are hired with prior experience in almost all federal court 
circuits, but only one clerk with CAFC experience has ever been hired (Dyk, 2016).  
Policymakers are part of governmental organizations, and the structure of these 
organizations also affects information processing (Simon, 1991). While organizations 
have larger capacities and resources to collect and analyze information than individuals, 
they still face tradeoffs between a costly but more exhaustive broad search and focusing 
early on key information to reduce costs at the expense of potentially missing important 
information (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007).  
Both individuals and organizations filter information through multiple biases 
when evaluating alternatives to make a policy decisions: bias against risky alternatives 
(Denrell and March, 2001), inconsistent and changing preferences (Tsetsos et al., 2012), 
biased perception of the problem itself, as well as evaluation of the alternatives 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Jones et al. (2003) point out that such frictions in 
information processing lead to long periods of stability in policymaking interrupted by 
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major punctuations of policy change due to new information, new actors, or important 
preference changes.  
2.5 Empirical Setting for Studying the Role of Stakeholders and Information 
This dissertation uses the setting of patent policy made in the Supreme Court as a setting 
to support theoretical contributions with empirical evidence in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4. In the Supreme Court, the agenda setting phase and the policymaking phase are 
distinct and interactions between the policymakers and stakeholders are recorded in 
court documents. In addition, as discussed in further detail in section 2.5.3, focusing on 
patent policy also provides several advantages for an empirical strategy because 1) 
patent-related issues are relatively non-partisan and cases are decided either 
unanimously or not along party lines and 2) there is high information asymmetry in 
knowledge on technology and patenting behavior. As a result, decisions are not 
predicted by partisanship and the role of stakeholders and information, particularly 
expertise, may play a role in influencing decisions, as stated in the Cochrane v. Deener, 
94 U.S. 780 (1877) opinion of the Court:  
"It would, perhaps, be desirable if all cases of this sort [i.e., patent cases] could 
be referred to a commission of intelligent experts and practical men to report 
their opinion thereon, with their reasons, for the final action of the court. … 
Neither courts nor ordinary juries are perfectly adapted to the investigation of 
mechanical and scientific questions." 
The following section provides key facts about patent policymaking and describes the 
information contained in court documents.  
2.5.1 Description of patent policymaking  
Patents are used by policymakers to trade off deadweight loss due to a temporary 
exclusive right with economic growth resulting from a higher rate of innovation 
(Schumpeter, 1942). The key challenge is to identify the level of patent strength that 
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enhances incentives to innovate and optimizes social welfare (Bessen and Raskind, 
1991).  
All three branches of the United States government are involved in patent 
policymaking. The executive branch acts mainly through the White House, the 
Department of Justice, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
Other agencies that tackle issues related to patents occasionally get involved, such as 
the National Institute of Health (NIH) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The 
legislative branch is represented by Congress, while the judicial branch involves the 
District Courts of the Federal circuit, the CAFC, and the Supreme Court.  
Concretely, since the 1990s, courts have been the primary policymakers in 
intellectual property (Chien, 2010) and the Supreme Court has been actively involved 
since about the year 2000 (Holbrook, 2013). Regarding patent policy, there are two 
obvious ways in which courts interact with the other branches of government. First, the 
Supreme Court occasionally redistributes power to the executive branch by requiring 
input generally from the Solicitor General and the USPTO for cases filed at the CAFC 
(Rai, 2012). Second, Congress has the ability to make structural adjustments that alter 
the jurisdiction of the courts (Spiller and Tiller, 1997). Also, although it is rarely used, 
Congress also has the power to overrule a court decision, such as in Roche Products v. 
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Bolar Pharmaceuticals14 and Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp15 (Holbrook, 
2007). 
Chien (2010) finds descriptive evidence that participation from the executive 
branch has an effect on decisions through amicus briefs. Between 1989 and 2019, the 
courts sided with the government in 90% of patent cases at the Supreme Court and 80% 
of patent cases in the Federal Circuit for which amicus briefs were filed on the merits, 
in the position-taking phase, by the Solicitor General and sometimes with the USPTO 
and other entities related to executive power (Chien, 2010). In comparison, in the merits 
phase of the 31 patent-related cases decided at the Supreme Court over the period 2000-
2015, the Supreme Court ruled 21 times (81%) in favor of the side supported by an 
entity related to the executive branch of government out of the 26 instances in which 
such an entity was a participant. With regard to the legislative branch, the literature 
provides anecdotal cases of the effect of the influence of Congress on court decisions 
in patent policy (Holbrook, 2007) but does not include empirical tests of the systematic 
existence of this relationship.  
 
14 Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals, 733 F.2d 858, 221 USPQ 937 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). The Supreme Court rejected the “experimental use” justification for the use of 
a patented chemical before patent expiration when the experimentation had a business 
purpose. In the focal case, a generic drug manufacturer experimented on patent 
knowledge to obtain FDA approval before the patent expired so that they would be 
able to compete on the market when the patent expired. The Supreme Court 
considered this behavior as patent infringement. Congress then passed the Hatch-
Waxman Act, modifying section 271-e-1 to permit such use of patented knowledge in 
experiments aimed at obtaining FDA approval. 
15 Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp. 406 U.S. 518 (1972). The Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of an accused infringer who had manufactured the components of 
a patented device but had exported and assembled the parts outside of the United 
States. Congress overruled this decision to adopt §271(f) to consider such behavior as 
patent infringement. Additionally, Congress adopted §271(f)(2) to expand the 
consideration of infringement as the “exportation of a component of a patented device 
with no substantial non-infringing use.” (Holbrook, 2007)   
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Burk and Lemley (2009) and Chien (2010) argue that the courts have used the 
flexibility of interpretation allowed by patent law to tailor decisions to different 
industries, aided by information provided by stakeholders in amicus briefs. However, 
these studies do not support these claims with empirical analyses that allow us to assess 
the extent to which patent policies, as enacted by the courts, favor one or another 
segment of firms.  
As the number of legal disputes concerning patents continuously increases, 
precedents set with decisions on these disputes occasionally change aspects of the 
strength of patents: the scope of patenting, the breadth of interpretation of the claims, 
and the ability to exclude infringers from using patented knowledge (Walsh et al., 2016) 
and other administrative aspects. There is no clear correct answer based on the law in 
many patent cases for the following reasons. First, boundaries in knowledge are fuzzier 
than property rights over tangible goods. Second, by definition, innovations come in 
various unpredictable forms to which the existing rules are not adapted. Lastly, the 
complexity in estimating the consequences of a decision increases because the types of 
entities involved in these disputes vary widely depending on the technology field, 
organizational structure, availability of resources, and business models. As a result, 
courts do not simply solve disputes between parties; they are often compelled to 
consider socio-economic and ethical implications. As a result, patent-related Supreme 
Court cases are likely to involve more knowledge asymmetry than the average Supreme 
Court case and Justices are therefore likely to rely on information in the stakeholders’ 
briefs.  
Because the ultimate goal of the patent system is to maximize public welfare, 
the groups that are affected by the system need to be considered. Chien (2010) and 
Caldeira and Wright (1988) point out that amicus briefs give the courts information 
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beyond the content of the briefs regarding the nature, the number, and the diversity of 
stakeholders in the case. Policymakers are likely to perceive a problem as having an 
important socio-economic impact on many entities if a large number of advocates 
mobilize. In patent cases, the presence of amicus briefs at the appellate level increases 
the probability that the Supreme Court will accept the case (Chien, 2010). As an 
extension of this reasoning, an increase in advocates for a position could be predicted 
to increase the perceived legitimacy of the arguments supporting that position. Caldeira 
and Wright (1990) find that for all types of cases at the Supreme Court, public interest 
law firms and citizen groups participate more at the merits phase than at the petition 
phase. In addition, they find that despite opportunities to save costs, amici seem to 
prefer to file separate briefs rather than cooperating. Therefore, interest groups seem to 
consider that there is value in the number of briefs filed on a position. Nevertheless, 
Chien (2010) finds that, for patent cases, the number of amici supporting a particular 
side has a significant positive effect on the side ultimately winning. In addition, she 
finds that consumer groups are underrepresented, which can be explained by their lack 
of organizational and knowledge resources compared to those of for-profit corporations. 
Although the financial threshold and acceptance conditions are low given the low cost 
of filing an amicus brief (less than USD20,000, according to Chien (2010) and Caldeira 
and Wright (1988)) and the high rate of acceptance by courts, the briefs do not 
proportionally represent affected groups. The rejection of an amicus brief is a very rare 
event: 91 out of the 832 requests (called “motions for leave to file amicus brief”) were 
rejected over the period from 1969 to 1981 (Caldeira and Wright, 1990). In addition, 
certain types of interest groups might have more weight on the decision. Lohmann 
(1993) points out that private firms are more likely to have the resources to engage in 
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mass political action and create a negative public perception of a governmental entity 
by complaining.  
In terms of the content of such briefs, Chien (2010) finds that on patent-related 
issues, amicus briefs are more likely to influence the Supreme Court by using new 
arguments rather than repeating legal arguments already mentioned by the parties. This 
is partly consistent with the findings of Black and Boyd (2012). Using four terms of 
Supreme Court nondeath penalty cases, Black and Boyd (2012) found that new 
arguments brought by amici influenced the agenda setting phase when amici reiterate 
the litigants’ arguments, and reinforce the position of the party they support. 
2.5.2 Data: Structure of court documents  
Opinions are published in the United States Reports, which are official reports of 
decisions published by the US government. Opinions are composed of the majority 
opinion followed by concurring or dissenting opinions if there are any. The opinions 
are preceded by a syllabus summarizing key facts of the case up to the Supreme Court’s 
decision.   
 The opinion section includes a header that provides the following information 
about the case (Figure 1). The header indicates the Supreme Court docket number, 
which is followed by the name of cases that contain information about the litigants: the 
name of the petitioner(s) followed by the term “petitioners.” Then, the name of the 
respondents is listed with the two sides separated by a “v.” indicating that the 
petitioner(s) and the respondent(s) are arguing against each other. Third, the date the 
ruling was decided by the Court is recorded. 
The main body of the opinion is composed of several parts. It starts with the 
name of the Justice delivering the majority opinion, followed by a short definition of 
the issue at stake. That paragraph is followed by the main arguments supporting the 
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majority opinion’s ruling. Although the structure is not systematic, it is very common 
for the argumentation to be divided into two sections with a first section summarizing 




Figure 1 Example of an opinion header 
 
 
The content and the order of the parties’ briefs are defined by Rule 14 and Rule 15 for 
the petition phase and Rule 24 for the merits phase (Supreme Court of the United States, 
2017), while Rule 37 gives instructions for amicus curiae briefs. All briefs first include 
(Figure 2 and Figure 3) a concise statement of the question at issue, a list of all 
participants involved in the brief along with information about the side they support (as 
party or amici), and the date of the brief. A table of contents follows alongside a list of 
citations. The list of citations includes a table of cited authorities (compulsory if the 
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petition exceeds 1,500 words), citations of the “official and unofficial reports of the 
opinions and orders entered by the courts or administrative agencies,” as well as 
references to “the constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes, ordinances, and 
regulations involved in the case.” Third, an argumentation supporting a review of the 
case by the Supreme Court is presented. The rules put an emphasis on conciseness and 
warn that a brief that does not comply with all the rules may be denied. In the 
argumentation section, a paragraph presenting a condensed “summary of the argument” 















Figure 3 Example of an amicus brief’s header 
 
 
Citations of legal precedents and external documents are used in this study. References 
to Supreme Court decisions follow a relatively standardized format. For example, eBay 
v. MercExchange is cited as 547 U.S. 388 (2006). This means that the case was decided 
in 2006 and that the opinion appears on page 388 of volume 547 of the United States 
Reports. Decisions may be published with a lag of several years.16 Therefore, citations 
sometimes refer to the unofficial Supreme Court Reporter that is published more 




the citation in the Supreme Court Reporter is 126 S. Ct. 1837. In the empirical sections 
of this dissertation, I use a table of correspondence between the two formats of citations, 
built manually using information on Westlaw, to convert all citations in Supreme Court 
Reporter format to the United States Reports format in order to identify unique 
decisions.  
 References to decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals also follow a 
standardized format. Precedential decisions are published in the Federal Reporter. For 
example, the citation of the CAFC case opposing eBay and MercExchange is 401 F.3d 
1323. “F.3d” indicates that the decision was published in 1993 or later in the Federal 
Reporter, Third series. Decisions published in the first series ranging from 1880 to 1924 
are cited with an “F.,” and the second series ranging from 1924 to 1993 are cited with 
“F.2d.” While some decisions that are not considered as precedents are sometimes cited 
by academics, they are not published in the Federal Reporter and will be excluded from 
the empirical analyses in this thesis.  
 Decisions in the US District Court are published in the Federal Supplement and 
are marked with variations of “F. Supp”; “F. Supp” refers to the first series ranging 
from 1933 to 1998, while the second and third series are referenced with “F.Supp.2d” 
for 1998-2014 and “F.Supp.3d” for decisions published from 2014. 
In the empirical parts of this dissertation, legal precedent citations are scraped 
directly in the body of the argumentation for opinions as well as in party and amicus 
briefs.  
 
Contrary to legal citations, references to other sources such as academic articles present 
more variation in format. In opinions, I manually identify citations. For party and 
amicus briefs, I rely on the table of authorities listing all the references made in the 
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body of the argumentation. I use the format of the table of authorities, in which each 
reference listed starts on a new line, to scrape the documents and build a data set of non-
legal references made in briefs. I manually identify all references made to academic 
articles as a proxy for expert information. I also identify publications made by non-
profit organizations that do not represent the interest of private companies as expert 
information. In addition, I create a table of correspondence between the original citation 
format and a cleaned citation version to identify identical citations. This allows the 
creation of a list of unique citations by brief, solving the issue of variation from brief to 
brief in the format of citation for a given publication. 
2.5.3 Empirical strategy 
To empirically examine the role of different types of information and stakeholders in 
the policy process in the judicial branch of government, I use the setting of patent 
policymaking in the Supreme Court over the period 2000-2015. Key features of this 
setting are the following.  
 First, patent-related issues are relatively non-partisan. The Supreme Court 
decisions have been unanimous in two-thirds of the cases decided over the period 2000-
2015 and among the remaining third, none of the dissents follow party lines. Sag et al. 
(2009) find that there is an effect of ideology on Supreme Court decisions in IP cases 
for conservatives only. However, the effect is significantly weaker compared to other 
cases. In addition, this effect varies across types of IP and the effect is significantly 
smaller for patents compared to copyrights. Therefore, while IP is not a strictly 
apolitical topic, IP is different from other cases, “if not entirely exceptional” (Sag et al., 
2009). The outcomes are not strongly predicted by partisanship and there is room for 
argumentation to influence the policymakers.  
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Second, patent disputes are characterized by a high information asymmetry 
between stakeholders and policymakers. Many of the cases require an understanding of 
technology and the economic strategy driving patenting behavior. The pace of 
technological change continuously increases and strategic decisions involving patents 
are not always observable. As a result, closing the gap would require continuously 
updating the policymaker’s knowledge, incurring high costs for collecting up-to-date 
information, even for a Justice with advanced technical training. Stakeholders that 
conduct the research and development producing the technologies that are involved in 
the cases, users of patents in innovation strategies, and patent law scholars and 
practitioners, have the knowledge that Justices need to make better decisions. Because 
of this information asymmetry, Justices have incentives to use the knowledge provided 
by stakeholders. This provides stakeholders with power to influence policymakers 
(Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1987, 1962).   
In the setting of patent policy, the courts are the primary policymakers and the 
Supreme Court has been central since 2000 (Chien, 2010; Holbrook, 2013). An 
advantage of this setting over lobbying in the elected branches of government is that 
the exchange of information between stakeholders and policymakers (Supreme Court 
Justices) is observable. In addition, the argumentation supporting the policymakers’ 
decisions is also published in an opinion and is therefore observable. Both stakeholders 
and policymakers support their argument by citing legal precedents and various external 
documents (academic articles, industry reports, newspaper articles, etc.) referenced in 
a relatively standardized format. The amount of information provided by stakeholders 
shows a high level of variation contrary to the amount provided by lobbying in other 
branches of the government.  
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Stakeholders lobbying in the elected branches of government frequently lobby 
for multiple issues, or issues with multiple aspects. This is a major challenge in 
identifying any causal relationship between lobbying and the information provided with 
the adoption of a law. In the Supreme Court setting, however, the outcome “success” is 
clearly defined by whether the firm is on the winning or losing side of a case. In addition, 
policy change is associated with three aspects of patent strength (Walsh et al., 2016). 
The first dimension is patentability, while the second is the breadth of interpretation of 
the boundaries of claims. The third dimension is the ability to exclude others from using 
the patented technology. I consider these aspects to be three policy topics with a multi-
dimensional metric corresponding to an increase or a decrease in strength on each 
dimension. Each decision made by the Supreme Court affects one or more of these 
aspects, and the interactions between stakeholders and policymakers can be associated 
with the results. In a recent seminar,17 Director of the USPTO Andrei Iancu suggested 
that distinguishing these different topics might be important. In response to a question 
asked by inventor and entrepreneur Lonnie Johnson18 regarding the influence of amicus 
briefs submitted by the USPTO in Supreme Court decisions, the Director responded 
that the USPTO seems to have an influence sometimes but that it “hasn’t been so 
successful when it comes to section 101 (patentable subject matters).” 
Policy changes measured as Supreme Court decisions create a one-dimensional 
change within the policy topics. Aspects are strengthened or weakened. While the size 
of the change is difficult to evaluate, the direction of the change is clear. Therefore, it 
 
17 “A Discussion with Andrei Iancu, Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual 
Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office” at the 
Scheller College of Business at Georgia Tech, February 25th 2019 
18 Inventor the Super Soaker water gun, which has been among the world's bestselling 
toys every year since 1991 (https://www.biography.com/people/lonnie-g-johnson-
17112946) 
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is possible to control if there have been shifts in positions by both the firms and the 
Court. 
All amici are entities that have chosen to act rather than “free ride” despite the 
collective action problem that exists. Given that jurisprudence is applicable to all, there 
are no individual benefits that can be obtained by performing this action. The decisions 
that stakeholders make are: choosing which position to support, choosing which 
arguments to make to support the chosen position, undertaking an individual or 
collective non-market action, and in case of a collective non-market action, deciding 
what form it will take – as part of a trade association and/or filing an amicus brief with 
other entities, engaging in a “relational” strategy with repeated interactions over time 
or a “transactional” one-off action (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). The results of this study 
allow inferences to be made purely based on the efficiency of the strategy chosen and 
the firms’ knowledge. Transaction costs are limited to coordinating interactions with 
other entities to write the brief in collaboration and possibly sharing the cost of legal 
counsel, which is estimated to be lower than USD20,000 (Caldeira and Wright, 1988; 
Chien, 2010). This relatively low cost to some extent mitigates the concern of selection 
bias towards high-resource participants compared to lobbying, for example. However, 
there is still some concern that the entities that have more capacity to monitor cases that 
provide opportunities for policy change will be over-represented. In addition, a 
limitation of the use of amicus briefs as an indicator of the amici’s interest in the case 
is that parties sometimes ask other entities to support their position with an amicus brief. 
Therefore, the analysis may be underestimating the importance of the role of parties on 
the outcome of cases. 
Lastly, stakeholders can only participate with briefs as parties or amici, and 
cannot provide benefits, such as financial donations for example, to the Supreme Court 
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Justices. In addition, Supreme Court Justices are appointed for life. Therefore, I can 
argue that in the Supreme Court, concerns for financial incentives or constituency-
building are as negligible as they can possibly be for policymakers. This feature 
mitigates the concerns for unobserved influences that stakeholders can exert on the 
policymaker. 
These features solve for the three key traditional challenges faced by studies in 
isolating causal mechanisms between the behavior of stakeholders in the policy process 
and policy outcomes (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014; Pittman, 1977; Zardkoohi, 
1985).  
 
There are limitations in using this setting. The Supreme Court receives about 7,000-
8,000 petitions per term.19 Less than a hundred of those cases were accepted each term 
over the period 2000-2015 (see Table 1), and among accepted cases, less than 2% were 
patent-related.  
In addition to representing a small share of the cases, the specificity of not being 
partisan makes patent cases different from a large proportion of the cases in which the 
question at stake involves a bigger role for partisan preference (Sag et al., 2009). Some 
topics, such as abortion or civil rights, may allow little external influence and the main 
predictor of decisions is the number of Justices that have strong political preferences on 
the topic. Thus, the results of this study will not be applicable to the same extent to all 
other Supreme Court cases. Nevertheless, this study informs us about how the Justices 
and stakeholders are likely to behave and influence each other within the latitude 
allowed by topics and the strength of preferences of the Justices on the bench.  
 
19 Source: https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx 
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The results of this study are more clearly generalizable to cases in which the 
question is apolitical, and in which the Justices are non-experts. The number of existing 
cases is still small but is growing. I argue that this is likely to be more and more frequent 
with the increasing pace of technological change. Some examples that already come to 
mind for which the executive and legislative branches of government have not set a 
clear legal framework and disputes are arising are artificial intelligence, data privacy, 
and migration to data currency. While it is possible that technology may become a 




3 CHAPTER 3 THE HETEROGENEOUS EFFECT OF PATENT STRENGTH ON 
FIRM INNOVATION 
3.1 Introduction 
Innovation is central in economic growth and policy measures are key tools for incentivizing 
profit-maximizing agents to innovate (Romer, 2014, 1994). Patent policy is one of these 
policies. Its objective is to establish an institutional environment that balances the trade-off 
between enhancing incentives to innovate and deadweight loss from the exclusivity granted. 
From a firm strategy perspective, innovation is central to firms’ competitive advantage and 
differences in their strategies to appropriate returns from investments in innovative activities 
are a key determinant of profitability differences across heterogeneous firms (Ceccagnoli, 
2009). This study examines how changes in the institutional environment affect relative payoffs 
from different firm strategies across heterogeneous sets of firms, focusing on innovation 
strategy. 
Concretely, knowledge boundaries are harder to define than the boundaries of material 
goods, especially in the case of inventions, which constantly appear in different and 
unpredictable shapes. Furthermore, setting the right balance between incentives for inventors 
and efficiency gains from diffusion has been a constant challenge in patent policy. 
Consequently, policies affecting the strength of patents have been modified multiple times over 
the years. Both in the academic literature and for policymakers, there is an ongoing debate 
concerning the effects of patents on firms’ incentives to invest in R&D and on the strategic use 
of patents. Studies trying to answer the question “what is the impact of patent strength on firm 
innovation?” have improved our understanding of firms’ diverse patenting strategies. 
Nevertheless, the size and direction of the effects of patents on innovation are still debated 
today (Arora et al., 2008; Boldrin and Levine, 2009; Budish et al., 2016; Cohen, 2005; Jaffe, 
2000; Penrose, 1951; Sampat and Williams, 2019; Williams, 2017, 2016).  
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One of the reasons for the high complexity of the debate is that the strength of patents 
involves multiple aspects. Walsh et al. (2016) group the aspects of patent strength into three 
dimensions.20 The first dimension is the range of inventions patents can protect, which includes 
the subject matter that is patentable as well as the quality level of inventions in terms of novelty, 
usefulness, and non-obviousness. The second dimension is the breadth of interpretation on the 
boundaries of claims, which translates into how close a rival’s invention can be without 
infringing on a patented invention. The third dimension is the ability to exclude others from 
using the patented knowledge, which is determined by the penalty for those who are found 
guilty of infringing on a valid patent. This study focuses on the third dimension: the term 
“strength of patents” in this study henceforth refers to the ability to exclude others from using 
patented knowledge. In other words, “weaker patents” in this study refers to patents functioning 
in a way that diverges from the definition of a property right. The first contribution of this study 
consists in providing insights on patents’ characteristic of providing exclusivity. For patent 
owners, there is an essential expectation that as intellectual property rights, patents should 
function in a way somewhat similar to property rights for the knowledge they seek to protect. 
In addition, this aspect is also fundamental based on a Schumpeterian view of the economy. 
Despite being of central importance, there is little empirical evidence to rely on (Aydin, 2015) 
compared to other aspects such as patent length, patent breadth, or patentable subject matter, 
which have received more attention (among others: Gallini 1992, Williams 2010). This study 
goes beyond the empirical finding of Aydin (2015) that reducing this exclusivity aspect results 
in a decrease in patenting (and licensing) by examining changes in R&D investments and the 
composition of both patented inventions and R&D investments in order to provide insights on 
 
20 These dimensions only consider the strength of patents and do not capture other 
characteristics of the patent system that also potentially influence the propensity to patent 
such as the cost of patenting, delays in examination, examiners’ training, and administrative 
aspects. 
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shifts in the rate and direction of innovation. An important finding of this study is based on 
going beyond the observation that, on average, reducing the exclusivity that patents confer 
increases the technological impact (measured with forward citations) of inventions patented by 
large firms in complex product industries. By examining the composition of patenting activities, 
I find that the increase of the average is driven by a decrease in the propensity to patent 
inventions with low technological impact. Consistent with other qualitative and quantitative 
evidence, this change in the composition indicates a reduction in the practice of building 
defensive patenting portfolios. 
A second key difficulty in settling the debate is that changing the strength of patents 
triggers a myriad of mechanisms in firms’ innovation strategy that complicate predictions about 
the production of innovation both at the firm level and in the economy. At the firm level, a 
given firm can both be a patent holder and a potential user of knowledge patented by other 
entities. Therefore, potential combinations of several types of patenting strategies complicates 
our understanding of the effect of patent strength on firm innovation. As one French firm’s IP 
officer stated: 
“The game… the practice [of filing for patents] is more and more complex. There is a 
little bit of everything. […] The company’s industrial strategy is to introduce products 
and services in the market, which have a significant differentiating technological 
content. […] The goal [of our patenting strategy] is to protect that differentiation, in an 
offensive way, whenever possible. Is there also a defensive part? Yes, that too.” 
(Interview with the chief IP officer in an international corporation manufacturing auto 
parts, September 2016) 
As a result, based on existing empirical evidence, no clear prediction can be made on whether 
a change in excludability will promote or hinder the production of innovation. In the case of a 
decrease in patent strength, the most obvious change is a decrease in patents’ probability of 
succeeding in protecting inventions. At a firm level, such a change is likely to impact both 
firms’ propensities to protect inventions using patents and the number of patents required to 
succeed in protecting each invention (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). As a result, changes in 
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patent-related costs and in the ability to appropriate investments may modify firms’ incentives 
to invest in the production of those inventions through R&D. At a macro level, given the 
cumulative nature of innovative activities (Scotchmer, 1991), a decrease in patent strength can 
increase the amount of spillovers that lead to innovations in the economy by decreasing the 
number of patents available as a source of information (Ernst, 2003). However, it can also 
increase spillovers by reducing the protection of the knowledge they hold private (Galasso and 
Schankerman, 2014). As a result, a change in patent strength yields reactions that are different 
in terms of incentives to innovate depending on the role of patents in a firm’s innovation 
strategy, which is contingent on firm characteristics and the technology field (Cohen et al., 
2000).  
Despite having a corpus of literature that has demonstrated the variety of potential 
effects, mechanisms involved when patent strength is changed are still typically examined in 
isolation from each other, particularly in empirical work, in order to solve for identification 
issues. Therefore, a second contribution of this study is to provide unique empirical evidence 
regarding the relative importance of these mechanisms for different types of firms when patent 
strength is changed and their net effect on incentives to invest in R&D and patenting propensity. 
To propose a comprehensive discussion that integrates the various patent-related firm strategies 
found in the literature on this research question that is half a century old, I reconcile approaches 
taken by legal, economics, and management scholars.  
In the first part of the study, I examine both the arguments that predict that strong patents 
(in terms of the exclusivity they provide) are associated with more innovation, and arguments 
supporting the opposite view. An analysis of the arguments made by 151 stakeholders during a 
major legal case changing this particular aspect of strength complements the theoretical 
discussion. The event used is the United States Supreme Court decision eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 2006, henceforth called “the eBay case.” With its 
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decision on the eBay case, the Supreme Court shifted away from over a century of practice 
regarding the rulings for injunctions, creating arguably the most important ruling in the patent 
system in the past decade (Seaman, 2015). By making patent-related permanent injunctions 
harder to obtain, the Supreme Court significantly weakened patents in terms of their ability to 
exclude others from using proprietary knowledge. While this change is a focused case, its 
examination allows an understanding of how the concept of excludability, which is a defining 
aspect of intellectual property (IP) rights, is related to firm innovation. Furthermore, a second 
part of this study consists in quantitatively testing the arguments found in the academic 
literature and made by those stakeholders. I leverage the eBay case as a shock weakening 
patents to examine whether changes in R&D investments and patenting behavior are consistent 
with the mechanisms referred to by each side and their consequences for the rate and direction 
of innovation.  
The two parts of the empirical analysis in the study complement the theoretical 
discussion in order to further our understanding of the heterogeneous effect of weakening the 
excludability aspect of patents on firm innovation for different types of stakeholders.  
This study’s contributions are also methodological. There are two common 
methodological challenges for studies estimating the impact of IP rights. The first issue is to 
control for rival hypotheses such as a technical breakthrough, regulatory capture, and industry- 
or country-level changes in order to isolate the effect of a change in IP rights’ strength (Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 1999). To consider the eBay case as an exogenous 
shock, I rely on the reaction of firms from a major foreign country that have stakes in the US 
market but are outside the US policy process. I use an exhaustive panel data set of patents 
matched with applicant information for French firms over the period 1996-2010. Using 
information about the patentees along with patent information, I analyze changes in the 
intensity of R&D investment and in the propensity to patent in reaction to this shock, as well 
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as changes in the composition of firms’ innovative activities. A second common 
methodological issue is measuring patenting propensity – what an entity chooses to patent out 
of what is patentable. I use French firms’ patents in their own country as the pool of patentable 
inventions and consider, among those inventions, the proportion that is filed in the United 
States. The variation in this ratio constitutes a measure closer to the concept of patenting 
propensity than existing ones, which is also robust to changes affecting the baseline number of 
patentable inventions. By examining firms’ reactions in terms of patenting behavior and 
investments in R&D, I provide evidence that weaker patents do not necessarily lead to a 
decrease in innovation.  
3.2 Background: A Shock on Patents’ Ability to Exclude 
Shifts in attitude towards patent holders and patent strength over time (c.f. Chapter 1) also affect 
the excludability aspect of patents. During the pro-patent period, attention is focused on the 
lack of incentives to innovate given by under-compensating patent holders in damages awards. 
In the following period of skepticism towards the exclusivity that patents confer, attention is 
focused on the risk of over-compensation hindering innovation and hurting consumers through 
hold-up problems and higher costs of conducting R&D. The shock used in the empirical 
analysis of this study occurred during this second period.  
Given that inventions are created in new and unpredictable shapes, the government 
needs to adjust the law to adapt the patent system to changes in technology and in firm 
strategies. However, the fast pace of innovation relative to traditional policymaking in the 
elected branches of government and the need for the patent system to accommodate new 
technologies has led the judicial branch to become the key source of policy change for the past 
three decades (Merrill et al., 2004). When disputes arise, the courts alter the rules by setting 
legal precedents. This chapter studies the impact of Supreme Court-based policymaking, in 
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which decisions are made in the context of a unique case but create a rule that is applicable to 
all after the ruling has been made.  
The eBay case occurred in 2006 in a patent system in which the exclusive right given 
to patent holders had been established in several parts of the legal system for over a century. 
The Constitution (Article I, clause 8) gives Congress the authority to award inventors with 
exclusive rights. The first Congress of the United States acted by adopting the Patent Act in 
179021 (Seaman, 2015), by which patents give their owners an exclusive right to commercialize, 
perform R&D, and sell patented knowledge to others. Infringers received a fine until 1819, 
when Congress changed the law to allow granting injunctions: 
“[T]he circuit courts of the United States . . . shall have authority to grant injunctions, 
according to the course and principles of courts of equity, to prevent the violation of the 
rights of any . . . inventors, secured to them by any laws of the United States, on such 
terms and conditions as the said courts may deem fit and reasonable.”22 
When an injunction is granted, infringers are required to stop any activities related to the 
patented knowledge. In its interpretation of the law, the Supreme Court has considered 
injunctions automatic, at least since 1908: 
"From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his remedies. It hardly 
needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a 
prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the 
law confers upon the patentee. If the conception of the law that a judgment in an action 
at law is reparation for the trespass, it is only for the particular trespass that is the 
ground of the action. There may be other trespasses and continuing wrongs and the 
vexation of many actions. These are well- recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, 
especially in patent cases, and a citation of cases is unnecessary.” 23  
Lastly, the US Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), which has been the de facto 
last court of appeals for patent-related cases since its creation in 1982, stated as early as 1983 
that injunctions are automatic: 
 
21 An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) 
22 An Act to Extend the Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States to Cases 
Arising Under the Law Relating to Patents, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481–82 (1819). 
23 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) 
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"We hold that where validity and continuing infringement have been clearly established, 
[…] immediate irreparable harm is presumed. To hold otherwise would be contrary to 
the public policy underlying the patent laws. […] Without this injunctive power of the 
courts, the right to exclude granted by the patent would be diminished…."24 
As a result, in terms of enforcement, for about a century before the eBay case, any entity found 
guilty of infringing on a valid patent was required to stop any activities using the patented 
knowledge. According to the legal literature (among others: Beckerman-rodau 2007, Kieff 
2011, Mulder 2007), permanent injunctions were systematic, absent exceptional circumstances, 
upon infringement of a valid patent based on Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
This rule was applied on entities that practiced the patent as well as non-practicing entities 
based on the precedent set by the Supreme Court decision Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern 
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908). Therefore, when the Supreme Court agreed to take the 
eBay case, it opened the debate to revisit the interpretation of the Patent Act of 1819 despite 
the established jurisprudence.  
On May 15th, 2006, the Supreme Court’s ruling on the eBay case led to the loss of the 
automatic nature of injunctions in case of the infringement of a valid patent.25 Gupta and Kesan 
(2017) analyze patent disputes after the eBay case to find that the permanent injunction grant 
rate dropped by 13% for non-practicing entities, while it dropped by 5% for practicing entities. 
They find that this drop for non-practicing entities was largely due to individual inventors, while 
patent holding companies were not affected differently compared to practicing companies. 
However, Gupta and Kesan (2017) find that the rate at which injunctions are sought decreased 
by 52% for practicing companies and by 86% for non-practicing companies.  
In sum, before the shock, whenever the infringement and the validity of a patent were 
established, courts automatically ruled for an injunction. After the shock, injunctions were no 
longer automatic based on these two criteria alone. 
 
24 Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Company, 718 F.2d 1573 (CAFC, 1983) 
25 More details about the eBay case and its legal consequences available in an appendix A. 
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With this ruling, the exclusivity inherent to a property was weakened. This shock in 
2006 was a court-imposed reduction in the ability of patent owners to exclude and enforce 
patents in the United States compared to the previous hundred years. I refer to this change as a 
“weakening of patents” in the rest of this chapter.  
While the case was being litigated, there was a debate among stakeholders and the 
Supreme Court Justices regarding whether such a change would foster or hinder incentives to 
innovate. The debate that occurred mirrors the one occurring in the academic literature.  
3.3 Theoretical Framework: Heterogeneous Effect of Weakening Patents on 
Innovation  
Given the extent of divisions in the literature regarding the relationship between patent strength 
and innovation, there is still an open debate considering whether the effect of a decrease in the 
patent strength would stimulate or deter innovation (Aydin, 2015; Williams, 2017). Based on 
the existing literature, several mechanisms are expected to be at play, resulting in heterogeneous 
effects of weakening patents on innovation contingent on firms’ technological fields, 
characteristics, and innovation strategies. To help frame the academic debates and to motivate 
and interpret the econometric findings below, I review the consistency of the outcomes 
anticipated by scholars with those expected by the stakeholders, based on an analysis of court 
documents obtained from the Westlaw database.  
The documents include the opinion of the Supreme Court on the eBay case, the briefs 
filed by each party, and the 31 amicus briefs filed for the case by 151 amici (a subset is listed 
in Table 3). I identify the type of entities that take positions on each side of the debate and 
analyze each of their arguments based on the legal precedents cited. I exploit the relatively 
standardized format of legal precedent citations to systematize the examination of arguments. 
By scraping court documents, I obtain a data set of all the legal cases cited.  
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Among the 337 legal cases cited, I focus on the cases cited four times or more, which 
limits the list to the 38 most relevant cases of jurisprudence for a discussion on the excludability 
aspect of patents. Although the number of citations by case is relatively low (between 4 and 
27), the information obtained on legal precedent citations complements a qualitative reading of 
the documents by providing a structure to guide the analysis of the content.  
Among the amicus briefs, 13 briefs were filed in support of eBay and were in favor of 
the decision weakening patents, 14 briefs supported MercExchange and argued against 
weakening patents, and 4 did not take a side. 26  The most cited case on both sides was 
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), in which the 
Supreme Court established that injunctions are automatic, and that the validity of a patent does 
not depend on whether it is practiced. The arguments made by each side focused on whether 
this rule should be changed.  
 
Table 3 Sample of stakeholders in the eBay case 
In favor of weaker patents Against weaker patents 
Research in Motion, Ltd 
Time Warner Inc. 
Business Software Alliance 
Yahoo! Inc. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation 
Nokia Corp. 
American Innovators' Alliance 
Intellectual Property Professors 
American Intellectual Property Law Ass’n 
(AIPLA) & Federal Circuit Bar Ass’n 
Pharma. Research and Manufacturing of 
America 
Biotech. Industry Org. 
United Inventors Ass’n & Tech. Licensing 
Corp. 
Wisconsin Alum. Res. FDN 
Ass’n of American Univ. 
National Ass’n of State Colleges & Univ.  
Land-Grant Colleges 
American Bar Association 
Rembrandt IP Mgt, LLC 
Various Law & Econ. Prof. 




26 Taking neither side, legal practitioners specialized in intellectual property recommended a 
status quo. A pharmaceutical company and an IT company argued that the principle of equity 
should be applied but that an injunction should not be granted based on whether the patent is 
exercised. There were no clear commonalities in the arguments used by these entities. 
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3.3.1 Weaker patents decrease innovation 
First, against the decision weakening patents, companies and associations of companies with 
activities related to pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and biotechnology submitted 3 of the 14 
amicus briefs (Table 3). Besides the firms in these industries, there were other amici whose 
business model relied on patent licensing. There were four amicus briefs submitted by small 
firms and inventors and two amicus briefs submitted by non-practicing entities including 
licensing firms, ventures, and universities’ technology transfer offices. In addition, five amicus 
briefs were submitted by legal practitioners’ associations and legal scholars. The US 
government and high technology large firms submitted the remaining amici. The data shows 
that this side argued that the right to exclude and its predictability are necessary for technology 
to be freely transferable and to maintain incentives to invest in R&D. For example, 
representatives of biotech firms made the following argument: 
“The right to exclude others from practicing a validly patented invention provides the 
investment incentive that is essential for high-risk, high-cost biotechnology research 
and development. Increased unpredictability with respect to availability of exclusive 
right will greatly diminish the value of patent rights, […] reduce inventors’ desire to 
promptly disclose inventions to the public and discourage the investment required to 
research and discover innovative technologies.” 27  Argument by the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization (BIO) 
In the court briefs, eleven cases were highly cited to support two key arguments. Four cases28 
were cited to support the first argument, which was that patents are meant to provide a right to 
exclude. The second argument was that patents are needed to solve for the Arrow information 
paradox.29 In addition to the eleven most-cited cases, frequently cited cases involved decisions 
 
27 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as amicus curiae in support of respondent 
28 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980); Special Equipment 
Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 
(1969); cited respectively by 10, 9, 6, and 6 briefs 
29 Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 35 (1923); Foster v. 
American Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) 
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in which injunctions were not granted despite established validity and infringement. 
Stakeholders referenced these cases to point out that circumstances related to extreme public 
interest issues different from the eBay case had justified the exceptional ruling.30 
These arguments are consistent with key studies on innovation and patenting strategy. 
As tools for appropriation, the most obvious effect of weakening patents is that they will be 
used less by firms to protect their inventions. This is likely to have higher incidence on 
incentives to innovate for industries in which patents are important mechanisms of 
appropriation, such as discrete product industries working with pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
and biotechnology (Cohen et al., 2000). The weakening of patents is also expected to affect 
firms that do not have the complementary assets to develop and commercialize the fruits of 
their research such as universities, public research organizations, small technology specialist 
firms, and private inventors. Sufficiently strong patents can ensure that the rent dissipation from 
disclosing knowledge and transferring it will be compensated by revenue (Arora et al., 2001; 
Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Aydin, 2015; Gans et al., 2008). Therefore, weakening patents 
is likely to lower the incentives for these types of firms to use patents as an appropriation 
mechanism and to invest in R&D.  
 Beyond what happens at the level of a given invention, there are two expected 
consequences of this decreased usefulness of patents as appropriation mechanisms. First, 
patents are used as a source of information with the disclosure of patented knowledge (Ernst, 
2003). Therefore, if a given firm uses patents less, the amount of knowledge disclosed will 
decrease. Given the cumulative nature of innovation (Scotchmer, 1991), the decrease of 
knowledge spillovers may negatively impact innovation in other firms. Second, viewing patents 
as probabilistic appropriation mechanisms (Gallini, 1992; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005) helps 
 
30 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Amoco Prod. Co. v. 
Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) 
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understand potential changes in patenting strategy. A lower probability to succeed in protecting 
the patented knowledge for each patent can lead inventors to use more patents to protect a given 
innovation to compensate for the lower probability of success. This mechanism is likely to 
occur in technological areas in which components of inventions can be patented separately, 
such as in complex product industries (e.g. electronics). If such behavior is adopted, the cost of 
innovating will increase with the number of patents that must be filed and maintained, which 
will reduce incentives to invest in innovative activities.  
In summary, if weaker patents increase rent dissipation in technology transfer, firms are 
both more likely to internalize commercial activities and to adopt costly patent-intensive 
behavior. Firms with lower resources are especially less likely to be able to adopt such changes 
to adapt to a weakening of patents (Blind et al., 2006). Therefore, based on the literature and 
the empirical evidence from court documents, a decrease in patent strength (excludability) is 
expected to result in a decrease in incentives to invest in R&D and a decreased patenting 
propensity for firms in discrete product industries and firms of any industry with relatively low 
resources such as SMEs.  
3.3.2 Weaker patents increase innovation 
On the other side of the debate, among the 87 amici supporting the decision to weaken patents, 
a technology field is clearly identifiable (Table 3). Nine out of the thirteen amicus briefs were 
submitted by large firms and associations of large firms in complex product industries, mainly 
in information technologies, finance, and electrical engineering. Fifty-six legal scholars and 
practitioners, as well as six interest groups related to legal issues and information technologies 
also made their arguments in 3 amicus briefs. The amici on this side point to the difficulty in 
navigating the patent thicket and the excessive use of injunctions that stifles incentives to 
innovate.  
“Technology products typically consist of hundreds or thousands of patented 
components. It therefore is impossible for technology companies to investigate all of the 
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patents, and pending patent applications, that may be relevant to a new invention, 
notwithstanding their best efforts to do so.”31 Argument by Business Software Alliance 
et al. 
“Patent assertion companies use the threat of injunction to extract not an amount 
reflecting the value of their patented invention as used in the product or service, but the 
value to a company of being able to continue to use or sell the infringing product or 
service – which in many instances means the amount a company is prepared to pay to 
remain in business.”32 Argument by Research In Motion (RIM) 
Based on a qualitative analysis of the arguments supporting weaker patents, I find that 16 cases 
were referenced frequently to support three key arguments. The first argument was supported 
by four cases 33  that highlight that the threat of injunction gives excessive leverage in 
negotiation. A second argument was supported by four cases34 to point out that injunctions have 
not been used following a general rule, and three cases35 were cited to advocate for a ruling 
proportionate to the offense. Third, two cases36 were cited to emphasize the need to take public 
welfare into consideration. Stakeholders on this side painted injunctions as a penalty that is 
often unjustified and disproportionate. They point to “trolls” that use injunctions as leverage 
although they do not have research costs to recover and do not provide public benefits by 
commercializing patented inventions, especially in industries with complex products. Overall, 
entities on this side of the debate argue that strong patents make them vulnerable when facing 
patent holders and stifle their incentives to invest in R&D.  
 
31 Brief of Business Software Alliance, Software and Information Industry Association, 
Information Technology Industry Council, and Information Technology Association of 
America as amici curiae in support of petitioners 
32 Brief of Research In Motion, LTD. as amicus curiae in support of petitioners 
33 Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., (2d Cir. 1974); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, 
Ltd., (Fed. Cir. 2005); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., (1917); Nerney 
v. New York, N.H. & (2d Cir. 1936) cited respectively in 9, 4, 4 and 4 briefs 
34 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, (1982); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., (Fed. Cir. 1995); 
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharms. Co., (Fed. Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music 
Co., (1994); cited respectively in 9, 4, 4, and 5 briefs 
35 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, (1982); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 
(1987); Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. (1933); cited respectively in 9, 5 and 5 
briefs 
36 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, (2001) Abend v. MCA, Inc., (9th Cir. 1988) both cited in 4 
briefs 
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Consistent with the stakeholders’ arguments, the literature finds that patent strategies 
for large firms in complex product industries, who argue for weaker patents, are very different 
from the firms that oppose weakening patents. In complex product industries, such as 
information technologies, a product or process is often fragmented. Fragmentation refers to 
components of a given innovation that are patented separately and held by different owners. As 
a result, when commercializing such an innovation, firms must “navigate the patent thicket”; in 
other words, they must manage the risk of being infringers (Shapiro, 2000). Firms bear the risk 
of being under “hold-up” by other patent owners, which increases the risk of investing in R&D 
(Clark and Konrad, 2008). In such technological areas, the use of portfolios of patents is 
common to strengthen a firm’s position in cross-licensing negotiations and to threaten or defend 
against litigation. Ziedonis (2004) finds that firms in complex product industries tend to patent 
more under strong patent systems and that the effect is not specific to capital-intensive firms 
and is applied to firms that rely on “fragmented pools of external technologies.” Therefore, the 
costs involved in building defensive patent portfolios are likely to decrease with weaker patents 
(Walsh et al., 2016).  
For firms with resource constraints in fragmented industries, the expected effect of 
weakening patents is ambiguous. The study by Ziedonis (2004) suggests that we can expect this 
decrease in the size of patent portfolios to occur for firms regardless of the level of their 
resources. Nevertheless, previous studies have also found that resources matter in the ability to 
conduct strategic patenting (Blind et al., 2006), so SMEs are likely to hold fewer patents than 
large firms. Hence, the scale of the decrease in portfolio size may be smaller. In addition, 
fragmentation of intellectual property has a negative impact on innovative performance for 
firms with a small number of patents (Cockburn et al., 2010). Therefore, it is not clear that firms 
with a small patent portfolio in complex product industries will chose to reduce it further.  
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Lastly, given the cumulative nature of innovation, interdependence between inventions 
is not limited to complex product industries. An entity holding the initial patent of a stream of 
research (Galasso and Schankerman, 2014; Scotchmer, 1991) or holding patents on the 
necessary research tools (Walsh et al., 2003) may create hold-up situations and royalty-stacking 
issues.  
Overall, the literature is consistent with the arguments in court briefs: incentives to 
innovate are stifled by strong patents in industries in which technologies are highly fragmented, 
such as complex product industries. Weaker patents can result in higher incentives to invest in 
R&D for the following three reasons. First, weaker patents reduce hold-up situations and make 
R&D investments less risky. Second, they decrease costs related to building patenting 
portfolios. Lastly, they allow spillovers from which other firms can benefit (Cohen et al., 2002; 
Hyytinen et al., 2015; Scotchmer, 1991). In terms of patenting propensity, firms that have 
enough resources to engage in building defensive patenting portfolios are likely to reduce that 
practice when patents become weaker. Therefore, a decrease in patent strength (excludability) 
can be expected to decrease the propensity to patent and increase incentives to innovate for 
large firms in complex product industries. 
 
The opinion delivered by the Supreme Court shows that the Supreme Court Justices were more 
receptive to the arguments supporting the view that strong patents stifle firm innovation. The 
Supreme Court cited eight cases of which five were the top five most-cited cases by amici 
supporting the weakening of patents. None of the most highly cited cases used by 
MercExchange’s side figure in the decision.  
The opinion includes two sections in which Justices express different arguments 
supporting the same unanimous decision. In the second section,37 Justice Kennedy, Justice 
 
37 The document is presented in more detail in an appendix available upon request. 
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Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer highlight that taking circumstances into account is 
key. These four Justices justify the departure from previous decisions with the following 
differences in circumstances due to an evolving economic and technological context: first, the 
increasingly wide variations in the nature of innovations patented and the economic model of 
patent holders; second, the development of an industry in which injunctions are used as leverage 
to obtain excessive licensing fees, which is unrelated to the production and sales of new goods; 
third, this leverage is especially disproportionate in industries with fragmented technologies, in 
which the patent holder of a small component of a product can influence its commercialization; 
and, lastly, opportunistic behavior became more likely over the few years leading to the case 
because patents with unclear boundaries were granted, especially in business methods. The 
arguments regarding these changing circumstances are also supported by referencing the 
academic literature and reports. Among more than the 200 publications referenced, the report 
by the United States Federal Trade Commission (2003) is cited by 13 amicus briefs: 7 briefs on 
eBay’s side and 4 on MercExchange’s side. In contrast, most documents are only cited once 
and the number of citations for that report is more than twice the frequency of the second most-
cited publication. In this publication, the FTC points to the development of an industry in which 
firms use patents to obtain licensing fees and not as a basis to produce and sell goods. The 
Supreme Court also refers to this document to highlight the disproportionate leverage 
injunctions given to some patent owners. 
 
The qualitative analysis of stakeholders’ positions shows that different types of firms expected 
their incentives to innovate to change in opposite ways following this shock, and studies in the 
literature support arguments on both sides. This motivates the critical test conducted in the 
empirical section of this study. The outcome of this critical test is made further uncertain 
because existing studies having established that patents are not an effective way for firms to 
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appropriate returns from innovation for most firms in several industries and business models. 
Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) reviewed the literature supporting this claim and found that 
empirical evidence is consistent across the United States, Europe, and Japan and is not specific 
to a particular period (Arundel, 2001; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Cohen et al., 2002, 2000; Levin 
et al., 1987; Mansfield, 1986). The authors found that firms use distinctive strategies according 
to their technology field. Only firms in some discrete product industries (pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals) use patents to protect profits directly (Cohen et al., 2000). Nevertheless, Cohen et 
al. (2000) point out that although patents by themselves are considered a weak protection in 
almost all industries, firms use patents in combination with other appropriability mechanisms. 
Therefore, there is uncertainty about “if” and “how” changing patents’ excludability aspects 
will impact firm’s innovation strategies. Firms may simply turn to other protection mechanisms, 
especially for large firms that have sufficient resources, and R&D investments could remain 
unchanged. Therefore, the following section makes a distinction between the effects of 
weakening patent strength on patenting behavior and on R&D investments.  
3.4 Research Design 
Key identification and measurement challenges can be summarized based on two seminal 
papers by Kortum and Lerner (1999) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001). These studies focus on 
another major case of changes in patent strength: the creation of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982. This study’s empirical strategy builds on the research design 
used by the two aforementioned studies.  
 Kortum and Lerner (1999) tested three rival hypotheses to explain a surge in patenting 
in the mid-1980s. First, the friendly court hypothesis explains the surge through the assumption 
that the CAFC is friendlier to patent holders than to alleged infringers. Second, the 
technological revolution hypothesis attributes the surge to scientific breakthroughs in a certain 
field. Third, the regulatory capture hypothesis suggests that the change in policy is the result of 
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lobbying, so firms that are most concerned with patenting will make changes beneficial for 
them. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) point out that this analysis should include firm characteristics 
because patent strategies vary by firm type. This second study finds that large firms with large 
fixed costs entered the patent portfolio race and small new firms with a focus on design became 
first-time patentees after the Texas Instrument lawsuit of 1985-1986 that signals the 
“friendliness” of the court to patent holders.  
To estimate the impact of the shock on weakening patents in the US, the empirical 
strategy in this study consists in using a panel data set of firms from a foreign country. The 
country must have a large enough economy to include firms of various sizes and industries for 
several years before and after the 2006 shock. In addition, those firms need to have a significant 
share of their activities in the US to react but should be outside the US policymaking process 
for the shock to be considered exogenous.  
Based on WIPO and the OECD, in 2006, France was the 9th largest economy based on 
gross domestic product, 4th in patent applications, and 13th in R&D spending. Firms of various 
sizes in both complex product industries (automobile, aerospace, IT) and discrete product 
industries (pharmaceuticals, chemicals) are observable in the French economy. As detailed 
below, I build a panel data set with firm characteristics matched with their patenting activities 
over 1996-2010. French firms have a significant share of their activities in the US: 29% of 
French patents were also granted in the US over the period 1996-2010 based on this data set. 
Therefore, firms are likely to react to an event in the US without being participants, which I 
verify in the court documents. Thus, the eBay case can be considered as an exogenous shock. 
3.4.1 Data 
The quantitative data set is a panel of the entire population of patents filed in France, the United 
States, and other countries by firms that operate in France, matched with a unique identifier 
with these firms’ organizational, financial, and R&D characteristics between 1996 and 2010. 
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Examining the entire population ensures that there is no bias related to population specification, 
selection, or response. 
I extract the population of patents filed in France by applicants based in France from 
Patstat (version 2016). Using patent family identification, I also collect information about 
whether these patents were filed in other countries. Patents filed by French firms, by law must 
be filed in France first for national security reasons, and need to obtain special authorization by 
the French defense ministry to do otherwise (Ministère de la Défense, 2014). Therefore, by 
keeping only patents that have been filed in France first, based on priority dates, the data focuses 
on inventions created in the country. The initial sample contains 170,990 patent applications 
filed by 17,389 applicants. 
The French firm census data, collected jointly by the French Statistical Office (INSEE) 
and the Public Finance Administrative Office (DGFiP), contains annual financial information 
for the entire population of French firms over 1996-2007 and 2008-2010 in the FICUS and 
FARE databases,38 respectively. The database “Contour des entreprises profilées” collected by 
INSEE provides information to further improve the information regarding firms belonging to 
the same enterprise (as defined by the 2008 law - Loi de modernisation de l'économie-LME) 
for 2009 and 2010. The data sets include a unique firm identifier attributed to every legal entity 
operating in France (the SIREN number).  
The annual R&D survey conducted by the French Ministry of Higher Education, 
Research, and Innovation contains firms’ R&D information over 1996-2010. The population 
for this survey includes all firms that are “likely to conduct R&D activities” in France. The 
survey identifies SIREN numbers in the fiscal administrative system to survey the entire 
population of firms with investments in R&D higher than EUR750,000. Other firms are 
 
38 There is a response rate of 100%, as these databases contain the census of firms collected 
through the fiscal administrative system. 
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surveyed as a sample. To avoid dropping observations, especially for small and medium firms, 
I impute an R&D budget of zero euros to firms that are in the database but are missing R&D 
information.39 The rationale behind this decision is the following. First, the official justification 
given by the French Ministry for surveying about 11,000 entities per year rather than the entire 
population is that the entities performing R&D activities represent less than 1/200 of the entire 
population of firms in France. Second, the survey method mitigates the risk of imputing a 
budget of zero to new firms with R&D activities. Each year, the survey is updated to include 
firms that engage in R&D for the first time. They are identified using both their fiscal reporting 
of R&D investments for tax credits and the governments’ records of applications for public 
R&D funding. This method has been iterated since 1990, therefore, from 1996 (the first year 
used in this study) the identification of firms “likely to conduct R&D activities” in France can 
be considered reliable. Lastly, the response rates for this survey range from 92% to 95% every 
year because firms face a fine when they fail to respond.  
All of the above data sets include firms’ SIREN numbers. I match them with an exact 
correspondence with Patstat based on a data set provided by the French patent office (National 
Institute of Industrial Property - INPI) that includes patent application numbers and SIREN 
numbers with an attribution rate between 96% and 98% for 1997-2010. As a result, I associate 
patents with the following applicant characteristics: size measured by the number of employees, 
and the indicator of belonging to a group, industry, and R&D budget.  
Some observations have missing information. However, firms in France are legally 
required to answer these surveys. Therefore, I consider these errors as marginal and will work 
as if I had the entire population of patents filed by firms operating in France. Most of the 
observations dropped are patents filed by individuals or public organizations. I restrict the data 
 
39 Robustness checks using a random assignment of R&D budget for missing values instead 
of zeros (calculated based on industry average R&D investments and weighted by firm size) 
can be made available upon request. 
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set to firms that have filed at least one patent in France and to the period 1996-2010. This period 
is chosen for the following reasons. The lower boundary is based on a concern for reliability. 
The number of firms in the matched data set increases by about a thousand firms from 1995 to 
1996. In comparison, variations between each year Y and Y+1 are on the order of a couple of 
hundred firms for all other years. Therefore, year 1995 is excluded. For the upper bound, while 
the data set could have been extended up to 2014, the Leahy-Smith American Invents Act (AIA) 
adopted in September 2011 introduced changes in various aspects of the US patent system. 
Scholars and policymakers’ understanding of the effects of this recent and complex event is 
still incomplete. Therefore, while the study is limited by its inability to estimate the long-term 
impacts of the shock, the interpretation would require examining the AIA in such detail that is 
not in the scope of this study. The final sample includes 119,263 patent applications filed in 
France by 11,038 firms over 1996-2010. 
Lastly, I use semi-structured interviews, conducted in September 2016, with IP officers 
in six large French firms among the CAC4040 about their US patenting strategy focusing on the 
past 20 years. The goal in these interviews was to verify whether French firms monitor and 
react to changes in patent strength in the US, as well as to verify that the characterizations of 
patenting strategies by industry type (discrete vs. complex products) found in prior studies are 
also found among French firms.  
3.4.2 Outcome measures  
To overcome the challenge of not having a direct measure of innovation, I make inferences on 
the impact of changing patent strength on firm innovation by estimating the impact of the shock 
on two outcomes. 
First, I use R&D intensity to operationalize firms’ incentives to invest in innovative 
activities. R&D intensity is measured by the logarithm of the total R&D budget, adjusted to the 
 
40 Top 40 firms publicly traded in the French stock market. 
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value of euros in 2016, normalized by the number of employees of a firm i at year t (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001). The estimation of variations in this outcome is done for the sample restricted 
to the 4,526 firms that have patenting activities in the United States.  
A key measurement challenge concerns the second outcome, patenting propensity, 
which is used as an indicator of innovation and appropriability conditions. Patenting propensity 
is defined as the proportion of patentable inventions for which a patent application is filed 
(Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Mansfield, 1986). Researchers have difficulty operationalizing the 
concept of “patentable inventions” because information about patentable inventions that are not 
patented is not available in the vast majority of cases. As a result, patent propensity has 
traditionally been measured using: 1) a direct survey question, which is subject to the 
disadvantages of self-reported data and high costs of surveying a large sample over time 
(MERIT survey in the Netherlands and SESSI survey in France), or 2) a ratio of patent 
applications over research and development (R&D) expenditure (Scherer, 1983), which does 
not control for the fact that the ratio between innovation and R&D investments varies widely 
across technology fields and firm type.  
To address these challenges in estimating changes in patenting propensity, I use French 
firms’ patents in their own country as a baseline of their patentable inventions. The propensity 
of patenting in the United States is determined by variations in the proportion of these 
patentable inventions filed at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). This 
measure of patenting propensity is closer to the concept than previous studies and is robust to 
technology-specific, industry-specific, and country-specific changes that affect the baseline 
number of patents filed in France. In addition, to control for changes that could affect the ratio 
and not only the baseline number, the model includes a control for international patenting in 
other countries, as detailed below in the model specification section. This corresponds to ruling 
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out the technological revolution hypothesis (Kortum and Lerner, 1999) by controlling for events 
happening in France that affect patenting in the US as well as in other countries.  
Rather than using a censored regression model for the propensity to patent that is a 
percentage, I choose to use a log-transformed dependent variable to obtain unbiased coefficient 
estimates and improve the ability of the model to fit the data. O’Hara and Kotze (2010), among 
others, show that count models perform better than log-transformed models. I also use count 
models to estimate the robustness of the results.41 
As a result, patenting propensity is measured by the logarithm of the ratio of patents 
granted in the United States over patents filed in France. For a firm i in year t, the denominator 
represents the number of patents filed in France and the numerator of the ratio represents, 
among the patents filed in France, the number of patents also filed and granted in the United 
States. Grants are used for the United States because applications were not published for the 
first part of the period studied. The USPTO started publishing patent applications 18 months 
after they have been filed from late 2000 in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 122. Although there 
are discussions about the exact number, the rate of patents that are granted in the United States 
is considered very high (Lemley and Sampat, 2008; Quillen, Jr. and Webster, 2001). Therefore, 
I chose to trade off the loss of precision from using grants with the precision gained in using a 
panel on a longer period. 
3.4.3 Model specification  
The model used to estimate changes in patenting propensity is at the firm level in a panel data 
framework. The specifications of this model build on a patent production function at the 
country-level model used by Kortum and Lerner (1999) that represents patenting from one 
country to another. That model decomposes the number of patents filed by applicants from one 
country, France in this study, to another country, the US in this study, at a date t, p"#	%&	', into 
 
41 More detail about model selection in appendix B. 
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the following factors: the rate at which patentable inventions are generated in France (α%&	'), 
the fraction of inventions from France that find use in the US (ϵ"#	%& ), the propensity of 
patenting in the US (f"#	'), which is a fraction of inventions that are worth trying to patent in 
the US out of those that have use there, and a globalization factor (g'.). 
,-.	/0	1
2/0	1
= 456	7856	9:;9:	7  (1) 
Kortum and Lerner (1999) impose two simplifying restrictions: 1) the propensity to patent f"#	' 
depends only on the US and 2) the usefulness of the technologies developed in France for the 
US market does not vary over time. The key arguments in this study support a relaxation of 
these assumptions.    
The first key argument in this study is that a shock exogenous to a firm that changes 
patent strength can affect its decision to introduce technologies developed in France in the US 
market. This motivates the estimation of changes in patenting propensity over time and has 
consequences in terms of incentives to invest in R&D. Therefore, the shock is the key 
independent variable. <=>?@A is a dummy equal to zero before 2006 and one after 2006. The 
variable is considered as missing during 2006 to provide a margin of about half a year before 
and after the event to estimate a clean reaction. This controls for the anticipation42 of an 
uncertain event during the first half of the year until the decision on May 15th and the uncertainty 
regarding the enforcement of the decision by lower courts after the decision during the 
following half year. This implies that observations in 2006 are dropped when conducting the 
estimations. 
 
42 I conduct robustness checks testing for the possibility that the eBay case was identified as 
potentially important from the CAFC ruling. The first controversial decision to deny 
permanent injunction despite the infringement of a valid patent is made in 2003. I control for 
anticipation or uncertainty that could affect the results from 2003. Results in appendix G 
show that the effects on both patenting and R&D intensity are consistent. 
 77 
The second key argument is that the effect of the shock on firms’ innovation is expected 
to be contingent on their own characteristics. Therefore, this study also estimates the interaction 
between the shock and firm characteristics on patenting propensity and R&D investments. The 
theoretical discussion in section 3.3, based on the existing literature and an analysis of the court 
documents, indicates that large firms in complex product industries are expected to have a 
reaction different from other firms. A second key independent variable is therefore 
BCDEF&H>IJKFLMN, a dummy capturing whether firm i is a large firm and belongs to a complex 
product industry. Being large is defined as having 500 or more employees, which is a standard 
way of defining this category (Cohen et al., 2000). Patents in complex product industries are 
identified based on patents’ IPC classification. A firm is considered to belong to a complex 
product industry if over 50% of their patents belong to electrical engineering or mechanical 
engineering. Alternative tests based on the industry classification (ISIC codes with the first two 
digits between 30 and 39) used by Cohen et al. (2000) as well as with the fragmentation index 
proposed by Ziedonis (2004) both confirm the robustness of the results. The method based on 
patents is preferred because the importance of patenting in a given technology field is a better 
indicator for large firms whose activities are likely to be diversified in various fields.43 Given 
the uncertainty regarding small and medium firms in complex product industries, I also examine 
the effects due to the complexity of the industry alone using the variable H>IJKFLMN and its 
interaction with the variable <=>?@A.  
The Supreme Court made a decision in the eBay case that would be applicable to all 
firms in order to “adapt to the rapid technological and legal developments in the patents 
system.” 44  However, the court documents show that firms expect to be affected in 
 
43 Robustness checks in appendix F restricting the analysis to patents in complex product 
industries are consistent with the main results on patenting propensity. 
44 Section of the opinion written by Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens, Justice Souter and 
Justice Breyer. 
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heterogeneous ways, and the literature suggests that this may be right. Therefore, the goal of 
the quantitative part of this study is to estimate the effect of <=>?@A  and of <=>?@A ×
PQDIRSJFQA  (with firm type being either: H>IJKFLMN  or Large&Complex]7 ) on two 
outcomes: patenting propensity and R&D intensity.  
To estimate the impact of weakening of patents, including firm fixed effects is more 
appropriate for examining the effect of <=>?@A , which changes over the period observed. 
Including fixed effects allows controlling for the time invariant characteristics of individual 
firms that may influence this effect and are not available in the data set. Therefore, I control for 
firm fixed-effects using official firm identifiers (SIREN). In addition, I control for R&D 
intensity, international patenting propensity, and competition in the United States, which are 
not time invariant.  
On the other hand, a fixed effect model cannot be used to estimate the impact of 
<=>?@A × PQDIRSJFQA  because the investigation involves PQDIRSJFQA , which can be 
considered time invariant in this study and is therefore collinear with firm dummies. While the 
measure is based on patents, it is likely to be relatively stable over time by construction. 
Therefore, the effect of the interaction term is estimated using random effect models controlling 
for relevant and observable firm characteristics. Based on previous work on firm innovation, 
and more particularly on the propensity to patent and the patent production function, it is 
reasonable to consider that the right-hand side of equation (1) varies with firm size, R&D 
intensity, industry, globalization, and affiliation with a business group (Crepon et al., 1998; 
Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Hausman et al., 1984; Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Pakes and Griliches, 
1980). As a result, for a firm i at date t, the ratio of the number of patents filed in the US 
(p"#	%&	`') out of those filed in France (P%&	`') is expressed by equation (2) with Xc`' representing 
the characteristics j of firm i at date t. ∝c represents the elasticity of the patenting propensity to 






j  (2) 
If we set βm = ln(A), for each characteristic except size βrs = 	αrs, and β#`tu = 	∑ αrsc	 . A set 
of dummy variables captures industry-specific variations such as technological opportunities 
and business cycles.  
In summary, the random effect models with patenting propensity as a dependent 
variable include the following control variables: 
• BCDEFMN : dummy for having 500 employees or more to represent the size of the firm 
• H>IJKFLMN: represents the technology area of patents 
• Group: dummy variable indicating whether the firm is an entity belonging to a business 
group. This variable accounts for the potential access to resources that are not captured by 
the size and R&D investments of the firm. 
• International (also included in fixed-effect model): international patenting propensity for 
firm i at year t, measured by the logarithm of the maximum patenting propensity ratio 
among the top five destination countries for patent applicants, which are not North 
American nor European: China, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. This variable 
controls for changes that occur in France, such as a technological breakthrough, and are 
bound to affect international patenting. This measure is based on patents, so it is compatible 
with a model that controls for firm fixed effects. 
• Competition (also included in fixed-effect model): logarithm of the count of claims refused 
by the USPTO to a firm i in year t due to prior art based on existing backward citations of 
US patents. 
• Industries: a set of 21 dummy variables based on the industry classification in the French 
industry code (Activité Principale Exercée - APE) 
The model used to estimate the impact of the shock on R&D intensity is similar. The main 
difference is that the data set for each period is restricted to firms that have at least one patent 
 80 
in the United States. The estimation controls for firm size, membership to a corporation, and 
industry. In addition, the model includes R&D intensity lagged by one year to capture path 
dependency in R&D investments. While controlling for time trends is clearly important, 
including time dummies is not compatible with the main independent variable, Shock', and is 
therefore kept only as a robustness check (Appendix C). Nevertheless, all results are compared 
with findings using this alternative model.  
3.5 Findings 
3.5.1 Description of the data 
In the panel data, among the 119,263 patent applications filed in France by 11,038 firms, 72% 
were granted by the French patent office. This proportion presents an overall decrease from 
89% in 1996 to 67% in 2010. Among patent applications in France, 29% were also filed and 
granted in the United States. Based on the original sample of 195,653 patent applications filed 
by 39,420 applicants, which include non-firms and firms with missing information, the trend is 
the same. Therefore, there does not seem to be a bias in the final sample for the overall trend. 
The panel data set, which includes 24,678 firm-year observations, is unbalanced. About 
75% of firms are one-time patentees. Only 5% of the firms are included for 7 years or more. 
The number of firms remains between 1,490 and 1,767 in each year over the period 1996-2010 
with no clear trend. Based on firm-year units, large firms represent 17% of the sample. Their 
portion is on a decreasing trend from 19% in 1996 to 15% in 2010. Large firms make up 32% 
of the firms operating in France that have at least one patent in the US based on firm-year as a 
unit. Their representation in this group does not show a clear trend and the percentage varies 
between 28% and 36%. The rest of the sample is made of up of SMEs, which represent 83% of 
the population and are an increasing trend as patentees in France and make up 68% of the firms 
that have patents granted in the US. Two-thirds of the applicants are part of a business group, 
so this control variable is important for accounting for the resources and capabilities that are 
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not captured by firm size or R&D budget. Lastly, 18% of the firm-year observations indicate 
potential competition in the US market. 
With firm-year as the unit of observation, the average propensity to patent in the US 
(unlogged) is about 19% over the whole period, with no clear trend (Table 4). The average 
R&D budget normalized by firm size (unlogged) is EUR8,400 thousand per employee, with 
EUR16,000 thousand per employee for large firms and EUR6,800 thousand per employee for 
small firms. When we only examine firms patenting in the US, the average R&D intensity 
overall for large firms and small firms is, respectively, EUR16,000 thousand, EUR 23,000 
thousand, and EUR13,000 thousand. There are also no clear trends in variation of R&D 
intensity overall or for firms patenting in the United States. Nevertheless, a decrease in R&D 
intensity is observed in 2009, which is likely due to the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, a discussion 
of potential interactions with the results is provided in section Error! Reference source not f
ound. below. The distribution of R&D intensity is highly skewed, with many firms with R&D 
budgets close or equal to zero. Therefore, R&D intensity in the regression models was measured 
using the logged values of normalized R&D budget. The propensity to patent in one of the top 
five non-North American or European countries is 71% on average, with a general increasing 
trend over the period.  
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics (N= 24,678 firm-year observations)  
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Propensity to patent (not logged) 24,678 0.184 0.312 0 1 
RDI (in thousand of EUR 2011 /  
employee- not logged) 24,678 8.361 44.108 0 2,818,381 
Large 24,678 0.169 0.375 0 1 
Complex industry 24,678 0.392 0.488 0 1 
Group 24,678 0.660 0.474 0 1 




Concerning firms on both sides of the debate, one could argue that multinationals operating in 
France and in the United States that make large investments in R&D and have ample resources 
will patent a new potential product/process in the United States regardless of changes in the 
patent system. In addition, such behavior could be expected to be more common for firms in 
industries in which patents are an efficient means of appropriation, such as in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries. Based on the interviews conducted with Chief IP 
officers in large French firms, I find that this behavior exists but is not consistent for all firms. 
While there was some variation in the interviewees’ roles, they were all 1) the head of a 
department in charge of IP rights strategy for the corporation as a whole; and 2) their role 
included providing information related to the IP rights environment to the companies’ 
executives.  
For two out of the six firms interviewed, one in a complex product industry and one in 
a discrete product industry, changes in the United States did not explain their patenting 
propensity in a significant way.  
“The largest change is upcoming, it is Brexit. The other changes like in the US patent 
system are only adaptations.” (Interview with the chief IP officer of an aerospace 
corporation, September 2016) 
For the other four firms’ IP officers, monitoring changes in US patent law is essential to be 
aware of threats and opportunities.  
“Who could say that [they are not monitoring changes in the US]? If they say that, it’s 
very suspect, especially if it’s a company with an international market […] and that is 
not specific to the US. It’s the same in China and everywhere in the world.” (Interview 
with the Chief IP officer of an auto parts manufacturing corporation, September 2016) 
“We have a local team of US patent attorneys. […] We react to changes in the US. We 
can’t ignore what the public arena is doing. Because it either creates opportunities or 
because it changes things and creates threats. It’s our role to monitor that. We do it in 
Japan, in the US, everywhere. If there are changes, we will take them into account, it’s 
part of our job.” (Interview with the Chief IP officer of a chemicals manufacturing 
corporation, September 2016)  
In addition, some firms showed an awareness that the judicial branch is a key source of legal 
change for the US patent system. 
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“In Europe, the source of the law is the legislator. In the US, the legislator is the judge, 
with everything that is happening at the Supreme Court. Among other things, with 
computer technologies, we question the evolutions in the US.” (Interview with the Chief 
IP officer of a chemicals manufacturing corporation, September 2016) 
The interviews reveal the extent to which a firm’s sensitivity to changes in patent strength may 
be related to the firm’s technology field. While further examination with more observations is 
needed to make generalizable claims, based on this small set of firms, it is clear that the behavior 
is not specific to complex or non-complex product industries. In terms of interpretation of the 
quantitative results, information from the interviews suggests that the size of significant effects 
of the shock found in the following subsections can be considered conservative because the 
existence of such behavior contributes to reducing the variance in the patenting propensity ratio 
and R&D intensity. 
3.5.2 Effect of weaker patents on the rate of patenting and R&D investments 
The dependent variable, a log transformed version of the ratio representing patenting 
propensity, is continuous and unbound. I use an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator on the 
unbalanced panel data to estimate the effect of a decrease in patent strength. Based on the test 
devised by Hausman (1978), I find that model specifications with fixed effects are more 
appropriate than random effects (chi-squared(4)=522.05; prob>chi2=0.0000). Using a modified 
Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity in the fixed effect regression model, I find a 
heteroscedastic set of random variables (chi-squared(11,038)=1.3e+40; prob>chi2=0.0000) and 
use a robust estimator with standard errors clustered at the firm level (Stock and Watson, 2016). 
This specification is used in the first estimation model focused on the effect of the shock 
controlling for firm characteristics, including the unobserved ones, by using firm fixed-effects.   
Accounting for firm fixed-effects can result in multicollinearity issues in subsequent 
tests that examine the impact of the shock in interaction with time-invariant firm characteristics. 
Therefore, estimation models that examine the impact of PQDIRSJFQA  and <=>?@A ×
PQDIRSJFQA are OLS random effect models, also using the robust estimator, and controlling 
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for observable firm characteristics listed previously in section 4.3. The correlation matrix 
(Table 5) shows that there are no multicollinearity issues and the explanatory and control 
variables are indeed related to the propensity to patent and R&D intensity.  
 
Table 5 Correlation matrix (as included in the models’ estimations, N= 24,678 firm-year 
observations) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 US patenting prop. 1       
2 Complex prod. ind. -0.0131* 1      
3 Large 0.1822* 0.0674* 1     
4 R&D 0.2632* 0.0431* 0.2890* 1    
5 Group 0.0928* 0.0020 0.1703* 0.1814* 1   
6 International 0.5034* -0.0529* 0.1418* 0.2143* 0.0579* 1  
7 Competition 0.1013 0.0559* 0.2942* 0.2609* 0.0611* 0.0827* 1 
Note: * significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
Based on the results of the estimation of model 1 in Table 6, I find a negative and significant 
effect of the shock weakening patents on the propensity to patent. Holding other things equal, 
the propensity to patent decreases by 2.3 percentage points.45 This is consistent with the 3 
percentage-point decrease found by Aydin (2015). Firms in both complex and non-complex 
product industries decrease their rates of patenting in reaction to the shock, and the effect does 
not differ between the two types of industries (model 2 in Table 6). However, the decrease is 
significantly larger by 2.5 percentage points for large firms in complex product industries (5.1) 
compared to other firms (2.6) holding other factors constant (model 3 in Table 6). While the 
models are different and therefore not directly comparable, robustness checks accounting for 
time trends suggest that these results are conservative. The effect found by adding year 
dummies to the same regression model is close to an 8.7 percentage-point decrease.46 The 
 
45 Models 2 and 3 as well as 5 and 6 are used to examine the relative difference between 
groups of firms. The size of coefficients in these models cannot be compared to model 1 and 
model 4, respectively, because the specifications are different (controls and fixed effects). 
46 Appendix C. 
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difference between large firms in complex product industries compared to other firms is also 
significant and of comparable size when including year dummies in the model: the decrease is 
larger, by 6.1 percentage points instead of 6.2 percentage points. 
The decrease in patenting propensity for large firms in complex product industries 
cannot be interpreted as a simple decrease in the ability to use patents to protect inventions from 
rivals for the following reasons. First, this interpretation is inconsistent with the finding that the 
decrease is significantly larger for firms that argued in favor of the change compared to those 
that argued against it. Large firms in complex product industries would not be supportive of a 
change weakening this aspect of patents if their main use of patents depended only on their 
ability to exclude others. Second, arguments in the briefs filed by the amici supporting weaker 
patents point out the need to reduce the threat of litigation and of injunction coming from other 
firms and especially non-practicing entities. They show more concern about their vulnerability 
when facing other patent holders than the potential reduction of their ability to prevent others 
from stealing their own inventions.  
Therefore, the decrease in patenting propensity observed for large firms in complex 
product industries can be interpreted as a decrease in the need to file for patents with the purpose 
of building strategic patent portfolios for defensive reasons.  
On the other hand, the results of the estimation show that the shock decreased the 
patenting propensity of firms other than large firms in complex product industries, by a smaller 
size (model 3 in Table 6). The smaller size of the effect may be attributed to the lower likelihood 
that these firms will build defensive patenting portfolios compared to large firms in complex 
product industries (Bessen, 2003; Blind et al., 2006; United States Federal Trade Commission, 
2003). Therefore, the scale of the change is bound to be smaller for any given mechanism. The 
negative effect can be explained by firms on this side of the debate using patents to protect 
profits directly from licensing activities or commercialization based on the patented knowledge. 
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The analysis of court documents shows that opponents of weaker patents argued that the right 
to exclude and its predictability are necessary for technology to be freely commercialized and 
transferable. Patents are used to protect profits from commercialization directly in “discrete” 
product industries in which products are made of a small number of patentable elements (Cohen 
et al., 2000), as opposed to “complex” product industries in which patents are involved in 
indirect methods of protection through negotiations with other actors using patent portfolios. In 
addition, entities that sided against weaker patents also argued in the court briefs that decreased 
excludability would hurt their ability to manage patented technologies outside of the firm’s 
boundaries. This finding is consistent with the view that small and medium firms rely on patents 
to secure revenues from out-licensing technologies for which they do not have the 
complementary assets to commercialize internally (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006). Aydin (2015) 
found that the decreasing out-licensing following the eBay case was more pronounced for small 
and medium firms.  
Firms on the side that opposed weakening patents argued from the position of patent 
holders rather than that of potential infringers. The negative effect on patenting propensity can 
be explained by a lower incentive to use patents to exclude others from using proprietary 
knowledge (Cohen et al., 2000; Mansfield, 1986).  
 
To provide evidence regarding the meaning of this decrease in patenting propensity in terms of 
firms’ incentives to invest in R&D, I estimate the effects on the second outcome. I examine 
R&D intensity, which is the logged value of R&D budget normalized by firm size. I limit the 
data set to firms that have at least one patent in the US in the given year to ensure that firms 
have a reason to react to the shock that occurs in the US. I use a similar OLS model controlling 
for firm fixed-effects and correcting for issues of heteroscedasticity with a Whyte estimator to 
estimate the impact of the shock. I also use a random effects model controlling for additional 
 87 
time-invariant firm characteristics to estimate the impact of the shock in interaction with firm 
type. 
The empirical analysis shows that there is no negative effect of the shock on innovative 
activities. On the contrary, it shows a positive and significant effect (model 4 in Table 6).47 This 
increase in R&D intensity is positive for both groups (model 6 in Table 6). However, the effect 
of the shock for large firms in complex product industries is  {|}	= 0.0775 (sum of 0,2098 due 
to the shock for all firms and of -0,1323 specific to this group of firms from model 6 in Table 
6) with a z-score of 1.0503 that indicates the effect is not positive but not significantly different 
from zero. The remarkable result is that the increase in R&D intensity due to the shock is 
smaller for large firms in complex product industries, {~	= 0.0775, compared to the positive 
and statistically significant effect of 0,2098 percentage point increase in R&D for other firms 
(comparison of {|}  and {~ in Figure 4). This result is surprising since large firms in complex 
industries can be expected to have higher incentives to invest in innovative activities following 
their win in court. As examined in further detail in the following section, the larger increase of 
R&D intensity presented by other firms seems to be due to costs in shifting the direction of 
their innovative activities, that involved a larger increase in R&D investments than the one due 
to the increased incentives to innovate of large and complex firms on the winning side. 
The findings are consistent, and the positive effect is larger, when using the logarithm 
of the number of patent applications in France as an alternative measure of lagged R&D 
intensity. This sensitivity check is conducted to capture previous R&D intensity with a proxy 
that exists for one-time applicants. Patent applications can be used as the proxy because they 
come with a delay after performing the R&D, but they can also capture the extent to which the 
output of R&D of that firm depends on patenting.  
 
47 Models 2 and 3 as well as 5 and 6 are used to examine the relative differences between groups of firms. The 
size of coefficients in these models cannot be compared to model 1 and model 4, respectively, because the 
specifications are different (controls and fixed effects). 
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Given that this effect potentially concerns all French firms, I conduct two additional 
tests. First, I conduct a difference-in-difference analysis of the change in R&D intensity 
between firms that patent in the US compared to firms that do not. I find that firms that patent 
in the US increase their R&D investments significantly more than firms that do not, following 
the shock (Figure 5). There remains the concern that this effect may proceed from a global 
event that affects all French firms that patent internationally. Therefore, I conduct an additional 
placebo test by restricting the sample to French firms that do not patent in the US. I use a 
difference-in-difference approach to test the effect of the shock between firms that patent in 
Japan and those that do not. I repeat this exercise with the top five destination countries for 
French patentees and find no evidence of an effect. The results are kept as an indicative model 
rather than as the main model because there is a probable bias. Firms that have activities in the 
US are likely to be more successful and endowed with more resources on average than firms 
that only operate nationally. The effects estimated using models 4, 5, and 6 modified by adding 
time dummies show that these results are consistent when accounting for time trends. While 
the models are not directly comparable, the effect of the shock on R&D intensity is significant, 
positive, and of a larger size by 2 percentage points compared to the result in model 3 in Table 
6.  
The interpretation of the positive (yet not significant) increase in R&D intensity is 
straightforward for large firms in complex product industries, and the result is consistent with 
the theoretical discussion. The threat of the penalty for a firm that becomes an alleged infringer 
decreases with weaker patents and improves firms’ abilities to navigate the patent thicket 
(Shapiro, 2000). As a result of lower risk, firms have incentives to increase their R&D activities. 
However, the evidence of a non-significant increase found in this study shows that they do not 
increase investments in a significant manner. Nevertheless, the decreased risk reduces the need 
to build a preemptive patenting portfolio, which is consistent with the decrease observed in 
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patenting propensity. The resulting reduction in innovation costs related to patenting may also 
lead to higher incentives to invest in R&D activities.  
The more surprising result is the positive and larger effect for firms in other industries 
that argued against the decision. Investments in R&D increase, and this increase is even larger 
than for large firms in complex product industries (models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 6). To explain 
this change in the rate of innovative activities for firms on the losing side, I further examine the 
direction of innovation, focusing on the composition of R&D investments, the types of 
inventions that are patented, and the types of firms that engage in patenting. 
 
Table 6 Effect of weakening patents on firms’ propensity to patent and R&D intensity 
(unit of observation is firm-year) 
OLS  Patenting Propensity  R&D intensity  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Shock -0.0233*** -0.0328*** -0.0257*** 0.2643*** 0.1554*** 0.2098*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.048) (0.046) (0.040) 
Complex  -0.0080**   0.0143  
  (0.004)   (0.049)  
Shock*Complex  0.0145**   0.0601  
  (0.006)   (0.066)  
Large&Complex   0.0467***   0.1233** 
   (0.008)   (0.052) 
Shock*  
Large&Complex   -0.0249*   -0.1323** 
   (0.013)   (0.062) 
Large  0.0435***   0.1612***  
  (0.005)   (0.048)  
R&D intensity -0.0004 0.0200*** 0.0210***    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Group  0.0077** 0.0099***  0.1496*** 0.1569*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.044) (0.044) 
International 0.4482*** 0.5821*** 0.5879*** -0.0232 0.1773** 0.1765** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.103) (0.084) (0.085) 
Competition -0.0146*** 0.0026 0.0069 0.0366 0.1120*** 0.1248*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) 
R&D intensity t-1    0.2554*** 0.5271*** 0.5308*** 
    (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) 
Firm FE Yes No No Yes No No 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1142*** 0.0616*** 0.0590*** 1.3094*** 0.3972*** 0.4018*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.070) (0.142) (0.141) 
       
Obs 23,132 23,132 23,132 3,991 3,991 3,991 
# firms 10,688 10,688 10,688 1,418 1,418 1,418 
R-squared 0.244 0.29 0.2924 0.558 0.592 0.592 
Prob > stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Note: * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. N is smaller than 30,766 because: 1) observations are dropped for 2006 due to the 








Figure 5 Difference-in-difference in R&D investments between French firms that patent 
in the US and French firms that do not. 
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3.5.3 Effect on the direction of innovation  
First, I examine whether there are changes in the composition of innovative activities for large 
firms in complex product industries. I focus on the quality of the inventions patented based on 
forward citations as a measure representing technological impact on subsequent inventions. 
Given that this step focuses on patent-level information, I structure the data set to examine 
patent-year as a unit of observation rather than firm-year.  
 I operationalize quality as technological impact using forward citations minus the 
citations added by examiners (Moser et al., 2017). Moser et al. (2017) compares citing practices 
for patents on hybrid corn using field trial data as measures of objective performance. I subtract 
examiner citations because Moser and her co-authors find that examiner-added citations are a 
poor predictor of performance improvements. This measure is a “one size fits all” solution that 
has only been tested on a particular technology (hybrid corn); thus, generalizing it to all 
technologies presents limitations (Kuhn et al., 2016). While operationalization could be 
improved by using empirical techniques tailored to different types of patented technologies as 
argued by Kuhn et al. (2016), this exercise is not in the scope of this study and this measure is 
used for the sake of simplicity. 
High-quality inventions are operationalized using a dummy representing whether the 
number of forward citations five years after the patent was filed is above the 75th percentile in 
a given year in its technology field based on IPC classification. Low-quality inventions are 
captured by a dummy that indicates whether the patent is within the lowest 25th percentile in 
terms of citations in its year of filing and technology field. I use a difference-in-difference 
approach to estimate the impact of the shock on the outcomes between French firms that patent 
in the US and those that do not. 
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I find that after the shock weakening patents, the quality of the patents filed by large 
firms in complex product industries increases, on average. I examine the extremes and find that 
this increase in average is driven by a decrease in the number of low-quality patents (Table 7). 
This result is robust to using patents with zero citations within the five years following the filing 
date as a measure of low-quality patents. This is consistent with the interpretation that the 
decrease in the size of the portfolio of large firms in complex product industries is due to a 
lower need for defensive patenting. 
 
Table 7 Patent quality for large firms in complex product industries (patent-year level) 
 Quality Top Quality Low Quality 
RDFCAIFA	
× <=>?@ 0.493 (0.071)*** -0.049 (0.000)*** -0.101 (0.012)*** 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Covariates Size, Group, Int’l, Competition 
Size, Group, Int’l, 
Competition 
Size, Group, Int’l, 
Competition 
# observations 35,883 (12,025 treated) 35,883 (12,025 treated) 35,881 (12,025 treated) 
R-Squared 0.03 0.09 0.04 
 





The question remaining is: why do firms that argued that they would lose incentives to invest 
in innovation following the weakening of patents actually increase their R&D investments? I 
explore two potential explanations.  
  The most straightforward potential explanation is that given by the stakeholders in court 
briefs. The shock reduces existing firms’ abilities to appropriate the returns from their 
innovative activities and, as a result, some of such firms lose their incentive to invest in R&D. 
In that case, the observed increase in R&D investments is due to other firms seizing 
opportunities created by increased spillovers allowed by weaker patents or from incumbents’ 
lower patenting propensity, leaving gaps of patentable knowledge available to be patented by 
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new entrants (Cohen et al., 2002; Scotchmer, 1991). I conduct a difference-in-difference test 
using firm-year as the unit of analysis to examine, among firms on the losing side of the case 
(all but large firms in complex product industries), whether the number of first-time patentees 
increases after the shock for firms that patent in the US compared to firms that patent only in 
their home country. I find evidence that the number of first-time patentees decreases 
significantly after the shock (Table 8). This result does not support the first potential 
explanation and indicates that if opportunities are created by the shock, they are not captured 




Table 8 First time patenting (firm-year level) 
 First time patenting 
RDFCAIFA	 × <=>?@ -0.036 (0.009)*** 
Industry FE Yes 
Covariates Size, Group, Int’l, Competition 
# observations 21,300 (11,531 treated) 
R-Squared 0.198 
Note: * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Excluding large firms in complex product industries. 
 
 
A second potential explanation for the increase in R&D intensity is that, contrary to the threat 
firms made in their court briefs, they do not lose their incentive to invest in innovative activities. 
However, given the new level of patent strength after the shock, more efforts in innovation 
strategy are required for firms to generate the same value from innovative activities. Therefore, 
the increase in R&D intensity reflects higher costs rather than a change in incentives to 
innovate. I examine changes in the quality and the novelty of outputs of firms’ innovative 
activities on the side that argued against weaker patents. 
 94 
First, I find that contrary to the winning side (large firms in complex product industries), 
firms on the losing side do not significantly change their patenting behavior for low-quality 
patents in terms of technology impact. Based on a difference-in-difference test between patents 
filed in the US and those filed only a firm’s home country, with a sample restricted to patents 
owned by firms on the losing side, on average, firms increase the number of their top-quality 
patented inventions in terms of technological impact using the measure based on forward 
citations used previously (models 3 and 4 in Table 9). 
Second, I examine novelty by testing changes in the production of inventions that belong 
to technology areas in which the firm had no prior patents, using the IPC classes for patents 
owned by each firm going back to 1975. I find a significant increase in the number of patents 
filed in technological areas new to the firm for firms that experience the shock (model 4 in 
Table 9). As an alternative measure of novelty, I account for whether a firm’s patent is on a 
follow-on invention by measuring if it cites at least one of their own patents, using all the patents 
owned by firms from 1975. I find that the number of self-citing patents decreases after the shock 
for those filed in the US compared to those filed in France only (model 5 in Table 9). This 
indicates that following the decrease in exclusivity conferred by patents, firms that argued 
against this change engage more in innovative activities for which they do not own the 
knowledge they build on, such as exploratory research (March, 1991). 
Regarding changes in the composition of inputs, the quality of the data does not allow 
meaningful statistical analysis. The data set includes: 1) amount of R&D expenditure dedicated 
to basic and applied R&D and amount of R&D expenditure dedicated to development, with the 
sum being equal to total R&D expenditure; and 2) amount of internal R&D and amount of 
external R&D, the sum being equal to total R&D expenditure. After removing missing values, 
the sample size is less than a third of the original sample of over 23,132 firm-year observations. 
A difference-in-difference test between firms that patent in the US and firms that do not shows 
 95 
that both upstream R&D and external R&D increase (amounts normalized by firm size and 
logged).  
The increase in upstream R&D could indicate a shift towards higher value R&D 
activities. The increase in external R&D can be interpreted in two ways. This result could be 
consistent with firms moving to technological areas that are new to them and the need to rely 
on external knowledge acquisition to learn. However, another interpretation of this result is that 
firms are outsourcing the burden of determining whether an invention can be protected with 
patents under the new regime. In this view, rather than producing the inventions internally, they 
chose to acquire inventions that other firms have decided to patent and transfer. The level of 
detail on external R&D investments does not allow testing between these hypotheses. In 
addition, the results on the composition of R&D are based on a simplistic analysis of a limited 
data set and should be considered with some caution. 
 
 
Table 9 Quality and novelty of patented inventions (patent-year level) 



















Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Covariates Size, Group, Int’l, Competition 
Size, Group, Int’l, 
Competition 



















R-Squared 0.016 0.124 0.023 0.158 0.005 
Note: * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. Standard errors are in 





Each of the results on the composition of outputs and inputs of firms’ innovative activities on 
the losing side of the eBay case are simplistic difference-in-difference tests that are insufficient 
for making strong causal claims. Nevertheless, while these results are weak as standalone 
evidence, the accumulation of these observations is consistent with the second explanation for 
the increase in R&D investment. Firms that argued against the weakening of patents incur 
higher costs in R&D to shift their innovative activities towards higher potential value (upstream 
R&D and higher quality in terms of technological impact) or new sources of value (new 
technological areas and less follow-on inventions) to adapt to the disadvantageous change in 
the patent system created by the shock. This increase in costs may explain why firms argued in 
court against the weakening of patents. While firms argued that a consequence would be a loss 
of incentives to innovate, the observed reaction of firms based on the quantitative evidence is 
actually not entirely surprising. Their willingness to incur higher costs to continue innovating 
is consistent with the fact that innovation is a key source of competitive advantage in the 
knowledge-based economy in which firms operate. 
The results support a shift in the composition of inventions patented to adapt to the 
change in appropriability reducing the exclusivity that patents provide. These findings are 
consistent with Moser's (2005) work considering World Fairs in several countries, which found 
that while patents are not critical for firms’ incentives to innovate, they have a significant effect 





Although the research design proposed in this study offers several advantages, concerns – 
mostly related to using the reaction of foreign firms – can remain. The key robustness checks 
conducted to address these concerns are the following.48  
First, the variable capturing international patenting and, by construction, the measure of 
patenting propensity controls for changes specific to French firms. To further alleviate the 
concern regarding the specificity of the French case, I estimate the changes in French firms’ 
propensity to patent in countries other than the US over the same period to ensure the reliability 
of these findings (Appendix D). I find that the propensity of patenting decreases by 0.3% in 
Korea and Taiwan, which is ten times smaller than the change due to weakening patents in the 
US. A decrease by 1% is observable in the United Kingdom, which is about a third of the size 
found in the US.  
Second, events that potentially interact with the shock may be also located in the US. 
Two points need to be considered. The first is the existence of the International Trade 
Commission that still grants permanent injunctions on imported products when valid patents 
have been infringed. This makes the results in this study more conservative for firms that 
manufacture and import their products to the US that could experience either a status quo or a 
deterrence for investing in innovation due to the shock. The second is the Supreme Court case 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex INC (550 U.S. 398, 2007) in 2007, the decision of which 
rendered the combination of two elements unpatentable if the combination is obvious, which 
can be proven by the combination’s existence at the time of invention of the elements. Although 
this case could have had impacts on the machine industry, it has not been found to have clear 
effects on the patent system (Petherbridge and Wagner, 2007). In addition, while the decrease 
in patenting propensity may partly be explained by this event, the potential effect of this change 
 
48 Other additional robustness checks are detailed in an appendix available upon request. 
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on R&D investments is negative, which makes the size of the effect found in this study on this 
outcome more conservative.  
Third, while using the reaction of foreign firms helps control for the rival hypothesis 
called “regulatory capture” by Kortum and Lerner (1999), the US patent system may not be 
completely hermetic from French firms’ influence. As one French IP officer told me: 
“Industrial actors really try to talk to each other to influence public policies.” 
(Interview with the chief IP officer of an international manufacturing corporation in a 
discrete product industry, September 2016) 
One of the interviewees mentioned having previously worked on initiatives to harmonize the 
rules in meetings between IP5 (the top five patent offices in the world) and major industrial 
actors every two to three years. According to the interviewee, such meetings once included 
David Kappos, who was employed by IBM and later became Undersecretary of Commerce for 
Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
The potential existence of such indirect effects has to be acknowledged as a limitation of the 
research design in this study. Gaining a more precise understanding of French firms’ influence 
on the US patent system through these interactions would require a deeper investigation that is 
beyond the scope of this study.  
In addition, a key challenge is to distinguish between time trends and the effect of the 
shock on patent strength. All results are robust to including year fixed effects to account for 
trends (Appendix C), which were not included in the main models because of the collinearity 
issue with the variable capturing the shock.  
 The effect of the 2008 financial crisis is also of specific concern for time trends. First, 
robustness checks controlling for the crisis using a dummy variable are consistent with the 
findings (Appendix E). Second, for firms patenting in the US, the highest average R&D 
intensity was reached in 2007 with EUR225 thousand per employees. Decreases to EUR187 
thousand in 2008 and EUR88 in 2009 were observed. However, the level in 2010 showed an 
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increase almost back to the pre-crisis level at EUR186 thousand. Considering the results of this 
study, the decrease in patenting propensity found following 2006 may be due to considerations 
of cost reduction in patenting related to the financial crisis. On the other hand, the effect of the 
event on R&D intensity should be negative, which suggests that the size of the positive effect 
of weakening patents on R&D investments found in this study is conservative.  
There are also limitations in terms of generalizability of the results to the relationship 
between patent strength and innovation. While the shock leveraged a change in one of the 
defining aspects of intellectual property, it is focused on a particular tool (automatic 
injunctions) within an aspect of the strength of patents (the ability to exclude). The threat of 
injunction is relevant only if the potential cost is superior to going to court and being imposed 
an injunction. Firms might be leery of going to court to test this new limitation in the patent 
right:  
“Yes, they can’t get injunctions anymore, but it’s still less expensive to settle than to go 
to court. […] The cost of litigation in the US is between 3 and 5 million. So if someone 
asks us one million, we will pay the one million because we’re not certain to be able to 
invalidate the patent.” (Interview with the Chief IP officer of a manufacturing 
corporation in optics and other materials, 2016) 
Therefore, for firms that have the ability to pay, the eBay case may have no effect when the 
knowledge they are accused of infringing has a value lower than the cost of litigation. This 
suggests that the changes in patenting and R&D investments found in this study are 
conservative because these cases contribute to reducing the variance. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that the eBay case occurred in the context of a given initial 
level of patent strength. This level of strength, based on the review of the academic literature 
and policies, can be considered high. The empirical outcomes that may be associated with 
further reductions in patent exclusivity are unclear. 
The results of this study build on the existing literature combined with empirical 
evidence from the eBay case to provide new insights on the effects of excludability through IP 
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rights. A lower ability to exclude others from using patented knowledge pulls the nature of 
patents away from a property by definition. Therefore, this study provides evidence of the 
impact of a change in a key aspect of the patent system. The findings are generalizable to other 
aspects of patent strength to some extent. Patentability and breadth are the two other aspects of 
the three-dimension categorization proposed by Walsh et al. (2016). Given a certain level of 
excludability X, a change in patentability on a subject matter is a change between zero and X 
in terms of excludability for the given subject matter. Depending on the technological area of 
the subject matter and the firm type, the results of this study are applicable in a straightforward 
way. On the other hand, the generalizability of these results to a change in the breadth of 
interpretation of claims, which translates into how close a rival’s invention can be without 
infringing on a patented invention, is not straightforward and calls for a more cautious and 
extensive discussion.  
3.7 Conclusion 
The existing literature has already significantly extended our understanding of the mechanisms 
involved in firms’ patent strategy and the relationship between patent strength and innovation. 
These mechanisms have been studied from both sides of the on-going debate regarding this 
relationship. Therefore, the approach in this study consists in using the qualitative empirical 
evidence as a starting point to identify which of these existing insights are the most relevant to 
improving our understanding of the understudied aspect of excludability.  
This study supports each theoretical contribution with carefully designed empirical 
methods and rich data sets that aim to advance the state of the art in research designs to address 
this question. The research design solves for common identification and measurement issues 
by examining foreign firms’ reactions to a shock in the US. The use of mixed methods and the 
exhaustive population panel data allows this study to produce empirical evidence and make 
robust interpretations of the results concerning the mechanisms involved.  
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The findings of this study provide evidence that a decrease in patents’ ability to exclude 
can lead to more investments in innovation alongside a reduction in patenting. The uniform rate 
observed across firm types is explained by different underlying mechanisms contingent on 
industry and resources. 
 For large firms in complex product industries, this study finds that a reduction in 
patents’ ability to exclude has the following consequences. First, as the result of a lower risk 
when facing other patent holders and lower costs incurred in building a patenting portfolio, 
such firms have higher incentives to invest in innovative activities. Second, patenting 
propensity decreases due to a decrease in the need for preemptive patenting. The quality of 
patents in the portfolios of large firms in complex product industries increases due to a reduction 
of the patents with low technological impacts used for preemptive purposes. 
 On the other hand, for SMEs and for firms in non-complex product industries, a 
reduction in the ability to exclude others from using patented knowledge has very different 
consequences. First, the propensity to use patents as an appropriability mechanism decreases. 
Second, such firms increase their investments in R&D. However, this change is not the 
reflection of an increase in incentives to invest in innovative activities but rather a reflection of 
efforts made to adapt to the institutional changes created by the shock. Evidence suggests that 
the lower ability to exclude using patents forces firms to shift the composition of their 
innovative activities, which explains the increase in R&D costs. The quantitative analysis 
shows that firms on the losing side do not lose incentives to innovate contrary to the arguments 
made by such firms in the qualitative evidence. Their arguments and positions against the 
changes are consistent with innovation being central in our knowledge-based economy for 
firms’ competitiveness and the possibility that firms may have anticipated these increased costs. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS AND INFORMATION IN THE 
POLICY PROCESS 
4.1 Introduction 
Policy decisions are typically made in environments loaded with information, within which 
identifying and collecting the most relevant information is costly. In addition, policy decisions 
often require technical knowledge. Stakeholders can advance their private agendas by 
strategically providing information, taking advantage of the information asymmetry to 
influence decision-makers (among others: Brocas and Carrillo, 2007; Cyert and March, 1963; 
March, 1987, 1962). Stakeholder can use information to directly enlighten policymakers (Weiss, 
1995, 1993, 1980), reframe policy problems (Daviter, 2015), and influence skeptical decision-
makers (Andrews and Edwards, 2004; Eden, 1998; Ganz and Soule, 2019). 
This chapter discusses the role of information and stakeholders in two phases of the 
policy process in the Supreme Court. The work by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) on the 
usefulness of different types of information at different phases of the policy process advances 
our understanding of how stakeholders and policymakers are likely to use information in policy 
settings other than the courts. In this view, entropic information, defined as information with 
high diversity in content supported by various sources, is useful at the agenda setting phase. On 
the other hand, expert information, providing deep knowledge from experts on narrow aspects 
of policy problems, is more useful at the policymaking phase to enable policymakers to make 
an informed decision when choosing a policy solution. Baumgartner and Jones (2015) point out 
a lack of empirical evidence in policy process theories in general and undertake steps to support 
their arguments using historical data from local, state, and federal budgets.  
However, Baumgartner and Jones’ study mostly uses data in a descriptive manner and 
is not able to overcome the traditional issues in isolating causal mechanisms (de Figueiredo and 
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Richter, 2014; Keim and Baysinger, 1988) that are faced by most studies examining the 
potential influence of stakeholders in policymaking, as detailed in Chapter 1.  
In addition, existing policy process literature focuses on theory and empirical evidence 
almost exclusively concerning the executive and legislative branches of government, 
overlooking the judicial branch (Sabatier and Weible, 2014). Policy process studies on the role 
of information (e.g. Baumgartner and Jones, 2015; Daviter, 2015; Weiss, 1993) present the 
same gap. 
In light of these gaps, this chapter makes three contributions. First, I extend the policy 
process theory proposed by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) to the judicial branch of government. 
To identify the relevance of the arguments made by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) to the 
judicial branch of government, I rely on the legal and political science literature on the Supreme 
Court (among many others: Corley, 2011; Gely and Spiller, 1989; Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997). 
I also build on the organization theory literature that provides insights on the role of information 
applicable to interactions between stakeholders and policymakers (among others: Brocas and 
Carrillo, 2007; Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1987, 1962). This extension notes the unique 
features of the context of court-made policy: the agenda setting phase is distinct from the 
policymaking phase, there is a restricted set of alternatives to consider in the policymaking 
phase and a need to be consistent with past decisions following the principle of “stare decisis” 
(as detailed in Chapter 2). I use these features to argue that the roles of entropic and expert 
information in each phase of the policy process are more clearly discernible for the judicial 
branch of government compared to other policy settings.  
Second, I demonstrate that using the judicial branch of government as a novel empirical 
setting provides opportunities to present empirical evidence on the role of information and 
stakeholders. The policy process literature (Sabatier, 2007) as well as the literature on the use 
of information in policy (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015) struggles to propose testable theories 
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and empirical evidence. The aim of this study is to overcome traditional challenges and provide 
evidence on the role of stakeholders and different types of information on policymaking. 
By studying patent-related policymaking at the US Supreme Court, I exploit a setting 
in which information is provided by stakeholders (litigants and amici) through a recorded 
procedure that results in observable interactions between stakeholders and policymakers 
(Justices). As detailed in Chapter 2, the judicial branch of government provides unique 
opportunities to conduct empirical studies with archival data on defined policy problems (legal 
cases focused on a specific question) and status quo (established laws and jurisprudence), 
stakeholder participation (parties and amici), the transfer of information (briefs and oral 
arguments), a clear distinction between the agenda setting (certiorari phase) and the 
policymaking phase (merits phase), as well as observable argumentations of the policymaker’s 
decisions (final ruling in an opinion). For the agenda setting phase, I conduct a case study of 
the interactions between stakeholders and the Justices on all petitioning cases on a given topic 
in a time period that includes two cases that reached the agenda and resulted in policy changes. 
For the policymaking phase, I build a panel data set comprising all the patent-related Supreme 
Court cases over 2000-2015 that involve 1,155 unique stakeholders engaged 2,549 times in the 
form of parties or amici. 
Third, I also aim to contribute to the legal literature. Legal scholars have long 
recognized the Supreme Court as a policymaker (Dahl, 1957) and examined various aspect of 
the certiorari phase (among others: Black and Boyd, 2012; Black and Owens, 2009; Caldeira 
and Wright, 1988) as well as the merits phase (among others: Corley, 2011; Johnson, 1997; 
Segal and Spaeth, 2002). Empirical evidence has shown that information provided by 
stakeholders influences the Court (Black and Boyd, 2012; Caldeira and Wright, 1988; Chien, 
2010; Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997). To the best of my knowledge, however, this literature has 
not examined the role of different types of information. Empirical evidence on the effect of 
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information provided by stakeholders on the Supreme Court has been primarily obtained in 
previous research by using plagiarism software to examine the overall language of briefs and 
opinions (Chien, 2010; Collins et al., 2015; Corley, 2011; Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997). These 
studies do not make a distinction between the diversity and level of expertise of participating 
stakeholders and the arguments they make. Therefore, this study improves our understanding 
of legal policymaking by acknowledging the differential roles of unique types of information.   
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
 “This ‘information as diversity’ is very different from information as expertise and 
each is applicable to different parts of the process of decision making.” (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 2015, p. 47) 
Baumgartner and Jones (2015) distinguish two types of information used by policymakers: 
entropic information and expert information. The authors argue that each type of information 
is useful in a different phase of the policy process. Entropic information refers to a set of diverse 
arguments (content of the information provided) supported by diverse, non-redundant 
stakeholders. This type of information can help order a chaotic information environment by 
“operating in the problem space when trying to define and prioritize diverse signals that may 
indicate difficulties in the environment” (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015, p. 41). Entropic 
information helps policymakers set an agenda by considering the full picture in order to 
prioritize problems on which to focus and to define the boundaries of problems that are often 
complex (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015; Simon, 1973).  
Expert information, on the other hand, is obtained from a specialized group of experts 
to elicit deeper knowledge on specific agenda items. This type of information is useful in the 
policymaking phase in which policymakers try to solve the problems that are on their agenda 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2015). However, in practice, policy problems are often too complex 
to define before obtaining any expert information. This creates a “chicken and egg” situation 
for policymakers because the resources to collect expert information will be invested only once 
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a problem is identified as an agenda item that requires such effort. Therefore, based on their 
observation of the elected branches of government, Baumgartner and Jones (2015) point out 
that policymakers often conduct both agenda setting and policymaking simultaneously.  
The first key difference in the judicial branch of government is the certiorari phase 
followed by the merits phase at the Supreme Court. This creates a clearer distinction between 
agenda setting and policymaking compared to other settings. As a result, the courts also provide 
an opportunity to distinguish between the way in which information is used and the way in 
which stakeholders behave in the two phases.  
A second key difference is that the set of problems and policy solutions to choose from 
in the policymaking phase in the judicial branch is constrained in comparison to the elected 
branches of government. The Supreme Court selects problems from a pool of cases tried in 
lower courts, and decisions made to solve such problems requires the consideration of fewer 
alternative solutions compared to those made by the executive and legislative branches. A 
solution adopted by the Supreme Court among this restricted pool of solutions must be 
supported to be perceived as legitimate. As a result, a key difference in terms of the 
policymaking phase is that Supreme Court Justices may be more interested in supporting a 
policy decision with multiple arguments than deeply understanding narrow aspects of the issue. 
Consequently, I argue that the diversity of arguments can have a role in the policymaking phase 
in the judicial branch. Its potential role beyond the agenda setting phase is not discussed for the 
elected branches of government (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015). Discussions and empirical 
results based on the two discernable phases in the court setting provide a starting point to engage 
with the potential role of entropic information in the policymaking phase in general policy 
settings.  
Third, policymaking in the Supreme Court is made under the weight of past decisions 
that establish an institutional environment in which shifts in perceptions are difficult to induce. 
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In the Supreme Court, decisions must account for the existing law and legal precedents. Any 
departure from precedent requires justification to grant legitimacy to the newly adopted 
jurisprudence. However, decisions in the agenda setting phase do not need to be officially 
justified, whereas arguments supporting decisions in the policymaking phase must be made 
public. Therefore, legal arguments are likely to be used to discuss consistency with past 
decisions and expertise is likely to be needed to justify a departure. As a result, expert 
information provided by stakeholders is likely to influence the policymaking phase, consistent 
with predictions based on the elected branches of government (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015). 
In this organizational structure, Justices receive information from stakeholders’ 
arguments and behavioral “cues” that potentially influence their decision to review a case and 
to select a solution among alternatives. Political scientists have examined the Court’s use of 
cues to swiftly determine cases that may be discarded from the ones deserving more scrutiny, 
and whether stakeholders strategically manipulate such cues (e.g., Caldeira and Wright, 1988; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1963; Ulmer, 1984, among others). Supreme Court Justices make these 
decisions within the constraints, incentives, and limitations they face as policymakers 
(presented in Chapter 2). In this context, parties and amici as stakeholders are self-interested 
actors that have incentives to strategically supply policymakers with information. Therefore, in 
this section, I elaborate on the role of stakeholders and information in the two phases of the 
policy process in the Supreme Court and propose a set of hypotheses to guide data analysis in 
the empirical part of this chapter. 
4.2.1 Entropy 
“To distinguish it from expertise, we term this form of information as entropic 
information. A receiver has more information when messages on a variety of topics are 
produced by multiple nonredundant sources.” (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015, p. 47) 
The notion of entropic information as defined by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) involves two 
dimensions of diversity: diversity of the arguments and of the stakeholders providing the 
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arguments. Baumgartner and Jones (2015) propose to operationalize this construct by using 
measures based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Herfindahl, 1950; Hirschman, 1945) or 
Shannon’s index (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), essentially accounting for the dispersion of 
arguments across various sources.  
 To examine how this concept is likely to impact the two phases of the policy process in 
the courts, I distinguish the two dimensions of diversity involved and discuss the underlying 
reasons why each may or may not matter for the Supreme Court as a policymaker. I discuss 
whether entropic information is likely to influence the agenda setting phase (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2015) in the judicial branch of government and whether we can expect diversity to matter 
in the policymaking phase as well. 
4.2.1.1 Diversity of stakeholders 
Diversity of sources of information is desirable because policy issues are complex. Therefore, 
no single stakeholder is expected to provide an accurate and complete view of problems 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2015). In the judicial branch of government, this may be less of a 
concern because more time and resources are spent in the policy process and it is an adversary 
system (Larsen, 2012). In an adversary system, “if one party presents unreliable or flawed 
evidence to support his factual claim, then we can count on the other party to point this out” 
(Larsen, 2012, p. 1257). This tension increases the quality of the information for the 
policymaker and makes withholding relevant information more difficult for stakeholders. 
The diversity of stakeholders is also likely to be important for other reasons in the 
Supreme Court. A conceivable objective of the Court in a democratic system like the United 
States is to make policy decisions following democratic principles (Dahl, 1957). The Justices 
can consider the number of stakeholders on each side of a case as a proxy for saliency – the 
economic, political, and social importance of the case (Caldeira and Wright, 1988). 
Participation itself is an indicator of how many actors find a problem important enough to 
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dedicate resources to participate (Caldeira and Wright, 1990; Songer and Kuersten, 1995). 
According to Black and Boyd (2012), if saliency is a key indicator for Supreme Court Justices, 
the probability of a case being reviewed should uniformly increase with the number of amici 
because Justices want to tackle “important and far-reaching” cases. Empirical evidence in the 
Supreme Court shows that the presence of amici increases a case’s likelihood of being granted 
certiorari, but does not seem to affect the merits phase (Caldeira and Wright, 1988). This 
finding supports the view that stakeholder diversity matters for the agenda setting phase 
consistent with the argument made by Baumgartner and Jones (2015). Baumgartner and Jones 
(2015) do not discuss the role of entropic information for the policymaking phase, implicitly 
suggesting either that entropic information is likely to have no effect or may have a negligible 
effect. This view is consistent with the lack of an effect found in the merits phase. 
H1: Diversity of stakeholders positively influences agenda setting in the judicial 
branch of government 
4.2.1.2 Diversity of arguments  
According to Baumgartner and Jones (2015), a diversity of arguments is desirable because it 
can provide the most exhaustive view of the world when selecting problems to put on a 
policymaking agenda. In addition, a broad range of views are needed to understand policy 
problems because they are often complex (or “wicked”) (Rittel and Webber, 1973) and not 
well-defined (Simon, 1973). The Supreme Court tackles a broad range of topics and complex 
interdisciplinary issues (see the list in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2). Therefore, intuitively, the 
argument made by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) could be applicable to the agenda setting 
phase of the Supreme Court.  
However, the legal literature suggests otherwise. To the best of my knowledge, the legal 
literature has paid little attention to the diversity of arguments made in court for both the agenda 
setting and policymaking phase. A key point that studies on the agenda setting phase of the 
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Supreme Court consistently point out is that the Court receives a heavy load of petitions and 
relies on “cues” to make decisions speedily (Baum, 1993; Black and Boyd, 2012; Black and 
Owens, 2009; Songer, 1979; Teger and Kosinski, 1980). This may be why studies have taken 
more interest in the presence of advocates filing amicus briefs as a potentially influential factor 
rather than the content itself for the certiorari phase. Shapiro (1984, p. 24) even recommends 
that advocates “never file an amicus brief opposing certiorari” because it “merely highlights 
the importance of the case and thus conveys an impression exactly the opposite of the 
impression the amicus organization wishes to convey.” Therefore, the diversity of the content 
of briefs is not expected to be influential in the certiorari phase of the Supreme Court. As a 
result, the effect in the Court is expected to be the opposite of the effect that Baumgartner and 
Jones (2015) predict in the agenda setting phase based on other policy settings.  
On the other hand, previous studies have found that briefs in the merits phase provide 
information that helps Justices anticipate the impact of each alternative policy solution (Spriggs, 
1996; Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997). While participation itself does not matter directly 
(Caldeira and Wright, 1988), the information brought by participants matters. Empirical 
evidence from several studies supports the view that the content of parties’ briefs and amicus 
briefs influence the Court in the policymaking phase (Collins, 2004; Corley, 2011; Spriggs and 
Wahlbeck, 1997). To the best of my knowledge, no studies in the merits phase have examined 
the effect of the diversity of arguments provided. I argue that the diversity of arguments is likely 
to have a positive impact on the policymaking phase in the judicial branch of government. The 
effect of diverse information in the policymaking phase has not been discussed by Baumgartner 
and Jones (2015) on other policy settings. However, as mentioned previously, this explicitly 
suggests that no effect or a negligible one was expected.  
In the elected branches of government and most policy settings considered by the policy 
process literature, the policymaking phase consists of selecting the best possible policy solution 
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from a multitude of potential solutions. Therefore, as pointed out by Baumgartner and Jones 
(2015), a deep understanding of the problem based on expert information is more desirable than 
a diverse set of information. Conversely, the structure of the policymaking phase in the Court 
consists of choosing between a small set of alternatives. While the Justices can introduce some 
nuance in their ruling, the Supreme Court ultimately rules in favor of the petitioner(s) or the 
respondent(s). Therefore, the objective of the court is to decide which side wins and how by 
choosing between a restricted set of alternatives, and to ensure that the decision will be 
perceived as legitimate (Dahl, 1957; Murphy, 1964).  
In particular, the Supreme Court’s actions are undertaken in tension between legal 
considerations and policy considerations. Changes in the socioeconomic environment may 
justify a departure from the status quo. The Justices need to justify their decisions to make or 
reject such a departure in consistency with the body of law (Dahl, 1957; Supreme Court of the 
United States, 2017). In addition, as detailed in section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2, the Justices aim to 
advance individual agendas based on their own ideology and policy preferences (Dahl, 1957; 
Sheehan et al., 1992). Therefore, Justices can be expected to value the opportunity to support 
decisions with both legal arguments and policy arguments.  
Legitimate decisions can be made by supporting the choice with the most compelling 
arguments. As a result, there is value for the Justices in obtaining a diverse set of arguments to 
use in support of the final ruling. One of the dimensions of entropic information, diversity of 
arguments, may have a role in the policymaking phase of the judicial branch of government. 
The same argument is not applicable to the agenda setting phase. In addition to having finite 
resources to focus on the content of briefs due to high loads of petitions, the Justices are not 
required to justify rejections in the certiorari phase.  
H2a: Diversity of arguments does not influence agenda setting in the judicial branch 
of government 
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H2b: The position supported by a higher diversity of arguments is likely to win at the 
policymaking phase in the judicial branch of government 
4.2.2 Expertise 
Baumgartner and Jones (2015, p. 46) argue that in the policymaking phase, “in determining 
what solution fits a given problem, we rely heavily on experts (or at least we ought to).” In 
court, these experts can participate as stakeholders. In addition, both expert stakeholders and 
those who are not experts can cite publications produced by experts to support their arguments. 
Expert information, also referred to as technical knowledge or scientific knowledge in the 
literature, matters in the policy process because it helps policymakers design better policies and 
successfully solve problems (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015; Bendor and Meirowitz, 2004; 
Callander, 2008; Weiss, 1980).  
A body of work in the policy learning literature by Carol Weiss examines how 
knowledge can help policymakers make better decisions (Weiss, 1995, 1980). Weiss introduces 
the concept of knowledge creeping (1980); the use of information may not be discernible 
immediately and information is not necessarily directly used. Indirect influence can occur when 
consistent evidence accumulates to shape the policymaker’s vision of the problems and the 
alternative solutions over time (Weiss, 1993, 1980). This is a long-term process of 
“enlightenment” that can take “five or ten years or more before decision-makers respond” and 
transforms their policy decisions (Weiss, 1993). Sabatier (1988) builds on this view to argue 
that stakeholders are central to this learning process. While some types of belief are permanent 
(“core beliefs”), certain types of beliefs (“secondary beliefs”) can change when evidence is 
received. This is consistent with the argument made by Baumgartner and Jones (2015). 
However, the reason for the influence of expertise is not limited to its potential “enlightening” 
function.  
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In the political science literature, Callander (2008) argues that expertise is not simply a 
piece of information that is transferred from an expert to a layperson that turns the layperson 
into an expert. Depending on the complexity of the issue, the lay person will acquire a certain 
level of expertise. Despite this persisting asymmetry of information, expert information can be 
influential on policy decisions because of the legitimacy that it conveys. Expertise has an 
intrinsic authority due to the assumption that it is based on an objective, rational, and rigorous 
process of production and controlled by the expert and scientific community that produced it 
(Nelkin, 1975). As a result, supporting an argument with science can “de-politicize public 
issues” (Nelkin, 1975). This perceived legitimacy may be borne by experts as 
individuals/organizations, by whomever makes arguments supported by information produced 
by experts, or both.  
Literature that examines the policy processes in the elected branches of government 
finds that expertise is sought out by policymakers to make decisions that are perceived as 
legitimate (Boswell, 2008; Eden, 1998; Ganz and Soule, 2019). Ganz and Soule (2019) point 
out that, according to the social movement literature, stakeholders such as environmental 
movement organizations use scientific expertise to legitimate policy claims, especially to 
influence skeptical decision makers. In the policymaking phase, Jasanoff (1990) remarks that 
even during periods of “bitter ideological confrontations,” scientific advisory committees are 
perceived as indispensable to help policymakers make decisions on technical problems, and the 
work these committees conduct remains “curiously sheltered” in the eyes of the public in 
American politics. Also, Ganz and Soule (2019) find that environmental movement 
organizations are influential in the policymaking phase in Congress due to their “scientific 
expertise and perceived legitimacy.” 
The Supreme Court has an interdependent relationship with the elected branches of 
government. This is exemplified by the appointment of new Justices. Another example is that 
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the number of seats on the Supreme Court bench and the jurisdiction of the Court can in theory 
be modified by the executive and the legislative branches, although elected branches rarely 
exercise their power on the Supreme Court in this way (as detailed in Chapter 2). Elected 
branches of government are likely to be sensitive to the legitimacy that their constituency 
perceives regarding the Supreme Court’s decisions when interacting with the Court. As a result, 
the Supreme Court’s power is particularly dependent on legitimacy (Baum, 1977; Epstein et al., 
1989; Gely and Spiller, 1989; McCubbins et al., 2005, 1994b; Spiller and Gely, 1992; Spiller 
and Tiller, 1997). Therefore, expert information is likely to influence the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in both phases of the policy process. This is likely to be especially true in cases 
involving highly technical issues, such as environmental protection or intellectual property, 
which typically involve significant processing costs in addition to search costs. On the other 
hand, expert information focused on legal matters is likely to involve lower search and 
processing costs given the legal expertise of Justices and their clerks.  
In addition, there is an asymmetry of information between the Supreme Court and 
stakeholders who are experts for those technical issues. In comparison, this may not be the case 
for other topics, such as First Amendment rights issues. When there is asymmetry of 
information, the organizational theory literature has established that information can be used as 
a source of power (Brocas and Carrillo, 2007; Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1987, 1962; 
Nelkin, 1975). Therefore, consistently with Baumgartner and Jones' (2015) argument, expertise 
can be expected to influence the policymaking phase. On the other hand, the existence of an 
influence of expertise on the agenda setting phase depends on which mechanism is involved. If 
the Supreme Court is being “enlightened” by expertise, the impact is the same in the agenda 
setting phase. However, if the Supreme Court uses expertise as a way to legitimize their 
decision, expertise is likely to matter less in the agenda setting phase because there is no 
obligation for the Court to justify its decision and decisions have lower visibility to the public 
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due to the heavy load of petitions. “Enlightenment” occurs when the content of the information 
convinces the Court, regardless of who supplied the information. On the other hand, legitimacy 
in using expertise can also be obtained by using experts’ advice regardless of the content. 
Therefore, I test two rival hypotheses: 
H3a (enlightenment hypothesis – expert information regardless of supplier): 
Stakeholders win by enlightening policymakers with expert information at both the 
agenda setting phase and the policymaking phase in the judicial branch of government  
H3b (legitimation hypothesis – expertise regardless of content): Stakeholders win by 
helping policymakers legitimate their decisions at the policymaking phase in the 
judicial branch of government  
4.2.3 Indirect effects: Strategic supply of information  
The Justices’ actions and goals are not likely to be limited to adopting the best policies by 
relying on the most exhaustive view of the world possible. As detailed in Chapter 2, they have 
policy preferences and cognitive limitations that influence how they make decisions and filter 
the information obtained from stakeholders. As mentioned in the previous section, in cases with 
an asymmetry of information, stakeholders have institutional power to influence policymakers 
(Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1987, 1962) and can be expected to strategically supply them 
with information. This section discusses additional mechanisms that may alter the extent to 
which entropic information and expertise influence the policy process in the Supreme Court. 
4.2.3.1 New information to “shift” attention 
Daviter (2015, p. 494) points out that the view that information is used to “inform the search 
for suitable policy solutions” in the policy process is narrow and simplistic. Information is not 
simply used to solve policy problems; it can also frame them (Jones, 1994). Actors with private 
information can influence others by making some amount of such information available (Brocas 
and Carrillo, 2007). The information disclosed can be new “enlightening” information or can 
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shed light on information that was already available but had received little attention 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2015).  
 New information can be used in a strategic way to create “knowledge shifts” that explain 
policy change. This expression is used in opposition to “knowledge creep,” which leads to 
incremental changes. Scott Ganz reviews the literature on the role of experts in policymaking 
(Ganz, 2018; Ganz and Soule, 2019) and points out that from the 1980s, the academic literature 
has examined how information asymmetry and the misalignment in goals between an 
uninformed principal (e.g. policymakers) and expert stakeholders creates situations of agency 
in the elected branches of government (Crawford and Sobeli, 1982; Ganz, 2018; Gilligan et al., 
1987). In parallel, the literature on behavioral theory finds that in situations of conflicts of 
interest within an organization, coalitions of actors use information for institutional power 
(Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1987, 1962). As a result, stakeholders participating in Supreme 
Court cases also potentially strategically use their knowledge to influence the framing of 
problems. 
 Rare events such as major policy changes can be triggered by knowledge that 
fundamentally shifts the perceptions of the status quo (Baumgartner, 2013; Hall, 1993). 
Knowledge can create dramatic changes despite the weight of past decisions. This institutional 
inertia, also referred to as “the power of status quo,” constrains policy change to a minimal 
level most of the time (Hall, 1993). The degree to which a status quo has been discredited will 
affect the perceived need to look for alternatives. The perception of such a need is also referred 
to as a change in policy image in the punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner et al., 2014; 
True et al., 1999) and is likely to be triggered by knowledge. Policy change through this 
mechanism involves the co-existence of long periods of incremental policy change punctuated 
by occasional major changes. Empirical evidence of such major policy changes have been 
examined using the US federal budget (Baumgartner, 2013) and data from other countries’ 
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executive and legislative branches (Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson, 2006; Penner et al., 2006; 
Soroka, 2002). Evidence is descriptive rather than causal because of the identification and 
measurement challenges detailed previously (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014; Pittman, 1977; 
Zardkoohi, 1985). 
In the policy process literature, scholars who have considered information as useful to 
inform better policy decisions have also acknowledged and examined the “multifaceted” role 
of knowledge (Weiss, 1977) and the use of technical information to confirm pre-existing beliefs 
(Sabatier, 1978). However, this strategic behavior has been given little importance in the 
“enlightenment” view or in policy learning theories. Recent studies (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2015; Daviter, 2015) and recent political events in the United States, such as the growing 
concern for “fake news,” have shown that significantly more weight should be put on the 
strategic use of knowledge when explaining politics and policymaking. 
4.2.3.2 Bias towards stakeholders 
The legal and political science literature has widely accepted that Supreme Court Justices’ 
ideologies and personal preferences that guide their decisions cannot be ignored (Baum, 1977; 
Dahl, 1957; Martin and Quinn, 2007; Murphy, 1964).  
Many studies have examined the attitude of Justices towards different types of 
stakeholders (Black and Boyd, 2012; Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Sheehan et al., 1992). In the 
policymaking phase, several studies do not find empirical evidence that stakeholders’ status 
affects the final ruling (Collins, 2004; Paul M. Collins, 2007; Sheehan et al., 1992). In the 
agenda setting phase, multiple studies have found significant results regarding the influence of 
the status of stakeholders (among others: Black and Boyd, 2012; Black and Owens, 2009; 
Mcguire and Caldeira, 1993).  
Recent work by Black and Boyd (2012) builds on existing insights and finds evidence 
that the status of stakeholders does not explain the Supreme Court’s decision by itself. Using 
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empirical data in the certiorari phase, Black and Boyd (2012) find that the status of litigants 
and interest groups as amici matters in interaction with Justices’ political orientations. Liberal 
Justices tend to favor “underdogs” (operationalized as essentially all actors that are not 
corporate or governmental litigants) over “upperdogs,” while conservative Justices behave in 
the opposite direction. In addition, with liberal Justices, “underdogs” obtain some benefit from 
having interests groups as advocates whereas “upperdogs” do not (Black and Boyd, 2012). 
These results show a more nuanced effect in the judicial branch of government compared to the 
result for the elected branches of government in which Galanter (1974) finds that the “haves” 
simply obtain better outcomes than the “have nots” (which respectively refer to “underdogs” 
and “upperdogs”). In addition, this shows that the Supreme Court Justices’ policy preferences 
act as filters of the information obtained from stakeholders and observations of stakeholders’ 
behavior.  
These findings suggest that obtaining an exhaustive view of the world may be secondary 
to the Justices allocating attention based on their preferences. Both stakeholder type and the 
stakeholder’s resources are likely to be influential factors. However, to the best of my 
knowledge, all the empirical evidence provided by legal scholars use cases in tackling question 
with some extent of partisan orientation that is likely to drive the Justices’ vote. Although the 
empirical part of this chapter uses a setting with a non-partisan issue,49 I control for stakeholder 
types, and particularly for indications that they are “haves.” 
4.2.3.3 Information to feed confirmation bias 
Decision-making in policy is vulnerable to confirmation biases. A policymaker can voluntarily 
search for information that supports and legitimizes a pre-existing belief. Such behavior can 
also be less deliberate. Humans have a tendency to “draw one-sided evidence from ambiguous 
 
49 As detailed in section 4.3.1: Supreme Court Justices were unanimous in two-thirds of the 
cases decided over the period 2000-2015 and among the remaining third, none of the dissents 
followed party lines. 
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evidence” and this bias is related to personal beliefs (Lewis, 2008). Kahneman and Egan (2011) 
point out that as people look for evidence to make a decision, their minds work like those of 
lawyers trying to find evidence that will exonerate their client; people look for information to 
support their preconceived notions. As a result, even if policymakers are making decisions in 
good faith, they could be using information with selection bias due to their pre-existing 
preferences (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015).  
 Justices of the Supreme Court are trained as lawyers and make decisions based on their 
policy preferences (Black and Owens, 2009; Martin and Quinn, 2007; Segal and Spaeth, 2002). 
To make these decisions and fulfill their policy goals, they need information regarding the 
potential impact of alternatives, and this information partly comes from the stakeholders (party 
and amici) (Caldeira and Wright, 1990; Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1997). As previously mentioned, 
a situation of asymmetry between the better-informed stakeholder and the policymaker creates 
a situation in which the stakeholder communicates just enough information to induce the 
policymaker “to respond to it and holding back enough so that his response is as favorable as 
possible” (Crawford and Sobeli, 1982). Therefore, assuming that stakeholders are self-
interested entities, if they have knowledge about the Justices’ preferences, they are likely to 
filter the information they provide based on their anticipated reaction.  
The stakeholders’ arguments are likely to reflect the arguments that Justices have 
previously signaled that they find legitimate. Using such information, the stakeholders can 
frame a problem to influence Justices more efficiently. In this case, stakeholders who have the 




4.3 Empirical Setting 
4.3.1 Patent policymaking in the Supreme Court 
To empirically examine the role of different types of information and stakeholders in the two 
phases of the policy process in the judicial branch of government, I use the setting of patent 
policymaking in the Supreme Court over the period 2000-2015. Key advantages of this as an 
empirical setting are the following (discussed in further detail in section 2.5.3 in Chapter 2).  
 First, patents are a relatively non-partisan policy topic (Sag et al., 2009). Therefore, 
outcomes are not predicted by partisanship and information can potentially influence policy 
decisions. Second, understanding patent-related issues requires expertise related to technology 
and the socio-economic incentives behind patent strategies. Therefore, there is an asymmetry 
of information between stakeholders and policymakers, and as a result, policymakers are likely 
to need expertise. Third, the Supreme Court has been a central policymaker over the period of 
the study (Holbrook, 2013).  
 The setting also presents advantages in terms of identification and measurement. Unlike 
other policy settings, the exchange of information between stakeholders and policymakers, 
including the arguments made to advocate for a stakeholder’s position (briefs) or justify a policy 
decision (opinions) are available in archival data. There is variation in the participation behavior 
and the information exchange, as opposed to lobbying in other branches of the government. 
Policy problems are clearly defined and the two phases of the policy process are distinct. 
Supreme Court Justices are appointed for life and no lobbying is permitted in court. Therefore, 
concerns for financial incentives and constituency-building are very limited.  
These features solve for the three key traditional challenges faced by studies in isolating 
causal mechanisms between the behavior of stakeholders in the policy process and policy 
outcomes (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014; Pittman, 1977; Zardkoohi, 1985). Nevertheless, 
this setting has its limitations. First, entities who have a stake in the policy issue may not be 
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participants. Free-riding behavior is not observable and there is a concern of selection bias. 
However, the relatively low cost of filing a brief, lower than USD 20,000 (Caldeira and Wright, 
1988; Chien, 2010) in comparison with the resources required to lobby, suggest that the barrier 
for participating is low. In addition, the cost can be shared with other stakeholders by submitting 
a brief as a group, which mitigates the concern of selection bias.  
Among all cases handled by the Supreme Court, patent cases represent less than 2% 
(see Chapter 2 for detail) and all cases cannot be generalized as non-partisan. Some topics, such 
as abortion or civil rights, may allow little external influence and the main predictors of the 
decision may be the number of Justices that have strong political preferences on the topic. 
Therefore, results will not be applicable to the same extent to Supreme Court cases in other 
topics. Nevertheless, this study provides information about how Justices and stakeholders are 
likely to behave and influence each other within the latitude allowed by topics and the strength 
of preferences of the Justices on the bench. These results are more clearly generalizable to cases 
in which the question is apolitical and the Justices are non-expert. 
4.3.2 Key variables of interest 
4.3.2.1 Outcome  
For the agenda setting phase, the key outcome is whether a case was placed on the agenda of 
the policymaker. In this study, this outcome is measured by the decision of the Supreme Court 
as a whole to grant or deny review in each petition. A limitation of this study is that I am unable 
to observe the votes of each Justice or their interaction with clerks when information is 
processed.  
 Regarding the policymaking phase, there are two key outcomes. The first is being on 
the winning side in the final ruling on a case. Second, I measure how many arguments made by 
the Supreme Court in the opinion overlap with arguments made in briefs submitted by 
stakeholders.   
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4.3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
One of the novel contributions of this study is its systematic analysis of arguments using cited 
cases as a proxy for the arguments. By scraping the briefs for regular patterns, I am able to 
associate all stakeholders with the legal precedents and the documents produced by experts that 
they cited. Therefore, I can map the arguments made by stakeholders on the winning and losing 
sides across multiple cases. The key independent variables are entropic information, related 
dimensions of diversity, and expert information. 
 Baumgartner and Jones (2015) propose to measure entropic information with an entropy 
index that involves using a Markov process to provide a probabilistic representation of how 
much information is produced by each source (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). In this study, I 
distinguish the two aspects of diversity involved in the notion of entropic information defined 
by Baumgartner and Jones (2015).  
The first aspect is the diversity of stakeholders providing information based on a count 
of distinct stakeholders participating.  
As an alternative measure, I use the count of distinct types of stakeholders. Justices can 
infer how different segments of the population are likely to be affected based on the type of 
stakeholders participating in a case. Stakeholders that have the resources to petition the court 
and submit amicus briefs can be expected to have an advantage. The diversity of types of 
stakeholders represented may be important given that legitimacy is central for the Supreme 
Court (Murphy, 1964). Therefore, minorities’ interests should have as much weight as the 
participants endowed with large resources and power (as detailed in Chapter 2). Therefore, I 
conduct robustness checks on the count of distinct types of stakeholders. For the types of 
stakeholders, I use a slightly modified version of the classification proposed by Collins (2007, 
2004) that includes nine categories (Table 10). Black and Boyd (2012) choose this scale over 
others to examine the role of litigant status on certiorari decisions. They point out that this 
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scale’s key improvement over previous scales (e.g. Mcguire, 1995; Sheehan et al., 1992) is that 
it accounts for interest groups and governmental actors. Individuals involved in cases are 
inventors, lawyers, or academics. Among businesses, I distinguish big businesses from 
businesses of other sizes: big businesses are large national or international corporations “that 
presumably have greater litigation and financial resources than smaller ‘mom and pop’ 
businesses” (Farole, 1999). For firms, I use computerized matching with information from 
Compustat and from the website referenceUSA.com. The remaining missing information is 
assigned manually based on company website information and the description of amici 
mandatory in all amicus briefs. I use the definition of small and medium enterprises provided 
by the Small Business Administration (SBA) of 500 employees and USD7 million in revenue.50 
Similarly, among interest groups, I distinguish associations that represent the interests of big 
businesses from other associations. I use this categorization as an alternative measure that 
captures the diversity of types of stakeholders on a scale of 1 to 9. 
Second, I examine the effect of the diversity of arguments that were made using a proxy 
based on the citations made in briefs and opinions. Two types of citations are used as a proxy 
for arguments. Legal arguments are proxied by all references to legal precedents made by 
District Courts, the CAFC, or the Supreme Court. Expert arguments are all references citing 
documents published by experts, which include academic publications and reports by interest 
groups (non-profits or non-governmental organizations, excluding associations of 
businesses).51 Given that this variable concerns diversity, I pool the two types and use the total 
count of arguments as the measure.    
 
50 This criterion is only used in a handful of ambiguous cases. Almost all of the businesses are 
either large corporations with a national or international market or very small firms founded 
by a patent-holding inventor. 
51 The list excludes governmental reports, public and private entities’ reports, news articles, 
congressional hearings, briefs filed in prior legal cases, and statistics such as company 
financials or USPTO statistics. References to “rules” are also excluded (US Code, Federal 
regulation, Acts adopted by Congress, executive orders, manual for USPTO examiners, etc.). 
 124 
Expert information is examined in two ways. The first measure is the participation of 
experts. Experts include stakeholders identified as academics (individual scholars or 
universities) or interest groups (non-profits or non-governmental organizations, excluding 
associations of businesses). While some governmental organizations have high levels of 
expertise (e.g. USPTO, ITC), I do not consider them as experts to use a conservative measure 
of expert information restricted to policy-relevant information excluding legal and procedural 
concerns (e.g. manuals for drug evaluation by the FDA, manuals of patent examining procedure 
by the USPTO). An improved empirical contribution can be made by examining expertise with 
more precision by manually distinguishing between different kinds of publications produced 
by a given entity. This remains out of the scope of this thesis. The second measure involves the 
policy arguments based on expertise (henceforth simply referred to as “policy arguments”), 
proxied by citations of documents produced by experts: academics or interest groups (non-
profit organizations, excluding associations of firms).  
 
A key aspect to control for in both phases of the policy process is the difference in resources 
available to stakeholders to enhance their ability to influence policymakers. I consider resources 
as a latent variable for which the observable aspect is lobbying in the other branches of 
government. I use the amount of money spent in lobbying by stakeholders during the three 
years preceding a decision as a measure. As a robustness check, I use an alternative measure 
based on the cumulative count of lobbying actions undertaken. The operationalization based on 
lobbying the elected branches of government provides the advantage of capturing the potential 
influence of the other branches of government on the judicial branch. However, the lobbying 
data is left truncated, and values for the years 2000, 2001, and 2002 are assigned based on those 
of 2003.  
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Because of this limitation, I conduct robustness checks using an alternative measure. 
The legal literature refers to “haves” and the “have nots”; in this setting, the “haves” can be 
operationalized as stakeholders that are big businesses, associations of big businesses, and 
governmental organizations. This is a pragmatic solution even though it is “weakened at times 
by arbitrariness and overgeneralization” (Wheeler et al., 1987).   
 
 
Table 10. Stakeholder categories  
Stakeholder (litigant or 
amici) status 
Detail and example Expert Haves 
Individual academic Law, business, economics, and intellectual property professors Yes No 
Individual other  Inventor, lawyer No No 
Academic organizations Universities or university-related Yes No 
Businesses 
Presidio Components Inc., local 
manufacturer of ceramic capacitors in 
San Diego, less than 200 employees 
No No 
Associations of businesses 
National association of chain drug 
stores, National small business 
association 
No No 
Big businesses Apple, Monsanto, General Motors No Yes 
Associations of big businesses 
CTIA – the Wireless Association, the 
Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America 
No Yes 
Interest groups Public Knowledge, the Public Patent Foundation  Yes Yes 
Governmental organization 
The United States, the US Department 
of Justice, the International Trade 
Commission 
No Yes 
Other Mostly individuals who are lawyers or inventors No No 
 
 
4.4 Case Study of Agenda Setting 
This section relies on the case study of a policy topic for which litigants of a set of patent-
related cases at the CAFC have petitioned the Supreme Court. I isolate a list of federal-level 
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patent cases that focused on the same aspect of patents, used as a proxy of a policy topic to test 
the effect of the diversity of stakeholders (H1) and the influence of expert information (H3a 
and H3b) in the agenda setting phase. Additionally, I provide information about the use of 
expert information to examine the implicit intuition of Baumgartner and Jones (2015) that 
expert information does not matter in the agenda setting phase. To provide empirical evidence, 
I examine the difference 1) between cases that petitioned the court compared to those that did 
not; and 2) between cases that have been granted a certiorari and those that were denied a 
review. 
 An additional objective of this section is to provide an empirical understanding of the 
kinds of patent-related cases that are on the agenda of the Supreme Court. This provides 
information regarding the selection bias that affects the policymaking phase examined in the 
following section, which uses a sample of cases that were granted review by the Supreme Court. 
4.4.1 Data  
I obtain court documents from Westlaw that includes all patent infringement cases (section 
“1862 Injunctions” in the West Key number System in Westlaw) appealed at the CAFC, in 
which the question treated by the court concerned the conditions under which an injunction 
should be granted, restricting the data set to 37 cases using the keyword “injunction” over the 
period 2000-2012. The period of study starts in 2000 since the US Supreme Court became a 
central policymaking actor from the 2000s (Holbrook, 2013). Ideally, the period would extend 
as much as possible. To limit data collection costs, I examine a symmetrical window of 6 years 
before and after the most important ruling on this policy topic, which is the eBay v. 
MercExchange case of 2006 (Seaman, 2015).   
I exclude one case in which the question concerns whether a subject matter is patentable 
or not (Patent Act section 101). The final sample includes 36 cases (listed in appendix H) for 
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which the District Court decision was appealed at the CAFC over 2000-2012. Among those 
cases, 14 petitioned the Supreme Court and 2 of the petitions were granted.  
 The two cases that were granted a review on the Supreme Court’s agenda were the eBay 
v. MercExchange case of 2006 (547 U.S. 388, henceforth referred to as the “eBay case”) and 
the Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership of 2010 (564 U.S. 91, henceforth referred to as 
the “Microsoft case”). 
I argue that both cases led to decisions that can be considered as patent policy, in which 
the status quo was changed in the eBay case and strengthened in the Microsoft case. I examine 
the number of articles that reference these cases in the “Business & Industry News” section of 
LexisNexis from the year following each of the two decisions until now. For the eBay case, 15 
articles were written in 2007 and the number of articles per year consistently increased to reach 
35 in 2018. The eBay case is referred to by some legal scholars as “one of the most important 
patent law rulings of the past decade” (Seaman, 2015). In 2011, 94 articles were written about 
the Microsoft case. This number then decreased overall with some variation between 3 and 12 
articles per year until 2018. In comparison, among the 14 cases that petitioned the Supreme 
Court, the number of articles between the year following the decision by the CAFC and 2018, 
the cases were 21 and 9 for two of the cases over the entire period, and all others were mentioned 
between 0 and 5 times. Within this policy topic, the two cases reviewed by the Supreme Court 
resulted in the adoption of a policy that was noticed by industry.  
 For the 14 cases that petitioned the Supreme Court, I collect parties’ briefs and amicus 
briefs, a total of 68 documents. By scraping regular patterns corresponding to legal precedent 
citations and citations of publications produced by experts using R, I collect information about 
the legal arguments and policy arguments made by stakeholders on both sides of the 14 cases. 
As a frame of reference, in the final opinions for the two cases reviewed, the Supreme Court 
made 12 legal arguments and no policy argument in the eBay case and 43 legal arguments and 
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two policy arguments in the Microsoft case. For all cases, including the 22 cases that did not 
petition the Supreme Court, I use company websites to collect information about the status of 
petitioner(s) and respondent(s).  
4.4.2 Approach 
The empirical analysis of the role of entropic information and expert information in the agenda 
setting phase is based on a case study. Among a group of legal cases that appealed at the CAFC 
within the same policy topic, I examine which cases petitioned the Supreme Court and which 
cases were granted certiorari.  
The unit of analysis is a CAFC case. In addition to being a case study, the number of 
cases in the data set does not allow a proper statistical analysis. Thus, this empirical examination 
of the agenda setting phase cannot yield strong causal claims. Nevertheless, the key variables 
of interest presented in section 4.3.2 guide the analysis. I rely on descriptive evidence as 
indicators of potential causal effects to discuss the role of stakeholders and information in the 
US Supreme Court’s agenda setting. The objective is to provide an in-depth understanding of 
one particular case (a policy topic) for future studies to extend the examination to multiple 
groups of cases to make conclusions based on more developed quantitative analyses. 
 
In examining the effect of stakeholder participation and arguments in court on agenda setting, 
several alternative explanations have to be considered based on the literature.  
Conflict is identified as an important predictor of grants of certiorari in Rule 10 
(Supreme Court of the United States, 2017) and legal scholars have shown empirical evidence 
of its effect on agenda setting in the Supreme Court (Ulmer, 1984). This is measured as a 
dummy variable that captures whether the CAFC reversed the decision of the District Court 
specifically on the question(s) in the petition of the Supreme Court. 
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Public saliency of the topic. In the judicial branch of government, like the two other 
branches, Justices are not isolated from the world and Larsen (2012) finds that they “reach 
beyond the four corners of the parties' briefing when they think the parties have not done 
enough.” Today, information is crowding out our attention with the Internet and Larsen (2012) 
finds that it is more and more commonly used by the Justices as a way to gather facts. Over this 
period of study, a growing concern regarding the use of injunctions in patent infringement 
litigation has created a shift in attitude from the view of patent holders as entities defending 
their property to doubting their good faith. A narrative developed regarding “patent trolls” 
identified as non-practicing entities that do not produce social welfare by having invested in the 
R&D of the patented technology nor commercialized it. They are viewed as entities that sue 
other actors in the market to extract settlement money from legitimate actors, who are under 
“holdup” and unable to produce and commercialize technologies. I examine the number of 
Google searches of the keywords representing the key arguments related to this concern: “patent 
troll” in all categories and “holdup” restricted to the business & industrial category. The 
objective is to control for influence unrelated to briefs filed during the legal procedure.  
4.4.3 Findings 
4.4.3.1 Among CAFC cases: Petition v. no petition 
Before examining the difference between cases in which certiorari was granted and those that 
were denied certiorari, I examine the differences between cases that petitioned the Supreme 
Court and those that did not, among all cases reviewed at the CAFC. 
 For the 14 cases in which petitioners attempted to obtain access to the Supreme Court’s 
agenda, I use the briefs filed to petition the Court to identify the petitioners and the respondents. 
For the 22 other cases that did not petition the Supreme Court, I artificially assign the role of 
“would-be petitioner(s)” to the party that lost at the CAFC simply based on the ruling and 
“would-be respondent(s)” to the opposing party. This solution is flawed because losing in the 
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CAFC ruling is a poor predictor of being a petitioner at the Supreme Court. For example, a 
patent holder can win a patent infringement suit but disagree on the penalty imposed on the 
infringer. In that case, the party that won at the CAFC would be the petitioner. Therefore, this 
exercise is conducted to compare the cases, but has limitations. 
 Seventy-eight litigants were involved in the 36 cases decided at the CAFC; some cases 
had several petitioners or respondents.52 The data shows that there is no clear difference in the 
type of litigants involved in cases with and without a petition to the Supreme Court.  
In the 14 cases that resulted in a petition to the Supreme Court, the petitioners were big 
businesses in 10 cases, individual inventors in 2 cases, and small businesses in 3 cases.53 
Among the 22 cases that did not petition the Supreme Court, the would-be petitioners were big 
businesses in 14 cases, an association of big businesses in one case, and small businesses in 5 
cases.  
 Respondents in cases that involved a petition were big businesses in 9 cases, an 
association of big businesses in one case, an individual inventor in one case, and small 
businesses in 3 cases. Would-be respondents were big businesses in 13 cases, an association of 
big businesses in one case, individual inventors in 2 cases, and small businesses in 6 cases.  
The distribution across technology fields54 for cases with and without a petition to the 
Supreme Court is also relatively similar. Almost all the cases had petitioners and respondents 
in the same technological field. Over half the litigants were in industries related to information 
technology. The second most-represented area is the health sector with pharmaceutical firms, 
 
52 Firms that belong to the same corporation are counted as one litigant.  
53 The total exceeds 14 because some cases involve different types of petitioners. 
54 Technology fields are assigned based on company websites and Bloomberg. The categories 
used are broad (IT, finance, pharmaceuticals, medical technology, biotechnology, oil and gas, 
food and beverage, electrical devices, consumer services, automobile, IT services and 
processes, software, non-practicing entity, and machinery) because several stakeholders are 
diversified corporations. When diversification spans multiple technological fields, the field 
closest to the technological area of the patent(s) in question in the case was assigned based on 
the description of the patent(s) in court briefs.  
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biotech firms, and companies manufacturing medical technologies. Among all the cases, only 
the eBay case involved a litigant that was a non-practicing entity that would fit the description 
of a patent troll. Among cases that did not petition the Supreme Court, two cases belonged to 
technology fields not mentioned above: oil and gas and food and beverages. 
In terms of conflict, there was also no clear difference between the two groups of cases. 
Among the 14 cases that petitioned the Supreme Court, 4 exhibited a conflict between the 
CAFC and the District Court on the question presented to the Supreme Court. Among cases 
that did not petition the Supreme Court, it is not possible to know which part of the CAFC 
decisions they would have petitioned the Supreme Court for, and, therefore, whether there was 
a conflict. However, among these 22 cases, in 5 cases the CAFC aligned entirely with the 
District Court’s ruling; in 6 cases the CAFC affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the 
District Court’s ruling; in 9 cases it affirmed in part-reversed in part; and in 2 instances the 
District Court’s decision was reversed.  
4.4.3.2 Among petitioning cases: Granted v. not granted 
Among the 14 cases that petitioned the Supreme Court,55 2 were granted certiorari while 12 
were not added to the Supreme Court’s agenda. The key difference that stands out between the 
groups is the number of amicus briefs filed. This is consistent with results found by prior studies 
(Caldeira and Wright, 1988; Chien, 2010). 
 In the eBay case, in addition to the 2 petitioners and 1 respondent, 6 amicus briefs in 
total were filed (5 on the petitioners’ side, 1 on the respondent’s side) by 46 amici to petition 
the Supreme Court. On the petitioner’s side, including litigants, advocates were 35 scholars, 7 
firms (big businesses), 4 associations of big businesses, and 2 interest groups. On the 
respondent’s side, 3 large firms argued in favor of not placing this case on the Supreme Court’s 
agenda.  
 
55 Listed in Appendix A 
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 In the Microsoft case, there were a total of 67 stakeholders including litigants. Eleven 
amicus briefs were filed by 65 amici, and all were on the petitioners’ side. Advocates including 
the litigants were 36 scholars, 21 big businesses, 4 associations of big businesses, 1 small 
business, and 3 interest groups that advocated in favor of placing this case on the Supreme 
Court’s agenda.  
 None of the 12 cases that were not accepted on the agenda had amicus briefs filed by 
respondents. However, 7 cases had amicus briefs on the petitioner’s side. The largest number 
of amicus briefs was 4 in Baxter International Inc. v. Frenesius Inc.56 filed by one big business 
and 3 associations of big businesses. The second largest was Jazz Corporation and Dynatec 
International Inc. v. Fuji Photo Film Co. and the International Trade Commission,57 which had 
3 amicus briefs filed respectively by the US Department of Justice in favor of neither party, an 
association representing small businesses, and a big business. The third was Corevalve Inc. v. 
Edwards Lifesciences v. Streck, Inc.58 in which two amicus briefs were filed by two interest 
groups. Two other cases had one amicus brief filed respectively by an interest group59 and 2 
associations of big businesses.60 
 The key differences in terms of stakeholders participating in cases that were granted 
certiorari is the large number of amici advocating in the petition phase (Table 11). In addition, 
the eBay case was the only case that had amicus briefs on both sides. Otherwise, both groups 
of cases were similar as the majority of stakeholders were big business and some of the amici 
were interest groups.  
In terms of the number of types of entities (on a scale of 1 to 9), I find no difference in 
terms of litigants. The two cases that were accepted on the Supreme Court agenda involved two 
 
56 docket number 13-1071 
57 docket number 01-1158 
58 docket number 12-1325 
59 McFarling v. Monsanto, docket number 04-31 
60 ePlus Inc. v. Lawson Software Inc., docket number 15-639 
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types of litigants, while among the cases that were rejected one case involved 3 types, 7 cases 
involved 2 types, and 5 cases involved only one type of litigant. However, when considering 
all stakeholders, including amici, the eBay case and the Microsoft case both involved 
stakeholders of 5 different types. Among rejected cases, 1 rejected case increases its number of 
types from 3 to 4 types and 4 rejected cases increase from 1 to 2 types when accounting for 
amici. All others involved only one type of stakeholder. 
Diversity of stakeholders is positively associated with being on the agenda of the 
Supreme Court, both in terms of the number of stakeholders and the number of types of 
stakeholders represented by the participants (H1).  
In terms of the arguments (both legal and expert) made by stakeholders in the petition 
phase, for all the 68 briefs filed in the 14 cases that petitioned the Supreme Court, on average 
18.6 legal arguments were made by brief, and the count varied between 0 (for two briefs only) 
and 56. On average, briefs filed in cases that were rejected by the Supreme Court made about 
16.8 legal arguments, while briefs in the eBay case and the Microsoft case made 20.8 and 23.8 
legal arguments on average, respectively. In absolute terms, a total of 212 and 430 arguments 
were made in the eBay case and in the Microsoft case, respectively. In rejected cases, the 
maximum number of arguments was 134 and the average maximum across cases was 57. Grants 
for review by the Supreme Court are associated with a higher diversity of arguments; therefore, 
H2a is not supported by the data. However, H2a cannot be refuted with confidence using this 
data set. The effect of diversity of argument cannot be detangled from the effect of diversity of 
stakeholders because most cases that did not read the agenda had no amicus briefs. As a result, 
I am not able to test the counterfactual: whether a case with a low diversity of stakeholders but 
high diversity of arguments can win. 
A possible reason for this result is that, as documented by Epstein and Knight (1998), 
Justices are likely to anticipate unwanted outcomes in the merits phase when they make 
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certiorari decisions. In the following section on the policymaking phase (section 4.5), I find 
that the position supported by a higher diversity of arguments is more likely to win (H2b). This 
prediction is not verified because, as shown by studies on the Justices’ strategic decision-
making (Brenner and Krol, 1989; Caldeira et al., 1999; Epstein and Knight, 1998), even if the 
two phases of the policy process are separated in comparison to other policy settings, they are 
not hermetic from each other.   
 
 




case 14 cases denied petition 
   Mean Min Max 
Amicus briefs 6 11 0.9 0 (for 12 of them) 4 
Diversity of stakeholders 
(entities) 49 67 0.8 0 (for 7 of them) 4 
Diversity of  
stakeholders (types) 5 5 1.5 1 (for 6 of them) 3 
Diversity of arguments 212 430 57.3 6 134 
Legal arguments 187 334 53.7 6 123 




In terms of policy arguments based on citations of publications produced by experts, the average 
across all briefs in all 14 cases is 4.5, varying between 0 (for 35 briefs) and 23. On average, 
briefs in cases that were rejected by the Supreme Court made 2.8 policy arguments, while briefs 
in the eBay case and the Microsoft case made 5.9 and 9.0 policy arguments, respectively. A 
total of 53 and 126 policy arguments were made in the eBay case and the Microsoft case, 
respectively. On the other hand, for cases rejected from the Supreme Court’s agenda, the 
maximum count is 31, and the average maximum across cases is 9.  The data suggests that the 
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quantity of expert information used to support arguments made is positively associated to 
getting on the Supreme Court’s agenda.  
In terms of expertise based on stakeholder type, the two cases on the agenda are also 
the only ones with stakeholders from academia. Interest groups were also participants as amici 
in the two cases on the agenda and in one case that was denied a review. As a result, the eBay 
case and the Microsoft case involved 37 and 39 experts, respectively (Table 12), while all of 
the other cases involved zero experts, with the exception of the one rejected case in which 
interest groups participated as amici.  
Both the difference in the number of policy arguments and in the number of expert 
stakeholders suggests that expertise is positively associated with being on the Supreme Court’s 
agenda. A remarkable point in the data is that the majority of policy arguments are not made 
by experts; the great majority are cited by private actors, particularly big businesses. Based on 
this result, with two cases on the agenda with both expert information and expert advocates and 
14 cases rejected from the agenda with significantly expert information and no expert advocated 
(Table 12), it is not possible to conclude whether the enlightenment hypothesis (H3a) or the 
legitimation hypothesis (H3b) better explain the role of expertise.   
 
 




case 14 cases denied petition 
   Mean Min Max 
Policy arguments 25 96 4.6 0 22 





4.4.4 Discussion for the agenda setting phase 
The key result of the case study on the agenda setting phase is that the diversity of stakeholders 
positively influences agenda setting in the judicial branch of government (H1), consistent with 
the legal literature that finds that amici participation contributes to being granted certiorari 
(Black and Boyd, 2012; Caldeira and Wright, 1990; Chien, 2010; Songer and Kuersten, 1995). 
Baumgartner and Jones (2015) view the diversity of stakeholders as important sources of 
diverse information and as quality control of information provided by other stakeholders. 
However, based on both the legal literature and the results that show no distinction between 
types of amici or arguments (legal v. expert), this factor seems to be a proxy of the importance 
of the policy problem. 
The approach used to obtain empirical evidence on the agenda setting phase presents 
some limitations. First, it is a case study based on one policy topic. In addition, while the data 
set includes the entire population of cases in this policy topic at the Supreme Court, the sample 
size does not allow strong causal claims. Second, the sample of cases is collected based on the 
date of the decision of the CAFC. Using dates of petitions at the Supreme Court is not possible 
since part of the analysis aims to examine potential differences between cases that led to a 
petition and those that did not. In addition, this choice uses a point in time at which the litigants 
have obtained the ruling for their last recourse and the decision to petition the Supreme Court 
can be made. A drawback from using this date for data collection is that the time petitioners 
take between the CAFC decision and the petition to the Supreme Court varies. Interpretations 
of this lag are lacking in the literature to the best of my knowledge and data that can be used to 
examine the reasons for delaying a petition are not easily accessible. Third, Supreme Court 
Justices are not isolated policymakers. They may be influenced by the saliency of an issue in 
their certiorari decision. To control for a change in the saliency of the topic (Larsen, 2012) 
examined in the case study, which may have influenced the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the 
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eBay case and the Microsoft case, I conducted a Google keyword search of the words “patent 
troll” and of “holdup” within the Business & Industry category. Figure 6 represents the number 
of searches scaled to values between 0 and 100 based on the maximum count of searches in the 
period 2004-2012. The eBay case was granted certiorari on November 28, 2005 and the 
Microsoft case was granted certiorari on November 29, 2010. This is a simplistic verification 
based on noisy information. Nevertheless, I do not find a clear correlation between the saliency 
of the policy topic and the timing of the grants of certiorari. 
 
 
Figure 6 Google keyword search  
Source: Google 
4.5 Longitudinal Analysis of Patent Policymaking 
This section provides an empirical analysis of the role of information in the policymaking phase. 
In this phase, the policymaker (US Supreme Court) decides on the cases that are on its agenda 
by selecting a winning side and a losing side. Stakeholders argue by providing both legal and 

















































































































































arguments influence policy decisions, and whether the effect is due to learning from the content 
or to the legitimacy that expertise provides. 
 
4.5.1 Data 
I use the entire population of patent-related US Supreme Court cases decided over the period 
2000-2015. I collect all the parties’ briefs, amicus briefs, and opinions of the Court for the 31 
cases (listed in Appendix B). By scraping the 885 briefs submitted by stakeholders (litigants 
and amici), I construct a data set that contains information on the outcome of the cases and the 
participation of 1,156 unique stakeholders, leading to a total of 2,549 participation observations.   
 For the 517 stakeholders that are firms, characteristics are obtained from Compustat, 
the reference website USA.com, company website information, and the description of amici in 
amicus briefs. In addition, names of the stakeholders are matched against the Senate Office of 
Public Record (SOPR) over the period 2000-2015 to collect information for the number of 
lobbying actions undertaken by the stakeholders in Congress and the amounts spent in lobbying.  
 Using court documents, I classify each of the 31 cases into corresponding aspects of 
strength: 1) patentable subject matter, 2) breadth of interpretation of claims, 3) ability to exclude, 
and 4) administrative and other. Given that some concepts in the different aspects of strength 
overlap, some cases are assigned more than one category. Categorizing the cases allows for a 
consideration of stable policy topics on decisions made over time.   
Using the 31 opinions written by the Supreme Court to deliver their final ruling and the 
briefs filed by stakeholders, I scrape legal precedent citations and citations of publications 
produced by experts to respectively proxy the legal arguments and policy arguments that were 
made by stakeholders and policymakers. I make inferences about the influence of stakeholders 
on final decisions based on the overlap on the two kinds of arguments. As discussed in the 
limitations section, however, there are alternative explanations to this correlation that threaten 
the robustness of the causal claims made in this study.  
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4.5.2 Approach 
To examine the effect of variables related to the concept of entropic information, diversity 
within a coalition, defined as a group of stakeholders advocating for the same outcome, is 
central. Therefore, I use a case-side as the unit of analysis. In other words, for each of the 31 
patent-related Supreme Court cases, I have two observations: the petitioner(s) side and the 
respondent(s) side. Given that I am interested in understanding the relationship between the 
diversity of information and success in influencing the policy adopted in the policymaking 
phase, I reassign the two sides for each case into the winning side and the losing side based on 
the ruling on the case.  
As a result, I use a data set with 62 observations to analyze the relationship between 
diversity in stakeholders and diversity in arguments with success in the policy outcome. I 
conduct a comparison between the winning and losing side. Given the size of the data set, 
statistical inferences are limited.  
Another limitation in this study is that it may ignore policy decisions that were 
implemented by rejecting a case in the agenda setting phase. Nevertheless, if the decision is 
sufficiently important (Rule 10), the Supreme Court can perform “aggressive grants” by 
reviewing a case even when they approve of the lower court’s ruling in order to affirm it and 
make this decision uniformly across lower courts (Cameron et al., 2000). Therefore, in this 
discussion, I make two assumptions. First, I assume that a case being placed on the Supreme 
Court’s agenda is indicative that an important policy change is at stake. Second, the incentive 
to try to influence the Justices is not limited to the petitioners. Stakeholders on the respondents’ 
side are also actively trying to influence a policy decision in both phases of the policy process.  
To examine the effect of expert information and expert participation on the policy 
outcome, I structure the data set in a different manner. The focus is on tracking the influence of 
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stakeholder behavior and the information they provide. Therefore, the analysis is conducted on 
a disaggregated version of the data with stakeholder-year as the unit of analysis.  
4.5.3 Descriptive statistics  
4.5.3.1 Setting 
The Supreme Court ruled over 31 patent-related cases over 2000-2015, of which 4 were under 
the Rehnquist Court and 27 under the Roberts Court. Twenty-one of the cases were 
unanimously decided. Among the 10 non-unanimous cases, one Justice dissented alone in 3 
cases, two Justices dissented in 5 cases, and three Justices dissented in 2 cases. This is consistent 
with the claim that patent cases have remained a relatively non-partisan topic over the period 
of study (Sag et al., 2009). Therefore, whether they are influenced by information provided by 
stakeholders remains an open question.  
 Among the 31 cases, the patent holder is the petitioner in 7 cases and the respondent in 
24 cases. The winner was holding the patent in question in 12 of these cases (Table 13). Among 
the 20 cases won by the petitioners, 4 of them were patent holders. Among the 11 cases won 
by respondents, 8 were won by respondents that were patent holders. There does not seem to 
be any systematic preference of the court in favor or against patent holders.  
 The three policy “topics” determined by the three aspects of patent strength are non-
exhaustive and non-exclusive (Table 13). Among the 7 cases on patentability,61 3 cases made 
changes strengthening that aspect of patent strength. In 3 cases, the question tackled concerned 
the breath of patents and two of them strengthened this aspect. Lastly, among the 22 cases 




61 Subject matter involved were plants, software, business methods, medical tests, genes, 
processes, and one case tackled the obviousness criterion. 
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Table 13 Supreme Court patent-related cases 
 Number of cases Percentage of cases (out of 31) 
Petitioner held patent 7 22.5 
Respondent held patent 24 77.4 
Petitioner won 20 64.5 
Respondent won 11 35.5 
Petitioner who held patent won 4 NA 
Respondent who held patent won 8 NA 
Patent topic   
Patentability 7 NA 
Breadth 3 NA 




The average number of parties involved is 4.0, with 1.6 on the winning side and 2.3 on the 
losing side (Table 14). In addition to the petitioner(s) and respondent(s) briefs, on average, 23.7 
amicus briefs are submitted by 77.3 stakeholders. The number of amicus briefs on the winning 
side was 10.3 on average as opposed to 9.0 on the losing side. The number of stakeholders was 
also slightly higher on the winning side with 37.8 stakeholders against 30.8 on the losing side 
on average.  
The total of 2,549 stakeholder-year observations is not evenly distributed over time. The 
number of stakeholders trying to influence the court increased overall over the period between 
2000 and 2015 (Figure 7). The proportion of participations (stakeholder-year) by entity type is 
the following: 27.5% were individuals who were academics, 6.1% were academic institutions 
(e.g. universities), 4.8% were NGOs (non-profit organization other than firm associations), 19.8% 
were small businesses, 6.9% were associations representing the interests of small businesses, 
23.3% were big businesses, 2.0% were associations representing the interests of big businesses, 
and 6.1% were governmental organizations. The remaining stakeholders were essentially 
individuals who were not academics (e.g. inventors or law practitioners) and law firms. 
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At the case level, 27.6 experts participated on average. Among those experts, 22.6 were 
scholars, 5.1 were universities, and 3.9 were interest groups. The average number of policy 
arguments made in a case by any type of stakeholder was 53.1. 
Among all the 1,156 unique stakeholders, 54 had lobbied at least once during the period 
of observation. The number of lobbying actions in Congress among these 54 entities was 5 on 
average and the maximum was 35 for the company Red Hat Inc. The average amount spent on 
lobbying was USD1.5 million and the maximum was USD41.3 million by the US Chamber of 
Commerce. The great majority of lobbing actions occur between 2006 and 2010. This mitigates 








For each case, the Supreme Court delivers its decision in an opinion justifying the final ruling, 
often relying on legal precedents and research-based references. The number of legal arguments 













































average 10.3 and varied between 0 and 22 (Table 14). There is no clear temporal trend in the 
quantity of arguments made; the number of legal precedents referenced seems to be specific to 
each case. 
The number of legal precedents cited by each participation (stakeholder-year 
considering both parties and amici as stakeholders) also does not present a clear trend over time. 
On average, stakeholders made 22.3 legal arguments and 9.2 policy arguments.   
 
Table 14 Stakeholder participation by case 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Party 31 3.96 3.72 2 21 
Amicus briefs 31 23.71 18.11 0 75 
Amici 31 77.29 68.47 0 257 
Stakeholders 31 81.26 69.15 3 260 
Experts 31 27.58 31.77 0 144 
      
Legal arguments by all briefs (unique)  31 287.64 139.32 110 741 
Policy arguments by all briefs (unique) 31 53.06 45.51 0 180 
Arguments by all briefs (unique) 31 340.71 167.39 110 884 
      
Legal arguments in opinion 31 20.19 10.81 5 48 
overlapping with briefs 31 13.74 7.34 3 31 
Policy arguments in opinion 31 4.32 8.73 1 50 
overlapping with briefs 31 0.19 0.65 0 3 
Arguments in opinion 31 24.52 17.12 6 98 
overlapping with briefs 31 13.93 7.69 3 33 
Note: For each case, unique cases cited in briefs by all stakeholders (aggregated as a group) are 
counted for each type of argument.  
 
 
Table 15 Arguments by participation (stakeholder-year level)  
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Arguments 2,549 31.55 21.82 0 145 
overlapping with opinion 2,549 6.71 3.76 0 23 
Legal arguments 2,549 22.30 16.12 0 133 
overlapping with opinion 2,549 5.51 3.26 0 22 
Policy arguments 2,549 9.25 12.82 0 52 
overlapping with opinion 2,549 1.20 0.85 0 16 
Note: For each type of argument, count of unique citations by each participation. 
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4.5.3.2 Key variables of interest 
The two outcomes of interest in this study are which side wins a case and who influences the 
language of the policymaker’s decision. There is a winning side and a losing side in each case, 
and the findings section examines the factors associated with each side. In terms of overlap 
between policymakers’ and stakeholders’ arguments, from the point of view of a stakeholder 
as the unit of analysis, the number of arguments that overlap with the opinion of the cases in 
which a stakeholder participated was on average 5.5 legal arguments, and 1.2 policy arguments 
(Table 15). On the other hand, from the point of view of a case as the unit of analysis (Table 
14), on average, 12.7 of the legal arguments made in opinions overlapped with the legal 
arguments made by stakeholders and 0.2 policy arguments overlapped with those of 
stakeholders. 
 
The key explanatory variables in this study are two diversity measures related to the notion of 
entropic information and two aspects of expertise. First, in relation to the notion of entropy of 
information, the data allows variation across cases based on the data set using the case as the 
unit of analysis (Table 16). The diversity of stakeholders is on average 81.2 when it is measured 
by a count of distinct stakeholders that participate in a case. The average is 6.6 when it is 
measured by types of stakeholders.  
The diversity of arguments is 340.7 on average, measured as the count of unique 
arguments made by all stakeholders in a case (Table 16, same as in Table 15). The count of 
arguments is the sum of legal arguments, proxied by legal precedents cited, and policy 
arguments, proxied by the number of citation of publications produced by experts.62  The 
diversity of legal arguments only is 287.6 on average by case.  
 
62 Academics and interest groups excluding firm associations as detailed in section 4.3.2.2 
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Table 16 Diversity of information at the case level 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Diversity of stakeholders (entities) 31 81.26 69.15 3 260 
Diversity of stakeholders (types) 31 6.58 1.84 1 8 
Diversity of legal arguments 31 287.64 139.32 110 741 
Diversity of policy arguments 31 53.06 45.51 0 180 




At a participation level, experts represent 33.5% of all participations. On average, a 
participation by any type of stakeholder involves 2.4 policy arguments. The use of expert 
arguments is lower for experts who make an average of 1.8 policy arguments by participation. 
In comparison, non-experts make 2.7 policy arguments. The difference in the number of legal 
arguments and total arguments between the two groups suggests that experts seem to make 
fewer arguments in their briefs in general. This indicates that experts’ briefs tend to be more 
narrowly written. This may be because experts such as academics tie the briefs to their own 
work. This behavior can also indicate a strategy to focus the Court’s attention on fewer 
arguments.   
 
Table 17 Expert information at the participation level 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Experts 2,549 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Policy arguments 2,549 2.41 4.94 0 36 
by experts 855 1.84 3.70 0 36 
by non-experts 1,696 2.70 5.44 0 31 
Legal arguments 2,549 21.91 15.94 0 132 
by experts 855 18.71 11.07 0 55 
by non-experts 1,696 23.52 17.68 0 132 
Arguments  2,549 24.32 17.23 0 133 
by experts 855 20.55 10.89 2 61 







4.5.4.1 Unit of analysis: case level  
The outcome from the point of view of participating stakeholders is for their side to win. 
However, from the court’s point of view, there is always one side that wins and another that 
loses. Therefore, to understand what influences the Supreme Court in choosing which side wins, 
I am interested in differences in the diversity of participants and arguments between the winning 
side in comparison with the losing side.  
The data at the case level includes 62 observations because for the purpose of this 
analysis, I consider each side of the 31 Supreme Court cases as units of analysis. This is 
insufficient for conducting a meaningful statistical analysis. Therefore, this section analyzes the 
effect of the diversity of stakeholders and diversity of arguments based on correlations and 
discusses potential implication for causal relations.  
The winning side has a higher diversity of stakeholders advocating than the losing side, 
both in absolute number of stakeholders and in the number of types represented (Table 18). 
However, the difference is not significant. The winning side has 39.4 stakeholders on average, 
while the losing side has 33.2. In terms of the type of participants, the winning side has 6.2 
types of participants while the losing side has 5.8 on average. These results are consistent with 
the focus on the role of diversity of stakeholders in the agenda setting phase verified by a test 
of H1 based by Baumgartner and Jones (2015). The findings do not support a significant effect 
of diversity of stakeholders in the policymaking phase.   
For the diversity of arguments, the stakeholders on the winning side make 310.0 
arguments on average, which is statistically larger than that of the losing side, which makes 
214.6 arguments (Table 18). This result supports H2b: the position supported by a higher 
diversity of argument is more likely to win in the policymaking phase.  
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It is worth noting that the result is driven by legal arguments, and the difference is 
actually the opposite for policy arguments. In terms of legal arguments, the winning side makes 
287.6 legal arguments and the losing side makes 182.7, by a statistically significant difference. 
On the other hand, the winning side makes 22.5 policy arguments, a number that is statistically 
smaller than the 31.9 policy arguments made by the losing side. I examine the difference in 
arguments (total and each type) used in the 10 cases in which the winning side made more 
policy arguments. I find no significant difference in citation patterns with cases in which the 
winning side made fewer policy arguments. This observation supports the view that the type of 
argument made does not matter compared to the diversity of arguments, all types confounded.  
 
 
Table 18 Difference in diversity of information between the winning side and the losing 
side (N = 31 on each side)  
 Obs. Diff = losing side – winning side t-stat p-value  
Diversity of stakeholders 62 -6.19 -0.626 0.267 (Diff < 0) 
Diversity of types of stakeholders 62 -0.35 -0.560 0.289 (Diff < 0) 
Diversity of arguments 62 -95.42** -2.709 0.004 (Diff < 0) 
Diversity of legal arguments 62 -104.97*** -3.296 0.001 (Diff < 0) 
Diversity of policy arguments 62 9.55* 1.408 0.082 (Diff > 0) 
 
 Winning Side  Losing Side 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
95% confidence 






stakeholders 39.42 7.88 23.66 55.18  33.22 5.98 21.26 45.19 
D. of types of 
stakeholders 6.16 0.44 5.27 7.05  5.81 0.45 4.90 6.71 
D. of arg. 310.03 148.52 255.55 364.51  214.61 128.11 167.62 261.60 
D. of legal 
arguments 287.64 139.32 236.54 338.75  182.68 109.71 142.43 222.92 
D. of policy 







4.5.4.2 Unit of analysis: participation level  
 
To examine the relationship between stakeholders’ use of expert information and decisions in 
the policymaking phase, I estimate its effect using two measures for the outcome using the 
panel data set at the participation level. The binary variable captures being on the winning side, 
and the count variable captures arguments made by a stakeholder that overlaps with the 
arguments in the opinion.  
 I use two measures of expert information. First, I use the binary variable of being an 
expert. Second, I use the count of policy arguments made, which relies on citations of 
documents that have been produced by experts.  
 In the main models, I control for the logged count of total legal arguments made by the 
court, as a proxy for the weight of past decisions. I also control for being part of the “haves” 
using the logarithm of the amount spent in lobbying in the three years prior to the action of the 
stakeholder in court. This measure is preferred over the binary measure based on stakeholder 
type to avoid multicollinearity issues with the expert variable.  
 A correlation check shows that being an expert is correlated in a positive and significant 
way with both being on the winning side and providing arguments that overlap with those used 
by the courts in their opinion. On the other hand, providing policy arguments has a positive and 










Table 19 Correlation matrix (N = 2,549 at stakeholder-year level) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Winning 1 1.0000      
# Argument in opinion 2 0.1376* 1.0000     
# Policy arguments (logged) 3 0.0280 0.0152 1.0000    
Expert stakeholder 4 0.1208* 0.1001* -0.0822* 1.0000   
Lobbying amount 3 year (logged) 5 0.0143 0.0036 0.0019 -0.0802* 1.0000  
Weight of past decisions 6 0.0129 0.4552* 0.0540* 0.0539* 0.0143 1.0000 




The results suggest that being an expert is positively related with both outcomes in the 
policymaking phase (Table 20). On the other hand, using expert arguments is not significantly 
associated with either outcome (Table 21).  
 The results are driven by the citing behavior of the two types of stakeholders. As noted 
previously in section 4.5.3.2, experts tend to make significantly fewer citations for both legal 
and policy arguments. Since experts are often associated with the winning side (Table 20), 
fewer citations of expert information is associated with a lower likelihood to succeed in the 
policymaking process. Therefore, the relationship between expert information and the success 
of Supreme Court cases should be examined with a distinction between the two groups and 
controlling for citing behavior.  
 First, noting that a majority of stakeholders, among both experts and non-experts, do 
not use expert information in their briefs, I examine the differential effect between the two 
groups, using expert information as a dummy that does not account for the number of arguments 
made.  
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I test the difference between the marginal effects of using expert information between 
the two groups. First, I find that when neither experts nor non-experts use expert content in their 
arguments, experts are significantly more likely to be on the winning side and significantly 
more likely to have overlapping arguments with the opinion compared to non-experts (Figure 
8). This result strengthens the previous finding in Table 20 that showed that experts’ status is 
associated with being influential on policy outcomes, whereas using expert content to support 
arguments is not. Second, I find that by using expert information, the difference in the 
probability of experts and non-expert of being on the winning side is not significantly different 
from zero (Figure 9). On the other hand, experts remain significantly more likely to have 
overlapping arguments with the opinion compared to non-experts, regardless of whether both 
groups use expert information.  
 
 
Table 20 Experts and Policymaking 
 Winning Arg. in opinion 
 Logit Poisson 
 (1) (2) 
Expert 0.569*** 0.137*** 
 (0.162) (0.029) 
Weight of past decisions 0.016 0.558*** 
 (0.101) (0.020) 
Haves -0.064 -0.000 
 (0.065) (0.012) 
Constant 0.031 -0.229*** 
 (0.315) (0.063) 
Cst. alpha  -2.310*** 
  (0.100) 
   
Obs. 2,549 2,549 
Entity ID  1,155 1,155 
Log-likelihood -1647.5536   -5916.6057 
Wald chi2 (3) 13.71  842.22 
Prob > chi2 0.0033 0.0000 







Table 21 Expert information and Policymaking 
 Winning Arg. in opinion 
 Logit Poisson 
 (1) (2) 
Expert argument 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.002) 
Weight of past decisions 0.032 0.563*** 
 (0.101) (0.020) 
Haves -0.075 -0.003 
 (0.066) (0.012) 
Constant 0.007 -0.192*** 
 (0.011) (0.063) 
Cst. alpha  -2.272*** 
  (0.099) 
   
Obs. 2,549 2,549 
Entity ID  1,155 1,155 
Log-likelihood -1653.2847 -5915.9537 
Wald chi2 (3) 2.44 840.18 
Prob > chi2 0.4868 0.0000 












Figure 9 Use of expert information (binary) and policy language (count- arguments) 
 
 
Results presented up to this point suggest that the legitimacy hypothesis (H3b) is better able to 
explain the role of expertise in the policymaking phase than the enlightenment hypothesis (H3a). 
I conduct a further examination of the difference in the use of expert information 
between experts and non-experts by reiterating the test with a count variable instead of the 
binary variable. Accounting for the variation in the number of expert arguments made in briefs 
(Figure 10), I find that non-experts can close the gap with experts in terms of both the 
probability of being on the winning side and of having overlapping arguments with the opinion 
by making a large enough number of expert arguments. The threshold is about 12 expert 
arguments for the probability of being on the winning side and about 14 expert arguments to 





Figure 10 Use of expert information (count) and Policymaking 
 
 
Empirical findings suggest that being an expert is positively associated with success in the 
policymaking phase (Table 19 and Figure 8) and that expert information does not have a 
significant effect in itself (Table 18 and Figure 8). These results support the conclusion that the 
legitimacy hypothesis (H3b) is better able to explain the role of expertise in the policymaking 
phase than the enlightenment hypothesis (H3a). Additional findings show that nevertheless, 
non-experts can use arguments supported by expert content to reduce the difference with 
experts in how they affect both the ruling and the language of the decision (Figure 9). This 
result does not definitively support either hypotheses because this effect could be either due to 
the need for an accumulation of evidence to “enlighten” the policymaker, or to the increased 
legitimacy provided for stakeholders from using expert evidence. 
 
4.5.5 Discussion for the policymaking phase 
The key findings of the analysis of the policy making phase are the following. First, 
stakeholders who provide diverse arguments are more likely to win in the policymaking phase 
(H2b). Baumgartner and Jones (2015) focus on the role of diverse information to order chaotic 
information environments based on policy settings with a larger set of problems than the courts 
usually deal with. As a result, they overlook the explanation supported by this result: 
policymakers are likely to value the use of a variety of arguments to support their decision. 
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Another key result of this section is that the legitimacy hypothesis (H3b) is better able to explain 
the role of expertise in the policymaking phase than the enlightenment hypothesis (H3a). This 
finding provides more nuance in the role of expert information, which is viewed by 
Baumgartner and Jones (2015) as a way to enlighten policymakers in their decision-making.  
To test the robustness of the results, I control for the potential effects that are specific 
to policy topics. Second, I control for the type of stakeholder, and I alter to model to only use 
the count of policy arguments as a measure of expert information to avoid collinearity issues 
because the binary variable expert is constructed based on stakeholder type. Third, I control for 
year fixed effects to account for saliency, which is meant to capture other streams of information 
that could affect how policymakers frame problems and solutions independently of the 
information given by stakeholders.  
To account for as much of the information available to the Supreme Court when the 
decision is made as possible, I include both briefs in the certiorari and in the merits phase for 
the analysis of decisions in the merits phase. Future work based on this thesis will test the 
robustness of the results by limiting the data set to briefs that are only on the merits. Also, the 
analysis can be made more precise by distinguishing all arguments made by lower courts from 
the arguments made by stakeholders to remove information that the Supreme Court already 
possesses about a case. Additional nuance can be introduced on the timing of information 
supplied by differentiating between arguments used by lower courts, new arguments in the 
petition phase by stakeholders, and new arguments in the merits phase.  
Effects due to the “haves” status could also be controlled by accounting for stakeholders’ 
prior participation. Future work on this topic can control for the role of lawyers using 
information about their lobbying experience gathered from www. lobbyist info.  
One limitation of this study is that it considers the Supreme Court as an aggregate 
decision-maker. Future work on this topic may conduct a similar analysis using a multinomial 
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logistic regression using Justices’ votes as an outcome. Such an approach would allow 
empirical tests to be conducted by examining one or more Justices, often referred to as the 
“swing vote,” whose vote is not predicted by party affiliation. As a result, this method would 
allow the findings of this dissertation to be tested on topics beyond patent issues, even if 
partisanship is involved in decision-making to some extent.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter provide new insights regarding the role of diverse information and 
deep information (expertise) in both phases of the policy process. The diversity of stakeholders 
positively influences agenda setting in the judicial branch of government (H1). This result is 
consistent with empirical findings in the legal literature that show that the participation of amici 
is a key factor in being granted certiorari (Black and Boyd, 2012; Caldeira and Wright, 1990; 
Chien, 2010; Songer and Kuersten, 1995). This effect is true regardless of the side that is being 
supported (Shapiro, 1984). Based on this literature and the results, in the agenda setting phase 
of the judicial branch of government, the diversity of stakeholders is viewed as an indicator of 
the importance of a policy problem, which is different from the reason presented by 
Baumgartner and Jones (2015): desirability as sources of diverse information and as controllers 
of the quality of information provided by other stakeholders. In the policymaking phase, 
consistent with H1, the empirical evidence cannot reject the prediction that the diversity of 
stakeholders does not influence the ruling in the merits phase of the Supreme Court. This 
finding shows that the role of diversity of information differs in the judicial branch of 
government compared to the argument by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) based on the elected 
branches of government.   
 Contrary to the prediction that the diversity of arguments is not influential in the agenda 
setting phase in the judicial branch of government (H2a), I find that briefs in cases that were 
granted certiorari presented a wider variety of arguments than those that did not. There is a 
 156 
high probability that this is due to the limitations of the data. While this limitation should be 
kept in mind, the finding is consistent with the fact that Justices are sophisticated, strategic 
actors who try to anticipate outcomes in the policymaking phase when they make decisions in 
the agenda setting phase (Brenner and Krol, 1989; Caldeira et al., 1999; Epstein and Knight, 
1998). I find that stakeholders who provide diverse arguments are more likely to win in the 
policymaking phase (H2b). This outcome in the policymaking phase could be anticipated by 
the Justices when they make decisions in the agenda setting phase. As a result, the anticipation 
of the policymaking phase outcome could affect the results for H2a. Nevertheless, the finding 
(H2b) suggests that diversity of information also plays a role in policymaking when it comes to 
the judicial branch of government. This is explained by the fact that Justices are likely to value 
the ability to use a variety of arguments to support their decision. This explanation differs from 
the argument presented by Baumgartner and Jones (2015) based on other policy settings: 
diversity of information helps to order a chaotic information environment. 
 This study examines two rival hypotheses on the role of expertise in the two phases of 
the policy process. Stakeholders can exhibit expertise through their identity (academics, interest 
groups) or by presenting arguments that rely on expert information. I find that the expertise of 
the source of the information has a significant positive relation with a case accessing the agenda 
and a side winning on the merits phase. In addition, I find that the amount of expert information 
as content in the briefs is associated with cases accessing the agenda of the Supreme Court. 
However, it is also collinear with having experts as advocates. Therefore, the case study used 
in this chapter is not sufficient to make claims regarding a causal effect. In the policymaking 
phase, experts are positively associated with success, while the use of expert information is not. 
Success is measured in two ways: as being on the winning side of a case and as having 
overlapping arguments with the final decision. This suggests that the legitimacy hypothesis 
(H3b) is a better able to explain the role of expertise in the policymaking phase than the 
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enlightenment hypothesis (H3a). This conclusion differs from the view that expert information 
is valuable in helping policymakers design better policies (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015), 
which is close to the enlightenment hypothesis. However, I also find that expert information 
used by non-experts can reduce the gap with experts in terms of the probability of success on 
these two measures of outcome. Therefore, the role of expertise as content used to enlighten 
policymakers cannot be entirely ruled out (H3a). 
 The conclusions from this chapter have important policy implications. First, the study 
improves our understanding of how information can be used in court, for cases beyond patent 
cases. The generalizability of the findings is bounded by the extent to which stakeholders can 
influence the courts. Depending on the situation, the applicability of the results may be limited 
to a swing Justices, for example. Second, the insights from this chapter are also applicable to 
other policy settings. Depending on the organizational structure of the policymaking apparatus, 
there will be differences in resources allocated to collecting and processing information and in 
the size of the set of problems and solutions policymakers handle. Therefore, the applicability 
of results on the diversity of information should be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis. 
On the other hand, the findings on the use of expertise by policymakers are directly applicable 
to all elected policymakers who need legitimacy. 
 158 
5 CHAPTER 5 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Overall, this dissertation studies the co-construction of patent policy and stakeholders’ strategy 
in the courts. The research questions tackle fundamental issues in the economics of innovation 
and in policy process theory. The dissertation relies on several methodological improvements 
to support the theoretical contributions with empirical evidence. Both have academic, policy, 
and managerial implications in improving our understanding of how patent policy shapes 
stakeholders’ innovation strategy and how stakeholders’ strategy in turn shapes policy.  
This dissertation begins by reviewing the literature from a set of disciplines on the role 
of different types of information (policy process literature), the decision-making process in the 
Supreme Court (legal and political science literature), and the impact of patent policy on 
innovation (economics of innovation literature). This dissertation makes the following 
contributions to fill gaps in the literature that have developed as these streams of research have 
evolved separately. In addition, the findings have implication for managers and policymakers.  
 The first contribution of this dissertation addresses a fundamental research question in 
the economics of innovation literature: the long-debated relationship between patent strength 
and innovation. To confront the numerous theories in the existing literature predicting changes 
in firm strategy leading to both increases and decreases in innovation, a mixed-methods 
approach is used by combining interviews and an analysis of court documents with quantitative 
estimations of the impact using a panel data set of patent and firm data to examine the 
mechanisms behind patent policymaking and firm strategy. Using an exogenous shock and a 
novel methodological approach, I provide empirical evidence that a decrease in patents’ ability 
to exclude (one aspect of patent strength) can lead to more investments in innovation and a 
reduction in patenting. The uniform rate observed across firm types is explained by different 
underlying mechanisms contingent on industry and resources. Unsurprisingly, stakeholders 
who argued in favor of the policy that was eventually adopted increased their investments in 
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innovative activities. The more remarkable finding is that stakeholders who sided against the 
policy adopted also increase their R&D investments, even though they argued that the resulting 
decrease in patent strength would reduce their incentive to invest in innovation. The data 
suggests that the lower ability to exclude using patents may force firms to shift the composition 
of their innovative activities in order to adapt to a disadvantageous change in their institutional 
environment rather than to abandon the use of innovation as a source of competitive advantage. 
This result has two implications. First, the behavior of stakeholders on the losing side of the 
eBay case shows that, in the current knowledge-based economy, innovation is an indispensable 
source of competitive advantage for many firms. Therefore, stakeholders have high stakes 
attached to patent policy and have incentives to attempt to shape patent policy to their advantage. 
This indicates that patent policymakers make decisions that impact large firms’ investments 
and cannot be abandoned to compete in our knowledge-based economy. Second, patent policy 
shapes stakeholders’ innovation strategies and the impact of patent policy is heterogeneous and 
contingent on the type of stakeholder. Therefore, when policymakers like the Supreme Court 
make decisions that alter the patent system, they are in effect creating winners and losers who 
belong to different technological areas and have different levels of resources. Therefore, a key 
implication for policymakers from all three branches of government is that they should 
acknowledge that patent policy is a form of industrial policy that impacts essential factors of 
competitive advantage when they are evaluating policy alternatives to choose from.  
 This dissertation provides empirical insights regarding the functioning of policy process 
for patents. Such insights are valuable for firms that rely on innovation and patents. In addition, 
policymakers involved in various parts of the patent system can also benefit from a better 
understanding of how the Supreme Court, an actor that has become central in patent policy 
relatively recently, makes decisions and the roles stakeholders play in the process. To facilitate 
the understanding of patent policymaking in the Supreme Court, I present key facts and existing 
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academic findings about the Supreme Court as a policymaking entity in general and for patent 
policy in the form of a primer.  
  The primer reveals characteristics about the policy process in the judicial branch of 
government that differ from policy settings traditionally tackled by the policy process literature 
focused almost exclusively on the elected branches of government, the states, or local 
governments. The difference in organizational structure as well as the constraints and incentives 
under which policymakers build their agenda and choose between policy alternatives motivates 
a test of existing insights from the policy process literature in which courts are absent.  
 Baumgartner and Jones (2015) present a theory of the role of two types of information 
in different phases of the policy process based on policy settings in the other branches of the 
government. Information as diversity is expected to help considering a broad view of the world 
to select problems on which to focus in the agenda setting phase. On the other hand, expertise 
is expected to help find the best policy solution to solve those problems in the policymaking 
phase. A theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to propose a theory of the policy process 
in the judicial branch of government, building on predictions made by Baumgartner and Jones 
(2015) in light of 1) the legal and political science literature on the role of stakeholders and 
information in Supreme Court and 2) the policy learning and organizational theory literature on 
the strategic use of information. An empirical contribution of this dissertation is to test those 
predictions using a research design and data that solve for traditional empirical challenges 
related to identification and measurement faced by studies examining the relationship between 
stakeholders and policymakers, including Baumgartner and Jones (2015). I use all US Supreme 
Court patent cases over the period from 2000 to 2015 as the empirical setting to provide an 
understanding of the effect of the participation of stakeholders (as parties in a case, amici, or 
through lobbying) on the decisions that change patent strength.  
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Some findings considering the judicial branch of government are similar to predictions 
made for the elected branches of government: information as diversity and expertise are 
influential in the agenda setting phase and the policy making phase, respectively. However, 
their role is not restricted exclusively to one of the phases. I also find dissimilarities: the 
diversity of arguments by stakeholders is associated with winning in the policymaking phase 
and expertise matters in both phases of the policy process. In addition, I find some nuance in 
the role of expertise. I find that expertise is not principally used as content to an argumentation 
meant to convince policymakers. The stronger importance of the expert status of stakeholders 
over arguments that rely on expert knowledge shows that expertise is mainly used to legitimize 
a position in the policymaking phase (and evidence is not conclusive for the agenda setting 
phase). I argue that these results are due to differences in the organizational structure, 
constraints, and incentives in the Supreme Court compared to the elected branches of 
government. These findings provide information on the behavior of stakeholders to 
policymakers and inform stakeholders about the type of information the Supreme Court 
considers in different phases when making policy.  
A disheartening result from this dissertation is that expertise is employed more for its status 
than for the actual content it provides in policymaking. These findings alert scholars and science, 
technology, and innovation (STI) policymakers about the limited usage of expertise, which is 
often produced with public funds. In order for academic research to bring more significant and 
meaningful social and economic returns, a system should be developed that can incentivize 
policymakers to learn from expertise.  
 162 
APPENDIX 
A. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 2006 
Concretely, the case starts from a failure to reach a licensing agreement on three patents owned 
by MercExchange and results into a lawsuit against eBay and two other online commerce firms. 
The question of injunction concerned the patent referred to as the “265 patent” (patent number 
5,845,265) that protects a system for selling goods through an “electronic network of 
consignment stores”. The U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia found that the 
265 patent is valid, and eBay is infringing it, and therefore granted MercExchange $16 million 
in damages. However, the District Court denied MercExchange’s request for permanent 
injunction on the grounds that: 1) discussions regarding licensing prior to the trial show that 
MercExchange was willing to license and 2) MercExchange does not practice the patent and, 
therefore, the damage can be calculated by estimating the licensing fee due. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit reversed the injunction decision. It found that: 1) the 
excludability is inherently tied to the concept of property and 2) based on a comparison with 
exceptional cases in which injunctions have not been granted, the Court of Appeal declares that 
this case does not fit the description of an exceptional case.  
The Supreme Court ruled to overturn the decision of the C.A.F.C. and reject the request 
for permanent injunction. The final decision in favor of eBay means that injunctions are not 
automatic anymore in the case of a patent infringement from May 15th, 2006.  
The change brought by the Supreme Court is the application of Section 283 of the Patent 
Act stating that Courts “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to 
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems 
reasonable” by emphasizing more the proposition “in accordance with the principles of equity” 
whereas jurisprudence until then focused on “prevent[ing] the violation of any right secured by 
patent”. As a result, the principle of equity is applied by the Supreme Court as it is in other 
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areas of the law by granting injunction if the party seeking a permanent injunction demonstrates 
the following four factors: 1) The patent owner has suffered irreparable harm; 2) The remedies 
available at law (such as money damages) are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 3) The 
balance of hardships between the parties warrant a remedy in equity; and 4) The public interest 
would not be disserved by an injunction.  
In terms of enforcement of this policy change, according to Denicolò et al. (2008) and 
Poltorak and Lerner (2014), District Courts apply a simplified version of this four-factor test. 
The eBay case does not bring significant changes for: 1) an entity practicing the patent and 
competing with the infringer, 2) a research organization funded by royalties, 3) an entity in 
indirect competition with the infringer. This enforcement of the new rule seems to have the 
undesirable effect of favoring manufacturing licensee’s over firms “with other kinds of 
legitimate business models, such as innovators with limited or no presence in downstream 
markets”. Gupta and Kesan (2017) analyze patent disputes after the eBay case to find that 
permanent injunction grant rate dropped by 13% for non-practicing entities while it dropped by 
5% for practicing entities. They find that this drop for non-practicing entities is largely due to 
individual inventors while patent holding companies are not affected differently compared to 
practicing companies. However, they find that the rate at which injunctions are sought decreases 
by 52% for practicing companies and by 86% for non-practicing companies.  
B. Model selection – comparison with a count model approach 
I test the appropriateness of using the number of patents granted in the U.S. as the dependent 
variable. The variance of the number of patents granted in the U.S. is over 50 times larger than 
the mean so there is over-dispersion. As a result, the negative binomial estimation method is 
more appropriate than the Poisson estimation. In addition, the number of granted patent in the 
U.S. is likely to be equal to zero for a significant number of observations. Therefore, I test 
whether a zero-inflated model would be more appropriate. First, a comparison of the mean 
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observed, and predicted counts shows that the maximum difference in predicting value 1 is 
0.028 with a mean difference of 0.006 for the negative binomial estimation and the maximum 
difference is 0.061 with a mean difference of 0.012 for the zero-inflated negative binomial 
estimation. Based on this test, the negative binomial model is a better predictor. Second, using 
count-by-count information for counts from 0 to 9, based on the proportion of predictions based 
by the models for each value of the count variable I calculate the Pearson chi-square statistic63. 
Adding up the Pearson chi-square statistics for all counts for each of the models, I obtain 
475.398 for the negative binomial mode and 916.385 for the zero-inflated negative binomial 
model. This indicates that the predicted proportions were much closer to the actual proportions 
for the negative binomial model. However, based on a third test using the Bayesian information 
criterion, the Akaike information criterion and the Vuong statistics support the zero-inflated 
negative binomial model over the negative binomial model (BIC = -2.6*10^5 dif = 3732.300 
and AIC = 1.674 dif = 0.124 and Vuong = 27.504 prob = 0.000 p =0.000. strongly supports the 
zero-inflated negative binomial model). Overall, based on these three tests, I get inconsistent 
conclusions based on different criteria.  
Given this inconclusive result, I choose to estimate the effect of eBay using the negative 
binomial model for its better compatibility with panel data analysis. I include the logarithm of 
the number of patent applications in France and constrain its coefficient to 1. Based on the 
Hausman test, I find that the use of fixed effects is more appropriate than random effects (chi-
square(34) = 15,925; prob>chi2 = 0.0000) and year dummies are needed (chi-
square(13)=484.47; prob>chi2=0.000). In computing the estimation, the log-likelihood 
function of the model does not converge and remains at the same value from the 13th iteration. 
Therefore, I restrict the number of iterations to 20 arbitrarily and report results about the effect 
of the eBay case on patenting propensity that are only approximate.  
 
63 Pearson stat = number of observations * (absolute difference)²/ predicted for each of the counts. 
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Given the multiple issues related to the estimation using a negative binomial approach, 
I choose to report the main results using an Ordinary Least Square regression. Nevertheless, the 
count model shows consistent results in terms of direction and significance of the effects of the 
policy on the propensity to patent. In addition to those issues, to control for fixed effects, a 
Poisson model is more a more appropriate count model. Therefore, I also compute the results 
for this distribution controlling for fixed effect and find that the results are consistent. 
 
Table 22 Effect of the eBay case on firms’ propensity to patent – negative binomial 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Shock -0.0829*** -0.0779*** -0.0569*** 0.0514 -0.0239 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.051) (0.040) 
Complex  0.0431*   -0.0284 
  (0.026)   (0.047) 
Shock*Complex  -0.0304   0.0740 
  (0.033)   (0.065) 
Large&Complex   0.1528***   
   (0.029)   
Shock*  
Large&Complex   -0.1041***   
   (0.034)   
Large  0.2542***  0.3685*** 0.0883*** 
  (0.033)  (0.054) (0.011) 
Shock* Large    -0.2347*** 0.1233*** 
    (0.059) (0.036) 
R&D intensity 0.0220 0.0939*** 0.0993*** 0.1047*** 2.5939*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.068) 
Group  0.0900*** 0.1237*** 0.0935** 0.0954*** 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.044) (0.036) 
International 1.5835*** 2.2137*** 2.2211*** 2.0151*** 0.0883*** 
 (0.073) (0.055) (0.054) (0.085) (0.011) 
Competition -0.1526*** -0.0963*** -0.0777*** -0.0802*** 0.1233*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.036) 
Firm FE Yes No No No No 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 15.6342 14.8248*** 12.9673 14.8289*** 13.2526*** 
 (162.683) (0.132) (54.067) (0.238) (0.174) 
      
Observations 6,428 14,590 14,590 5,728 12,201 
# of firms 1,545 7,633 7,633 3,410 7,067 
Wald chi2 618.97 2472.69 2441.92 982.38 1936.21 
Log likelihood -4684.9407 -10710.588 -10727.75 -4426.4056 -7054.2246 
Prob > stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 





Table 23 Effect of the eBay case on firms’ propensity to patent – Poisson 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Shock -0.0829*** -0.0779*** -0.0569*** 0.0514 -0.0239 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.051) (0.040) 
Complex  0.0431*   -0.0284 
  (0.026)   (0.047) 
Shock*Complex  -0.0304   0.0740 
  (0.033)   (0.065) 
Large&Complex   0.1528***   
   (0.029)   
Shock*  
Large&Complex   -0.1041***   
   (0.034)   
Large  0.2542***  0.36849***  
  (0.033)  (0.054)  
Shock* Large    -0.23472***  
    (0.059)  
R&D intensity 0.0220 0.0939*** 0.0993*** 0.1047*** 0.0883*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) 
Group  0.0900*** 0.1237*** 0.0935** 0.1233*** 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.044) (0.036) 
International 1.5835*** 2.2137*** 2.2211*** 2.0151*** 2.5939*** 
 (0.073) (0.055) (0.054) (0.085) (0.068) 
Competition -0.1526*** -0.0963*** -0.0777*** -0.0802*** 0.0954*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.036) 
Firm FE Yes No No No No 
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant alpha  -1.9181*** -1.8810*** -1.7046*** -2.0943*** 
  (0.091) (0.091) (0.127) (0.141) 
Constant  -2.3223*** -2.3351*** -2.0463*** -2.4527*** 
  (0.097) (0.097) (0.200) (0.104) 
      
Observations 6,428 14,590 14,590 5,728 12,201 
# of firms 1,545 7,633 7,633 3,410 7,067 
Wald chi2 618.97 2472.69 2441.92 982.38 1936.21 
Log likelihood -4684.9408 -10710.595 -10727.75 -4426.4078 -7054.2262 
Prob > stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
C. Main models accounting for time trends 
To account for time trends, I use year dummies. As mentioned above, in this model, there can 
be concerns that the year dummies interact with the policy variable. Nevertheless, I observe 
that the result is consistent when attempting to capture for time trends. The size of the negative 
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effect is stronger, which is consistent with the observation that overall the average proportion 
of French patents also filed in the U.S. decreases.   
 
 
Table 24 Effect of the eBay case on firms’ propensity to patent with year dummies 
OLS  Patenting Propensity  R&D intensity  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Shock -0.0787*** -0.0811*** -0.0744*** 0.4245*** 0.2575*** 0.3135*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.090) (0.074) (0.071) 
Complex  -0.0085**   0.0116  
  (0.004)   (0.049)  
Shock*Complex  0.0144**   0.0509  
  (0.006)   (0.066)  
Large&Complex   0.0437***   0.1165** 
   (0.008)   (0.052) 
Shock*  
Large&Complex   -0.0230*   -0.1403** 
   (0.013)   (0.063) 
Large  0.0415***   0.1592***  
  (0.005)   (0.048)  
R&D intensity 0.0013 0.0208*** 0.0217***    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Group  -0.0021 -0.0001  0.5244*** 0.5283*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.022) (0.022) 
International 0.4609*** 0.5919*** 0.5976*** -0.0630 0.1908*** 0.2008*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.104) (0.052) (0.052) 
Competition -0.0057 0.0078* 0.0119*** 0.0133 0.1818** 0.1840** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.038) (0.085) (0.086) 
R&D intensity t-1    0.2497*** 0.527*** 0.1224*** 
    (0.034) (0.022) (0.030) 
Firm FE Yes No No Yes No No 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.1363*** 0.0945*** 0.0919*** 1.2705*** 0.3949*** 0.3986*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.090) (0.150) (0.149) 
       
Obs 23,132 23,132 23,132 3,991 3,991 3,991 
# firms 10,688 10,688 10,688 1,418 1,418 1,418 
R-squared 0.15014 0.3036 0.3015 0.5387 0.5947 0.5951 
Prob > stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 






D. French firms’ propensity to patent in South Korea, Taiwan and the United Kingdom 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Shock -0.0033** 0.0003 -0.0027*** -0.0016*** -0.0103*** -0.0127*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large&Complex  0.0020  0.0055***  -0.0153*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Shock*  
Large&Complex  -0.0052  -0.0065*** 
 
0.0009 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
R&D intensity 0.0005 0.0012** -0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 0.0036*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
International 0.0953*** 0.0023*** 0.0057** 0.0008 0.1446*** -0.0038** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) 
Competition 0.0025 0.1097*** 0.0001 0.0063** 0.0028 0.1512*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
       
Firm FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Constant 0.0029*** 0.0052 0.0044*** 0.0005 0.0105*** 0.0087** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
       
Observations 23,132 23,132 23,132 23,132 23,132 23,132 
R-squared 0.05106 0.0970 0.00089 0.0040 0.07015 0.0775 
# of firm 10,688 10,688 10,688 10,688 10,688 10,688 
Note: * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
E. The potential effect of the 2008 crisis 
I introduce a dummy equal to 1 from 2008 to account for the potential effect of the crisis. 
Because of collinearity issues, I remove the year dummies. The estimation results show that the 
direction and significant of the effect of the policy remain consistent. The size of the effect is 
diminished. However, given than both the policy dummy and the 2008 crisis dummy are equal 
to 1 over the period 2008-2010 with no way of distinguishing the effects, the size of the 
coefficients cannot be interpreted. Based on the weakly significant negative effect of the 2008 
crisis, the strong significance of the negative effect of the policy on patenting and the positive 
effect of the policy on R&D intensity, I can conclude that while the effect of the policy in the 
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main model might be smaller, this robustness check shows that the effect of the 2008 crisis does 
not change the conclusions of the study. 
 
Table 26 Effect of the eBay case on firms’ propensity to patent  
OLS  Patenting Propensity  R&D intensity  












 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.055) (0.057) (0.053) 
Complex  -0.00805**   0.01422  
  (0.004)   (0.049)  
Shock*Complex  0.01448**   0.05903  
  (0.006)   (0.066)  
Large&Complex   
0.04667**
*   0.12335** 
   (0.008)   (0.052) 
Shock*  
Large&Complex   -0.02487*   
-
0.13382** 
   (0.013)   (0.063) 
Large  0.04351***   
0.16156**
*  
  (0.005)   (0.048)  
Crisis (=1 from 
2008) -0.01105* -0.00449 -0.00481 0.03659 0.04164 0.04279 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) 
R&D intensity -0.00032 0.02004*** 
0.02105**
*    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    







  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.045) (0.045) 
International 0.44836*** 0.58213*** 
0.58793**
* -0.02078 0.17859** 0.17780** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.104) (0.084) (0.085) 
Competition 
-





 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) 





    (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) 
Firm FE Yes No No Yes No No 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 









 (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.070) (0.142) (0.141) 
       
Obs 23,132 23,132 23,132 3,991 3,991 3,991 
R-squared 0.13548 0.2937 0.2916 0.5569 0.5922 0.5924 
# firms 10,688 10,688 10,688 1,418 1,418 1,418 
Prob > stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
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F. Accounting for firm diversification 
Because firms can diversify in various technology area, the industry code may not be capturing the effect 
of the policy in complex product industries and discrete product industries with precision. The sample 
includes a significant number of large firms that are more prone to diversifying. Therefore, I isolate for 
each firm, the patents that are part of an undisputed complex product industry (electrical engineering) 
and patents that are part of undisputed discrete product industries (pharmaceuticals, chemicals and 
biotechnology) based on their International Patent Classification (IPC) codes. The results show that the 
effect of the policy is negative and significant in both types of industries, consistently with the main 
model.  
Table 27 Effect of the eBay case on firms’ propensity for their patents in complex 
product technology fields 
OLS  Patenting Propensity  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Shock -0.02049*** -0.04206*** -0.02237*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) 
Complex  -0.03758***  
  (0.006)  
Shock*Complex  0.02493**  
  (0.011)  
Large&Complex   0.04335*** 
   (0.008) 
Shock* Large&Complex   -0.02120 
   (0.014) 
Large  0.04055***  
  (0.007)  
R&D intensity 0.00508 0.02022*** 0.02102*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Group  -0.00071 0.00043 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
International 0.36468*** 0.49575*** 0.50803*** 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) 
Competition -0.02427*** 0.00028 0.00332 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
    
Firm FE Yes No No 
Industry FE No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.12634*** 0.11433*** 0.09146*** 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.018) 
    
Obs 12,927 12,927 12,927 
R-squared 0.1626 0.2067 0.2033 
# firms 6,427 6,427 6,427 
Prob > stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: * significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  
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G. Anticipation effect  
The law suit starts in 2002 and the first controversial decision to deny permanent injunction despite the 
infringement of a valid patent is made in 2003. To account for the possibility that market entities had 
perceived this case as having the potential to change the long-standing rule about excludability, I control 
for the anticipation effect or uncertainty regarding the decision between 2003 and the final decision in 
2006. I modify the policy dummy to be missing. The result of the estimation shows that the significance 
and direction of the effect of the policy on patenting propensity remains unchanged and is consistent the 
main findings of the study. 
 
 
Table 28 Effect of weakening patents on firms’ propensity to patent and R&D intensity 
accounting for potential anticipation effects 
OLS  Patenting Propensity  R&D intensity  














 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.061) (0.051) (0.044) 
Complex  -0.01124**   0.00260  
  (0.005)   (0.062)  
Shock*Complex  0.01662**   0.04553  
  (0.007)   (0.075)  
Large&Complex   
0.04543**
*   
0.17338**
* 
   (0.009)   (0.063) 
Shock*  




   (0.015)   (0.073) 
Large  0.04016***   
0.17458**
*  
  (0.006)   (0.051)  
R&D intensity -0.00119 0.02193*** 
0.02288**
*    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    





  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.046) (0.046) 
International 0.46093*** 0.59134*** 
0.59701**
* 0.01805 0.14786 0.15474 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.126) (0.098) (0.098) 





 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.046) (0.033) (0.032) 
R&D intensity t-1    0.25307** 0.55220** 0.55688**
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* * * 
    (0.037) (0.023) (0.023) 
Firm FE Yes No No Yes No No 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 




* 0.26397* 0.26178* 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.076) (0.145) (0.144) 
       
Obs 18,158 18,158 18,158 3,126 3,126 3,126 
# firms 0.2349 0.2900 0.2881 0.5217 0.5972 0.5971 
R-squared 9,286 9,286 9,286 1,269 1,269 1,269 
Prob > stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 




H. Agenda setting: cases that petitioned the Supreme Court in the Case Study (N=14) 
List of patent infringement cases (section “1862 Injunctions” in the West Key number System in 
Westlaw) appealed at the CAFC, in which the question treated by the court had to do with the conditions 
under which an injunction should be granted restricting the data set to 37 cases using the keyword 
















Table 29 List of patent infringement cases decided at the CAFC on conditions for 
granting an injunction 
Title Citation Date Document Preview 
MercExchange 
L.L.C. v. eBay Inc. 
401 F.3d 
1323 16-Mar-05 
PATENTS - Injunction. Generally applicable four-
factor test for permanent injunctive relief applies to 
disputes arising under Patent Act. 
i4i Ltd. Partnership 
v. Microsoft Corp. 
598 F.3d 
831 10-Mar-10 
PATENTS - Computers and Electronics. Sufficient 
evidence supported finding that patent relating to an 
invention for editing computer language was 
infringed. 
Fuji Photo Film Co., 




PATENTS - Consumer Goods. Only some imports of 
refurbished disposable cameras infringed patents. 





PATENTS - Injunction. District court's decision not 
to enter injunction for manufacturer's infringement of 
patent was abuse of discretion. 
Glenayre Electronics, 
Inc. v. Jackson 
443 F.3d 
851 11-Apr-06 
PATENTS - Damages. Patentee's acceptance of 
remitted damages award on direct infringement claim 
barred second trial on indirect infringement. 




PATENTS - Damages. Evidence supported $375,000 
damage award to owner of patents for herbicide-
resistant soybean seeds. 
Abbott Laboratories 
v. TorPharm, Inc. 
503 F.3d 
1372 11-Oct-07 
PATENTS - Injunction. Injunction did not bar filing 
of repetitive ANDA, precluding finding that 
manufacturer was in contempt. 




PATENTS - Injunction. Mandate rule did not 
preclude district court from reconsidering prospective 
application of permanent injunction on remand. 
Fresenius USA, Inc. 
v. Baxter Intern., Inc. 
582 F.3d 
1288 10-Sep-09 
PATENTS - Medical Devices and Procedures. 
Addition of a touch screen to a hemodialysis machine 
was obvious. 






PATENTS - Medical Devices and Procedures. 
Patents for hematology control technology provided 
adequate written description. 
Edwards Lifesciences 




PATENTS - Attorney Fees. Decision to not enhance 
damages or award attorney fees after verdict of 
willful infringement was not abuse of discretion. 




PATENTS - Computers and Electronics. System 
claims were invalid as indefinite even if 
implementing that functionality already was known 
prior to patent. 
Presidio Components, 





PATENTS - Injunction. District court clearly erred in 




Corp. v. TiVo, Inc. 
646 F.3d 
869 09-Sep-08   






Table 30 Stakeholders in patent infringement cases decided at the CAFC and petitioning 



















05-130 eBay 5 MercExchange 1 0 
10-290 MICROSOFT CORPORATION 11 
i4i Ltd. 






3 Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. And ITC 0 1 
05-924 MALLINCKRODT INC. and Nellcor Puritan Bennett, Inc. 0 Masimo Corp 0 0 





07-241 McFarling 1 Monsanto Corp 0 0 
07-912 APOTEX, INC. and Apotex Corporation 0 
Abbott 
Laboratories 0 0 




and Baxter Healthcare 
Corporation 




INC. and Techne 
Corporation 
0 Streck, Inc. 0 0 
12-1325 
EDWARDS 
LIFESCIENCES AG and 
Edwards Lifesciences LLC 
2 Corevalve 0 0 
15-639 EPLUS Inc. 1 Lawson Software, Inc. 0 0 







I. Policymaking: Patent-related Cases at the Supreme Court, 2000-2015  
 
Table 31 List of all patent-related Cases at the Supreme Court, 2000-2015 (N=31) 
Case 
number 
Title Year Patentability Breadth Exclusivity Other 
# Amicus 
briefs 
99-1996 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. 2001 0 0 0 0 13 
00-1543 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. 2002 1 1 1 0 40 
01-408 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. 2002 1 0 1 0 1 
03-1237 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. 2005 1 1 1 0 20 
05-130 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 2006 1 0 1 0 37 
04-1329 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. 2006 1 0 1 0 20 
04-1350 KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 2007 1 0 0 0 41 
05-608 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 2007 1 0 1 0 17 
05-1056 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. 2007 0 0 1 0 20 
06-937 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 2008 0 0 1 0 31 
07-1437 Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc. 2009 1 0 0 1 0 
08-964 Bilski v. Kappos 2010 0 0 0 0 75 
09-1159 
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford 
Junior University v. Roche Molecular 
Systems, Inc. 
2011 0 0 0 1 16 
10-6 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. 2011 0 0 1 0 14 
10-290 Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. Partnership 2011 0 0 1 0 62 
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10-844 Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S 2012 1 0 1 0 13 
10-1219 Kappos v. Hyatt 2012 1 0 0 1 6 
10-1150 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 2012 0 0 0 0 29 
12-398 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 2013 0 0 0 0 56 
11-796 Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 2013 0 0 1 0 23 
12-416 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc. 2013 1 0 1 0 27 
11-1118 Gunn v. Minton 2013 1 0 0 1 6 
13-298 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern. 2014 0 0 0 0 51 
12-1163 Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc. 2014 1 0 1 0 10 
12-786 Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. 2014 1 0 1 0 25 
12-1128 Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC 2014 0 0 1 0  
13-369 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 2014 0 0    
12-1184 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc. 
2014 0 0    
13-854 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc. 
2015 0 1    
13-896 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. 2015 0 0    
13-720 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC 2015 0 0    
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